

Selected papers presented at the

International Conference on Human Security and Peace in Central Asia

8-9 September 2005
Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan

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United Nations
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INTRODUCTION

In recent years, one more important term has entered the vocabulary – and hence the objectives – of the international community: ‘human security’. This has made noticeable correctives to discourses of security. Human security brings to the table many areas that have direct implications on the quality of human life and have not been looked at from this perspective. The realization of this need for a more broad-based view of security has been dictated above all by the actual transformations in the world, ironically best captured by one of the least precise terms – globalization.

Security in its conventional meaning of absence, or prevention, of armed violence, especially among states, while unfortunately still not obsolete, has become too narrow a reading to encompass the real range of human concerns. Openly violent threats to human life now include terrorism on a grand scale, exemplified by the horrors of New York, London, Beslan and Madrid, the growing spread and use of small arms by individuals and groups around the world, and numerous intra-state wars on various grounds. An even more deadly range of threats emanate from conditions of life that may not seem violent but nonetheless lead to deterioration of life, human suffering, and ultimately to open conflicts. They include extreme poverty, inequality, epidemics, deterioration of the environment and frequent natural disasters, clashes of cultural and religious values leading to violent intolerance. Add to this the ever-growing interconnectedness of the whole world, where a spark in one corner may easily cause an explosion in another, and we may only start imagining the complex security mosaic that the world faces today.¹

Since the end of the Cold War, the region of Central Asia – here defined not only as the five former Soviet Republics but also comprising Afghanistan, the Islamic Republic of Iran and Pakistan

1 Cf. Barry Buzan, ‘New patterns of global security in the twenty-first century’; in *International Affairs*, Vol. 67, No. 3, July 1991, pp. 431–51; Keith Krause and Michael C. Williams: ‘Broadening the agenda of security studies: politics and methods’, in: *Mershon International Studies Review*, Vol. 40, No. 2, October 1996, pp. 229–54.

– has become a new world arena of security concerns, from which such dangerous sparks may originate. The plentiful energy resources endowment, tourist potential and cultural attractions that the region may present to the outside world have been competing for world attention with, and occasionally losing to, religious militant extremism, drugs and human trafficking, extreme inequalities, and environmental hazards, among other problems. Both for its threats to security internally within the region, and externally to the rest of the world, it is extremely timely to study and discuss Central Asia, and to implement informed and concerted action to prevent or pre-empt the dangers and encourage safety and development.²

It is from this perspective – of countering threats and encouraging development in Central Asia – that UNESCO and the OSCE Academy in Bishkek (Kyrgyzstan) jointly organized an international conference on ‘Human Security and Peace in Central Asia’. On 8 and 9 September 2005, the conference brought together a distinguished group of academics, experts and professionals from various backgrounds for two days of insightful, productive discussions. Selected papers from the conference presentations are offered herewith for reading by the interested public.

It is no coincidence that UNESCO and the OSCE Academy, standing for the ideals and principles of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe itself, have organized this conference. Both organizations are dedicated to promoting international security and understanding through highlighting and developing the world’s diverse humanitarian and cultural values, and encouraging dialogues based on recognition, respect for diversity, and observance of human rights. Both of these institutions, in their particular philosophies, stand especially well for a distinguishing facet of the term ‘human security’.

In addition to the common negative meaning of security, that is, absence of threats and violence, human security emphasizes the

2 Cf. UNDP, Central Asia Human Development Report. Bringing down barriers: Regional cooperation for human development and human security, Bratislava, United Nations Development Programme, 2005.

positive side – development. To slightly change a formula coined by Amartya Sen, ‘security as development’ is an idea that lies at the heart of human security. Most of its concerns, from economic equality to environmental safety, to cultural recognition, to physical health, to education, and many more, are all remediable through overall development of quality of life; hardly any purely preventive measure may guarantee lasting safety in these areas.

The papers included in this publication reflect very well this developmental emphasis of human security. Bulat Khusainov and Serik Primbetov take on the economic dimension of security, one drawing attention to the worrying implications of economic transformations in the states of Central Asia, and the other highlighting the potential of regional economic integration for enhancement of security. On the example of Tajikistan, John Heathershaw recognizes the importance of contextual and cultural particularities in applying human security to various regions. The role of education in eradicating terrorism as a threat to human security is offered for consideration by Wayne Nelles, while Saodat Olimova presents the situation of Islam in Central Asia.

The world is transforming with great dynamism and Central Asia as a region is playing a major part in that process. Alas, this transformational dynamic is far from even, and far from being exclusively directed towards positive development, just like the unevenness of efforts to understand and curb growing inequalities. This conference and the present publication are small efforts conceived as a contribution towards an equitable and positive development track. The hope of UNESCO, the OSCE Academy and the contributors is that readers will find this volume of use in their own endeavours, scholarly or practical, towards understanding the variegated threats to, and enhancing the quality of, human life in Central Asia and the world.

HOW IS 'HUMAN SECURITY' PRACTISED IN CENTRAL ASIA? THE CASE OF TAJIKISTAN'S CONTENDING DISCOURSES OF PEACE

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INTRODUCTION

Defining human security is a challenge. Indeed the question of what is human security is not separable from the question of how 'human security' is practised. It is a 'travelling concept' and finds new meanings wherever it visits, in Central Asia as much as elsewhere. The immediate implication of this statement is that the search for a core definition of 'human security' may well be futile, and is at least of lesser importance than how security and peace are variously and discursively practised within the region. The question is of particular importance when one considers that the transformation of these practices is the object of the very idea of 'human security'. The case of post-conflict Tajikistan indicates that three distinct discourses of peace are present and interdependent: international, state and societal. If international interventions in the name of furthering individual rights, safety and welfare in Central Asia are unable to engage with and transform state and societal practices they will remain 'thin simplifications' of reality in the region.³ The interventions of the international community must seek a constructive and two-way relationship – both analytic/empathetic and normative/prescriptive – in order to understand what may reasonably be attained in terms of 'human security'.

The notion of 'human security' has given rise to a variety of interpretations. While 'the primary goal is the protection of individuals', it is acknowledged that 'consensus breaks down over precisely what threats individuals should be protected from.'⁴ Hampson has delineated three lines of conceptual progression: a rights-based

3 James C. Scott, *Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed*, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1998.

4 Human Security Report 2005, pre-publication version, Human Security Centre, University of British Columbia, p. viii (<http://www.humansecurityreport.info/> Accessed 9 November 2005).

version ‘anchored in the rule of law’; ‘a humanitarian conception of human security where the “safety of peoples” ... is the paramount objective; and finally, the ‘sustainable human development’ view.⁵ The sheer breadth of these lines of inquiry makes the task of the analyst who is concerned with its policy–practice all the more daunting. A reconsideration is required. One approach is to rationalize the concept down to a narrower basis which can then be widely accepted in the international community; some attempt has been made in this direction.⁶ However this approach runs the risks often associated when singular rational designs meet diverse empirical realities. A more fruitful alternative is to broaden our understanding of ‘human security’ further by considering how it has been practised within its various contexts.

This requires two steps, both of which elevate space as the key explanatory variable. Firstly, ‘human security’ must be placed among the ideologically saturated discourses of the development and conflict resolution community’s international context. It is appropriate to consider the genealogy of ‘human security’ – that is the variety of discourses that have preceded and proceeded in its development, from human rights to human development. One of these is the discourse surrounding the related concept of ‘peacebuilding’. The inaugural Human Security Report 2005 argues for the contribution of the international community – in particular conflict prevention and peacebuilding – to an improving human security environment.

Not one of the peacebuilding and conflict prevention programmes *on its own* had much of an impact on global security in this period. Taken together, however, their effect has been profound.⁷

Placing ‘human security’ alongside its discursive cousins immediately reveals both its liberal–democratic precepts and its location within the universities, peace institutes and policy–making establishments of the Western world. The above claim is a controversial

5 Fen Osler Hampson, *Madness in the Multitude: Human Security and World Disorder*, Oxford University Press, 2002, pp. 17–18.

6 See *ibid.*

7 Human Security Report 2005, *op. cit.*, p. 9.

one and while the authors may, in liberal internationalist terms,⁸ argue strongly in favour of a global-level correlation, the contribution of 'peacebuilding' and 'human security' also needs to be assessed in its various fields of play. Thus, secondly, any comprehensive reading of 'human security' in a particular context requires a consideration of the different discourses in play and the various voices at work in other contexts. Here the distinctions in academic and policy-orientated discourses between 'human security', 'peace' and 'human development' may be less relevant than the distinctions between international and local contexts. In our case, it is necessary to consider the ideologies and identities of Central Asia.

In this vein it is possible to go beyond 'peacebuilding' to delineate two further voices of 'peace' in the post-Soviet setting of Tajikistan. *Mirostroitelstvo* (Russian: peacebuilding) as an ideology of peace enforcement (competition, containment and eradication), has a particular salience among political elites in the former Soviet Union. Equally, *tinji* (Tajik: wellness/peacefulness) as an ideology of conflict avoidance and accommodation has a real resonance for a people scratching out a living in the aftermath of conflict. This context has determined the limits of the discourse of peacebuilding in Tajikistan and is the reason why peacebuilders have often failed to practise what they preach. More helpful analyses of conflict, and international order as a whole, are to be found amid the interactions of these discourses rather than through one particular ideological perspective. Together the interaction of discourses means that post-conflict Tajikistan has proceeded not towards democracy, a new authoritarian order or an apolitical society – but has elements of all three. However, amid this strange hybrid, international actors have found occasional spaces for genuine advancements in the well-being of individuals.

In Section 1 the paper looks at the discourse of peacebuilding, mapping the post-Cold War and neoliberal context that created a discourse of conflict resolution as democratization. Section 2 outlines the case of Tajikistan, showing how it fails to abide by the analytical

8 For a critique of peacebuilding's ideology of liberal internationalism see Roland Paris, 'Peacebuilding and the limits of liberal internationalism', *International Security*, Vol. 22, No. 2, 1997, pp. 54–89.

framework and normative principles of peacebuilding. Based on fieldwork conducted in 2005, the paper then goes to the alternative analytical and normative models found in the Tajik case. Section 3 provides a thumbnail sketch of the discourse of *mirostraitelstvo*, a regionalized discourse based in the ideological context of former-Soviet states, and represented by the notions of *avtoritet* and *stabilnost* (authority and stability). Section 4 looks at the localized practical discourse (or ethos) of *tinji* as a discourse of harmony that attempts to depoliticize the Tajik social setting and avoid or accommodate future conflict. The paper concludes with some cautionary words for the idealists and ideologues of ‘human security’.

1 **Peacebuilding and the international community: conflict transformation**

The international community’s peacebuilding discourse: origins and context

Developing in tandem with George W. Bush’s hopes for a ‘new world order’ and with Boutros Boutros-Ghali’s aspirations to a stronger role for the United Nations, peacebuilding found its first expression in the latter’s *Agenda for Peace* in 1992. Much has been written about the sense of optimism engendered by the end of the Cold War and its universally accepted ‘positives’: arms limitation and reduction agreements; the reunification of Germany; the emergence of democratic governments in many countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union; and the end of apartheid in South Africa. Furthermore, the UN Security Council-sanctioned war against Iraq of 1991 seemed to suggest that a new era of compromise between members of a genuinely global ‘international community’ may be possible for the first time in history.

Relying on a particular, ideologically motivated reading of these events, the burgeoning optimism of the post-Cold War period was the defining force of the birth of the concept of peacebuilding. In the preface to *Agenda for Peace*, Boutros-Ghali spoke of, ‘an opportunity has been regained to achieve the great objectives of the [UN] Charter – a United Nations capable of maintaining international peace and

security.’ A new parlance soon emerged to offer hope of a practical expression for this new-found enthusiasm and optimism. Along with concepts of preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peacekeeping, and peace enforcement, was the idea of post-conflict peacebuilding. This involved:

action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict.

The UN Secretary-General suggested a wide range of ‘post-conflict peacebuilding’ tasks including ‘disarming the previously warring parties and the restoration of order, the custody and possible destruction of weapons, repatriating refugees, advisory and training support for security personnel, monitoring elections, advancing efforts to protect human rights, reforming or strengthening governmental institutions, and promoting formal and informal processes of political participation.’⁹

From the outset, peacebuilding has been reinterpreted through its application in the war zones of the world. The discourse of peacebuilding was much utilized in the many UN peace operations of the early post-Cold War years. Despite unprecedented strong mandates and high hopes, substantial difficulties were encountered in fields as varied as Bosnia, Cambodia and Rwanda. However, Somalia perhaps provided the most high-profile failure for the new agenda. The United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) had a received a revised and robust mandate in 1992 involving *inter alia* peacebuilding, ambitiously defined as ‘creating a Somali state based on democratic governance’. However, security quickly became the paramount issue for the mission. Under Operation Restore Hope, the US-led United Nations International Taskforce (UNITAF) was charged with peace enforcement. It soon identified the priority of subduing warlords, in particular targeting Mohammed Farah Aidid. After eighteen US soldiers and an unknown number of Somali fighters were killed in the 1993 raid against Aidid, the Clinton administration eventually withdrew and placed strict limits on such multilateral intervention

9 Boutros Boutros-Ghali, *An Agenda for Peace*, New York, United Nations, 1992.

with Presidential Decision Directive 25. This led to the withdrawal of the United States from the position of security guarantor and the eventual expiration of UNOSOM II.

A wide range of explanations for the UN's difficulties were articulated. For some, including Virginia Luling, UNOSOM's was a problem of management and tactics: 'a chronicle of muddle, waste of resources, and pointless bloodshed, with the soldiers that had been welcomed as rescuers coming to be seen by many of the Somalis as invaders.'¹⁰ For others, including Ismail Ahmed and Reginald Herbold-Green, the problems were more strategic, indicating a UN insufficiently flexible to local dynamics. They argued that 'the central tenets of UN-brokered peacemaking are fundamentally different from local peacemaking techniques employed in Northern Somalia.'¹¹ Before long the peace enforcement dimension of the new agenda was reconsidered. Its lack of sovereign consent, departure from principles of minimum force, and lack of neutrality could be considered fundamentally counter to the state-centric basis of the international community. In apparent retreat to a minimalist practice of peacebuilding, Boutros-Ghali reaffirmed, in the 1995 supplement to *Agenda for Peace*, that 'respect for [the state's] fundamental sovereignty and integrity are crucial to any common international progress.' The United Nations, he argued, cannot 'impose a new political structure or new state institutions. It can only help the hostile factions to help themselves and begin to live together again.' Peacebuilding would require 'a deeper commitment to cooperation and true multilateralism than humanity has ever achieved before.' However, 'progress', he asserted, had been made with 'no reason for frustration or pessimism' but more 'confidence and courage' on the part of the 'international community'.¹²

10 Virginia Luling, 'Come back Somalia? Questioning a collapsed state', *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 18, No. 2, 1997, p. 287.

11 Ismail Ahmed and Reginald Herbold-Green, 'The heritage of war and state collapse in Somalia and Somaliland: local-level effects, external interventions and reconstruction', *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 20, No. 1, 1999, p. 24.

12 Boutros Boutros-Ghali, *Supplement to an Agenda for Peace: Position Paper of the Secretary General on the Occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary*

Peacebuilding as conflict resolution

Indeed an alternative and more enduring position was developing that argued what was needed was more interventionism not less. The failures in Somalia and elsewhere ironically seemed to add weight to the arguments of peacebuilding maximalists that something more comprehensive was required — yet something that did not need the commitment of a large volume of human and material resources on the part of the international community. A holistic and wide-ranging strategy was rationally if not empirically justified. The post-conflict peacebuilding agenda was institutionalized as UN Standard Operating Procedure (SOP), a habitual element of UN discourse, and the key legitimating tool for a variety of economic, political and military interventions around the world. Moreover, in the late 1990s NATO's Peace Implementation Council for Bosnia increasingly assumed sovereign responsibilities, while UN transitional authorities in Kosovo and East Timor became provisional governments. The UN has increasingly been called on to take a 'nation-building' or maximalist role. The *Brahimi Report* of 2000 attempted something of a discursive rearticulation of this problematic new role through the notion of interdependent peacekeeping and peacebuilding. Accordingly, 'force alone cannot create peace; it can only create the space in which peace must be built'. Strategically this might require 'quick impact projects', particularly in the areas of security sector reform and the rule of law/human rights protection. Much of the report then focuses on the priorities for internal reform of the UN in order to enable it to perform such a Herculean role.¹³

Maximalist conceptions of peacebuilding as nation-building have been given further salience by the September 11 attacks on the United States. As an especially politicized concept, it has been increasingly swept up by the grandiose expressions of policy-makers, and more often discursively practised in the context of large-scale military action, such as in Kosovo, Afghanistan or Iraq. As such the discourse

of the United Nations, 3 January 1995, A/50/60 – S/1995/1, paras 14, 103, 105 (<http://www.un.org/Docs/SG/agsupp.html>)

13 'The Brahimi Report', *The Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations*, 2000 (<http://www.un.org/peace/reports/peace-operations/> Accessed 14 June 2004).

has developed an ambitious 'nation-building cum peacebuilding' interpretation that seeks to 'weave a new cloth for the national society and to set up unprecedented new forms of governing'.¹⁴ This approach challenges the principle of non-intervention in domestic affairs and implies a new, improved status for human rights in world politics, leading Beck to characterize the Kosovo mission as 'militaristic humanism'.¹⁵ The irony that war is engineered in order for peace to be built is apparently disregarded by peace/nation-builders – driven by the political imperatives of world order while self-legitimized by their expression of 'ethical' ends over spurious means.

Emerging between ideas and contingencies, the peacebuilding industry has only begun to develop off-the-shelf models or comprehensive theories. However, beneath a burgeoning literature and increasing experience in the field the ideological preference towards liberal democracy is found. As Paris has argued, peacebuilding is guided by the doctrine of liberal internationalism while 'transplanting western models of social, political, and economic organisation into war-shattered states'.¹⁶ This is manifested in the international political discourse of peacebuilding – where the concept is presented in 'there is no alternative' terms. Under the liberal imperatives of the international community it offers the promise of democratization as in Bertram's understanding of UN peacebuilding. Designed to address the root causes of conflict, it entails building the political conditions for a sustainable democratic peace, generally in countries long divided by social strife, rather than keeping or enforcing peace between hostile states and armed parties.¹⁷

14 Michael Lund, 'What kind of peace is being built? Taking stock of post-conflict peacebuilding and charting future directions', a paper prepared for International Development Research Centre, Ottawa, Canada, January 2003, pp. 13–14.

15 Slavoj Žižek cites Beck in the context of Vaclav Havel's assertion that NATO's military attack on Yugoslavia and intervention into Kosovo, 'places human rights above the rights of the state'. Slavoj Žižek, *The Fragile Absolute*, London, Verso, 2000, pp. 56–57.

16 Paris, op. cit., pp. 54–89.

17 Eva Bertram, 'Reinventing governments: the promises and perils of United Nations peace building', *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 39, No. 3, 1995, p. 388.

From this brief survey it is readily apparent that peacebuilding's record as an analytical device is, at best, patchy. Even within its own logic, the conflation of state-making with liberalization of both the economy and political system is without much empirical evidence or theoretical basis. In this sense, ironically like most problem-solving theories, peacebuilding must be recognized as expressive and normative, in other words 'a way to stand for and promote certain ideals.'¹⁸ These ideals emanate from the primarily democratic, liberal and Western states that dominate the international community, and represent a compromise between their cultural contexts and long-standing political imperatives. Moving into area studies, it becomes clear that real cases of conflict invariably depart from this model. A look at the post-Soviet case of Tajikistan amply illustrates this point.

2 The strange case of Tajikistan

War and peace in Tajikistan

In 1992 Tajikistan experienced several months of intense civil war. While most of the fighting had ended by 1993, a peace agreement was not signed until 1997, and significant political violence continued sporadically until 2001. The war and its consequences have dominated Tajikistan's short history. The 'Kulyobization' of Tajikistan,¹⁹ where cadres from the southern region of Kulyob (who had provided the troops that brought pro-government forces back to power in 1993) came to hold most of the key positions in government, proceeded notwithstanding the power-sharing mechanism of the General Agreement. This trend was apparently confirmed by Emomali Rahmonov's re-election in 1999's fraudulent presidential elections. However, Tajikistan has avoided fragmentation along regional lines and descent into further conflict. Government, opposition and international actors have often worked together successfully to re-establish security in the country and begin to rehabilitate the economy. A 2003 referendum on constitutional changes, despite being conducted without international monitoring and with protests

¹⁸ Lund, op. cit., p. 22.

¹⁹ Shirin Akiner, *Tajikistan: Disintegration or Reconciliation?*, London, Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2001.

from much of the opposition, passed off peacefully and cleared the way for President Rahmonov to remain in power for two further terms. In 2005 international observers concluded that Tajikistan's elections failed to meet international standards and included 'large-scale irregularities' amid a near consensus among the international community in Tajikistan that these elections were worse than the previous ones of 2000.²⁰ As such, Tajikistan presents a singular case of movement from war to peace and begs the question, upon what is Tajikistan's peace based?

A recent report by the International Crisis Group (ICG) argued that the international community looked on while the Tajik Government accumulated power in its hands and marginalized political foes. 'Quiet diplomacy has its merits,' they argued, 'but ignoring the problems of Tajikistan's political development threatens to undermine the very stability that the international community is dedicated to protecting.'²¹ ICG seemed to suggest that a conservative or gradualist, as opposed to a more energetically liberalizing process of conflict resolution had allowed a legitimate settlement to change into an increasingly illegitimate and resolutely anti-democratic institution-building process. This criticism goes to the heart of the dilemmas faced in peacebuilding by international actors intervening with liberalizing mandates. The idea that a functioning liberal-democratic system can be transplanted into a context lacking certain institutional and ideological precedents may be a misnomer, in Tajikistan or elsewhere. Nevertheless, what impact has the discourse of 'peacebuilding' had in Tajikistan?

'Peacebuilding' in Tajikistan

A large part of both official and academic international analyses of Tajikistan's politics and society per se assumes that democratization and post-conflict peacebuilding are inseparable processes. The majority

20 OSCE/ODIHR, *Republic of Tajikistan Parliamentary Elections*, 27 February and 13 March 2005, OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission Final Report, Warsaw, 31 May 2005.

21 International Crisis Group, 'Tajikistan's politics: confrontation or consolidation?', *Asia Briefing*, 19 May 2004, p. 19.

of scholarly and policy–practitioner writing on peacebuilding reflects a dichotomy where the *peril* of further conflict can only be avoided through the *promise* of democratization. In this sense peacebuilding presents a win/lose game with political leaders and their citizens (somehow together) standing at a junction with a choice of two diverging pathways, one of which must ultimately be chosen.

Public international discourse with respect to Tajikistan consciously reflects peacebuilding’s positive dimension. The United Nations Tajikistan Office of Peace–building (UNTOP) was established, according to the Security Council, ‘in order to consolidate peace and promote democracy.’²² The UN Secretary–General’s representative in Tajikistan, Vladimir Sotirov, who heads the UNTOP, remarked in 2002 that ‘there is a wish and will in the leadership of the country to introduce democratic principles of governance and development in the society, in an effort to create a vibrant civil society’. Furthermore, he noted:

I am encouraged by the democratic developments so far in this country. I believe if it continues to move in the same direction in the future, it will quickly develop into a pluralistic democracy. However, a lot of difficulties have to be overcome, especially in the field of further separation of powers, mass media, promotion and the protection of human rights, thereby encouraging civil society, reforming power structures, and continuing with a spirit of tolerance and dialogue in the society.²³

In March 2004, the US Ambassador to Tajikistan, Richard Hoagland, remarked that he was ‘optimistic about democracy in Tajikistan’ and that ‘in the first instance, this is because the government has chosen a democratic path.’²⁴ While such words may

22 UN Security Council, Press Release SC/6860 4141st Meeting (Night) 12 May 2000 (<http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2000/20000512.sc6860.doc.html> Accessed 22 May 2004).

23 ‘Tajikistan: interview with UN Secretary–General’s representative’, 27 November 2002, IRIN News (<http://www.irinnews.org> Accessed 22 May 2004).

24 It should be noted that in some areas, such as suppression of the media and electoral law, Hoagland has been critical of the government. See

be dismissed by some as rhetorical, underlying such statements are peacebuilding's axioms regarding the sustainable post-conflict state. Furthermore, the blurred boundary between policy and academic analysts means that the promise of peacebuilding is a key element of many academic analyses of the Tajik war. It has provoked considerable international funding into peacebuilding's key dimensions, including decentralization and self-government in local communities, the development of a political party system and carrying out free and fair elections, as well as the reform of security.

'Peacebuilding' versus peace: an assessment

It is possible and potentially enlightening to conduct an institutionalist analysis of the practices (institutions) of Tajik peacebuilding. In the limited context of this paper, a general overview of peacebuilding's institutional impact is attempted on its own terms. From its ideological predilections, literature on peacebuilding often distinguishes between bottom-up and top-down dynamics concerning, respectively, the concepts of 'civil society' and 'good governance'.

Quantitative growth in NGOs does not equal qualitative growth in civil society and in itself may indicate little more than the latest fad of Western donors. Is there a link between the growth in NGOs and peacebuilding, or is this relationship merely ideologically appealing? What role do these organizations actually play in society? Abbas notes that the discourse of civil society in Tajikistan is largely conducted and imposed by elites, with little consideration of 'the personal and societal experiences of post-communist citizens and how those experiences have shaped citizens' approaches to society and politics today'.²⁵ Thus, 'the pattern of a weak post-communist civil society is likely to persist into the future'.²⁶ The author's own research in 2003

'US envoy calls for changes to Tajik laws on election, media', Asia-Plus news agency, Dushanbe, in Russian 0830 gmt 3 March 2004 (<http://www.eurasianet.org/resource/tajikistan/hypermail/news/0021.shtml>).

25 Najam Abbas, 'Dimensions and dynamics of Tajikistan's civil society discourse', paper presented to the 5th CESS Annual Conference, Indiana University, Bloomington, 14-17 October 2004, p. 6.

26 Ibid.

indicated reluctance on the part of the vast majority of NGOs to become involved in activities that might be deemed ‘too political’.²⁷ In the area of small arms and light weapons, some civil society representatives in Dushanbe feel that working in such areas might be seen as ‘oppositional’ by the government.²⁸ This gloomy picture is repeated to a greater or lesser extent across Central Asia. Many NGOs are concerned with educational and women’s issues being less politically sensitive issues. They are often small, poor and badly managed, having ‘very limited’ or ‘inadequate’ impact on conflict resolution.²⁹ Furthermore, Liu and Megoran *inter alia* have argued that ‘civil society’ in Central Asia expresses local and international power relations.³⁰ The ‘DONGO’ model (Donor–Organized Non–Governmental Organization), Liu notes, is fundamentally disempowering to micro–level reform and may indeed be subverted by local clients. Therefore, ‘attempts to encourage “grassroots” initiatives may end up reinforcing such illiberal institutions as patriarchy and clientelism’.³¹

The role of the political elite in the top–down processes of government departs markedly from the neoliberal notion of ‘good governance’. While the government has consciously incorporated the language of democracy into its legal framework and public pronouncements, it is unconstrained by either democratic mechanisms or a pluralistic political culture. Rahmonov and his supporters dominate parliament and all the institutions of state. Olimova and Bowyer draw parallels with other countries in Central Asia. The Tajik polity is characterized by a ‘hyper–personification of power’ – the accumulation of power in

27 See John Heathershaw, Emil Juraev, Michael von Tangen–Page and Lada Zimina, ‘Small arms in Central Asia’, *Eurasia Studies Series*, International Alert, 2004 (http://www.international-alert.org/pdf/pubsec/MISAC_eurasia_4.pdf).

28 Interview with Kathleen Samuels, Dushanbe, International Crisis Group, 10 June 2003.

29 Akiner, *op. cit.*, 2001, p. 58.

30 Morgan Y. Liu, ‘Detours from utopia on the Silk Road: ethical dilemmas of neoliberal triumphalism’, *Central Eurasian Studies Review*, Vol. 2, No. 2, Spring 2003; Nick Megoran, ‘Preventing conflict by building civil society: post–development theory and a Central Asian – UK policy success story’, *Central Asian Survey*, Vol. 24, No. 1, March 2005.

31 Liu, *op. cit.*, pp. 3–4.

the hands of an elite who are in some sense accountable horizontally but ignore 'the interests of the electorate by maintaining conditions of continual crisis'. The functioning of the system is accordingly 'susceptible to clan influence and corruption'³² and the rule of law is 'weak'. They cite the following democratic deficits:

- hypertrophy of the authority of the executive branch;
- accelerating growth of bureaucracy;
- weak role of parliament in the decision-making process;
- insubstantial judicial supervision;
- extreme fragmentation of the political, business, bureaucratic and military elites along ethno-regional lines;
- overlapping of state and private interests;
- corruption in all sectors and at all levels of government.³³

Given these conditions, Schoeberlein argues that there is observable movement against democratization: 'as Rahmonov consolidates his power, he and his supporters are working to reduce pluralism.'³⁴ Despite this, scope for compromise exists within the system and it seems inappropriate to label Tajikistan as a fully authoritarian system. Akiner argues that 'the current trend is towards the semi-institutionalization of power struggles among different individuals and/or interest groups, economic, regional, and political.'³⁵

The underlying argument of this paper is that the success of Tajikistan in avoiding further war is more than a historical anomaly or a temporary reprieve, and that the lack of progress in democratization is more than a matter of impatience with an inevitably long-term process. Despite the claims of its discourse, Tajikistan as a particular case of peacebuilding refuses to abide by the peril/promise dichotomy.

32 Saodat Olimova and Anthony Bowyer, *Political Parties in Tajikistan*, International Foundation for Electoral Systems, November 2002, pp. 3–4.

33 *Ibid.*, p. 4.

34 John Schoeberlein, 'Regional introduction: a host of preventable conflicts', in Monique Mekenkamp, Paul van Tongeren and Hans van de Veen (eds), *Searching for Peace in Europe and Eurasia: An Overview of Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding Activities*, Boulder, Colo., Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002, pp. 66–75.

35 Akiner, *op. cit.*, 2001, p. 88.

Moreover, its discursive and institutional praxis represents a ‘paradox of peacebuilding’.³⁶ How, it must be asked, did peacebuilding get it so wrong? Why are its assumptions about the nature of conflict resolution so inappropriate to the post–Soviet Central Asian context? The above analysis indicates that, in institutional terms, Tajik peacebuilding functions quite differently from the model exhorted in peacebuilding discourse. However, the paper contends that an institutional analysis in and of itself is incomplete without a grasp of the normative dimensions of practice. The following section goes on to look at regionally or culturally particular alternatives to peacebuilding. What are the practical ideologies underlying peace in Tajikistan?

Among most Tajiks the post–conflict period is understood strikingly differently to the neoliberal discourse of peacebuilding. At regional and local levels dominant voices are found to deny the existence of conflict and legitimize patriarchy and clientelism. My research has turned to exploring two interrelated but clearly distinct discourses of Tajik peacebuilding which are essential to the maintenance of the ‘broader intersubjective context’ of Tajikistan’s peace. The first, which I have called *mirostroytelstvo*, represents the approach of official state representatives to conflict resolution, not just in Tajikistan but prevalent across the former Soviet Union. While this discourse is self–consciously political, and sets strikingly different terms than the discourse of peacebuilding, the second discourse – which this paper spends most time discussing – is ostensibly ‘anti–political’. The popular Tajik articulation of *tinji* (wellness/peacefulness) largely accepts *mirostroytelstvo*’s concept of the political and understands this competitive process of power politics as the essential source of conflict. Hence articulators of *tinji* shun participation in politics and do not expect their opinions to be represented or human rights defended.

36 See John Heathershaw, ‘The paradox of peacebuilding: peril, promise and small arms in Tajikistan’, in *Central Asian Survey*, Vol. 24, No. 1, March 2005.

3 Mirostroitelstvo in the former Soviet Union: peace enforcement

Post-Soviet Mirostroitelstvo: origins and context

It is widely acknowledged that Russian peacekeeping challenges conventional notions of impartial, third-party peacekeeping, limited in both scope and duration. The interpretation and contextualization of ‘peacebuilding’ in the Russian-speaking areas of the former Soviet Union are indebted to ideologically saturated post-Soviet space. The translation of UN Security Council decisions and international doctrines of peacebuilding and peacekeeping means that more than the original English is lost in translation. While Russian doctrine borrows much from UN language, its practical interpretation both in Moscow and on the ground bears little resemblance to liberal ideals of the ‘international community’. Indeed the Russian term *mirotvorchestvo*, literally meaning ‘peacemaking’ or ‘peacecreating’, used to translate the English ‘peacekeeping’, implies a much more hands-on approach than that authorized by most UN peacekeeping mandates. This is less a technical matter of translation than an issue of a ‘travelling concept’ which takes on a new meaning in a different political context. Thus, unlike liberal notions of peacebuilding via democratization and socio-economic development, it has come to represent a distinctly Russian and distinctly authoritarian approach to conflict resolution. Moreover it brings the state back in and denies individualist conceptions of ‘human security’. This recalls the Copenhagen School’s argument that the state retains its salience as a referent object of security. ‘Even when our primary concern is the security of human beings’, Sørensen contends, ‘states need a significant place in the analysis, because states constitute the single most important macro-structure with consequences for individual security’.³⁷

According to Trevor Waters, in Moldova, for example, Russian peacekeeping represented ‘an instrument of unilateral interference in

³⁷ Georg Sørensen, ‘Individual security and national security: the state remains the principal problem’, *Security Dialogue*, Vol. 27, No. 4, 1996, p. 374.

a separatist conflict to further Moscow's neo-imperialist interests.³⁸ Furthermore, Waters argues that Russian peacekeeping 'allowed Transdnestrian separatists to build up armed forces and consolidate illegal state structures,³⁹ despite overwhelming international opposition. In Georgia, the behaviour of individual ex-Soviet garrisons was crucial to the course of the conflict, noting an instinctive hostility towards nationalist forces by Russian commanders that led to significant support for separatist forces, particularly in Abkhazia.⁴⁰ Many analyses, such as that of MacKinlay and Shaw, are careful to make a clear distinction between Moscow's strategic aims, which went through considerable upheaval during the 1990s, and the local tactics of Russian forces, noting that much depended on the orientation of commanding officers. The return of 'Eurasianism', however, as a neo-imperial strategy for retaining Russian hegemony in the near abroad, alongside consistent hostility towards nationalists among Russian commanders, played a significant role in the post-Soviet state formation of Georgia, Moldova and Tajikistan. 'Eurasianism' is one dimension of an ideology understanding of which is productive despite the chaos of the failings in the chain of command of the post-Soviet Russian armed forces.

In the former Soviet Union, discourses of peacekeeping (*mirotvorchestvo*) and peacebuilding (*mirostitelstvo* or *mirostroyeniye*) among state elites are joined by a common understanding of peace. This is perhaps best illustrated by the case of Tajikistan, where in the early 1990s the oppositional nationalist-Islamic forces were successfully marginalized as Moscow sought a loyalist to preside over a Russian protectorate state. Smith-Serrano argues correctly that the peacekeeping mission itself has become much less significant than the 'border control mission' along Tajikistan's southern frontier with Afghanistan.⁴¹ It is under Russian protection that President Rahmonov

38 Trevor Waters, 'Russian peacekeeping in Moldova: source of stability or neo-imperialist threat?', in John MacKinlay and Peter Cross (eds), *Regional Peacekeepers: The Paradox of Russian Peacekeeping*, Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2003, p. 150.

39 Ibid.

40 John MacKinlay and Evgenii Sharov, 'Russian peacekeeping operations in Georgia', in MacKinlay and Cross (eds), op. cit.

41 Andrés Smith-Serrano, 'CIS peacekeeping in Tajikistan', in MacKinlay and Cross (eds), op. cit., p. 181.

has been able to defy many UN and OSCE initiatives towards democratization, expand his personal power and re-establish a secular, authoritarian regime in Dushanbe. Lynch provides an excellent analysis of how the inchoate relationship between Moscow and its commanders nevertheless served Russia's neo-imperial ambitions.⁴² The character of Russian peacekeeping/-building raises important questions about the ideological context that bonds Moscow to its post-Soviet allies in the CIS. In this sense, *mirostitelstvo* can be understood not just as an institutionalized approach to 'peacebuilding' but as a regionalized discourse represented by state elites and primarily expressed in Russian language which carries certain presuppositions about the nature of international relations and conflict resolution that are altogether more 'statist' and authoritarian.

Mirostitelstvo as peace enforcement

Central Asia was largely bypassed by Gorbachev's new thinking and four out of five first secretaries of the Central Asian republics supported the August 1991 coup against Gorbachev. *Perestroika* and *glasnost* had little impact on power structures within Tajikistan although via Moscow they did facilitate the relative pluralism of the late 1980s and early 1990s that preceded the civil war. Today in Tajikistan, elites often explain a heavy-handed approach to political parties or the media with reference to the civil war and the dangers of pluralism. Furthermore it is often said that it is 'our mentality' (*nash mentalitet*), with reference to the former Soviet Union, that makes such 'Western-style' pluralism inappropriate. My experience of conducting numerous interviews with heads of local government (Hukumat and Jamoat) and state officials over the last two years suggests that two key concepts – *stabilnost* and *avtoritet* – are important in this self-assigned mentality of political elites in the former Soviet Union. Within the scope of this paper, only a cursory look at the ideologically informed usage of these two terms is possible.

First, the notion of *stabilnost* is typically used to explain the priority of economic development over democratization. As

42 Dov Lynch, *Peacekeeping Strategies Towards the CIS*, London, Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1999.

the head of an 'opposition' party, which is largely loyal to the administration of President Emomoli Rahmonov, remarked, 'democracy doesn't give us bread'.⁴³ Here democratization becomes a gradual process which must happen in *our* own gradualist way, and can only happen after a significant level of economic development has been achieved. Secondly, the term *avtoritet* is often used to signify a person who has authority among his peers and is able to have political impact. The following quote is illustrative. In discussing the strength of the president's political party, one of its leaders explained:

The position of the party became so strong when [President] Emomali Sharipovich Rahmonov – a person who has colossal *avtoritet!* – became our Chairman. Why? First, he promised the Nation that he would end the war. Second, he at once said that all political migrants and forced evacuees should return to the homeland. Third, he said that he'd resolve the problem of hunger. That's how the *avtoritet* of this person came about! Our party did not increase his *avtoritet*. He gave this *avtoritet* to the party. [Pause] I myself am a historian. For example, in some countries ... in Egypt ... Anwar Sadat and those who were before him – they were given *avtoritet* by the party. But in Tajikistan it was the opposite. Emomali Rahmonov gave the party his personal *avtoritet*, and we used it and raised the *avtoritet* of our party. Nowadays we do everything so that this *avtoritet* is maintained and increased.⁴⁴

Such a person is almost always a state official or tied into official structures. In contrast, civil society organizations emphasize their non-political nature even when they are being funded by international organizations to support programmes that are apparently political, such as voter education, gender issues or conflict resolution. The concept of *avtoritet* helps to describe the political sphere of an elite network which is apart from and untouchable by a donor-funded civil society sector.

43 Interview with Abduhalim Gaffurov, Chairman of the Official Socialist Party of Tajikistan, Dushanbe, 5 August 2005.

44 Interview with Muso Asozoda, Head of the Apparatus, People's Democratic Party of Tajikistan, 17 August 2005.

Together, the notions of *avtoritet* and *stabilnost* serve to provide normative and analytical grounding for the processes of peace enforcement, or conflict containment and eradication, that are prevalent among post-Soviet political elites. As well-evincing by the case of Russian involvement in Chechnya, if eradication fails to eliminate opposition to the elite, containment may be used until eradication is finally 'successful'.

In the field of international relations, two extreme positions can be taken vis-à-vis such contextually located ideologies emanating from area studies. Many political realists dismiss the cultural context, making 'ideology' merely cynical justifications for those in power. On the other hand 'orientalist' readings – from both 'within' and 'outside' – reify such contextual phenomena as 'tradition', 'culture' or 'mentality'. This paper opposes both these polar positions which effectively serve as straw men for more serious discussions of the nature of culture and ideology in peacebuilding. Here opposing ideologies can be best understood as inter-subjectively constructed social worlds. The belief in *stabilnost* and *avtoritet* is not simply the strategy of power-hungry elites; it has a cultural resonance which to a certain degree is shared by many citizens in the region, in particular those who hold positions with state structures (*gosstruktura*), including so-called reformers. Moreover, like the internationally more prominent concept of 'peacebuilding', it is not simply analytic but also expressive and performative. As such it can both shape the assessments of 'interest' by decision-makers and it endows hard-line actions with legitimacy both for an inner circle of decision-makers and a wider public.

4 Tinji in Tajikistan: conflict avoidance and accommodation

In Tajiki there are numerous words for peace. However, the commonly used notion of *tinji* (wellness/peacefulness) perhaps best conveys the feelings of many who shy away from conflict socially and especially politically. The voices of the Tajik powerless challenge are consciously anti-political in recognizing their disinterest in, and weakness vis-à-vis, political power. Ironically, this gives the discourse of *tinji* enormous political impact as an essential element in the maintenance of Tajikistan's peace. The symbiosis between

mirostraitelstvo and *tinji* is based on a common understanding of the political – which justifies the dominant relationship of the state over society. The following analysis of the discourse of *tinji* is based on research conducted for the International NGO Mercy Corps with community-based organizations (Community Initiative Group, CIG), citizens, community leaders and representatives of local government in five communities in Sughd *oblast*.⁴⁵

Denying the existence of conflict: harmony ideology

Across both leaders and citizens in Tajikistan conflict largely remains unacknowledged or weakly acknowledged in Tajik communities. The conflict, tension (Russian: *naprazheniye*) or disquiet (Russian: *bezspokoystvo*) cited is attributed to brief arguments caused by the lack of resources. Less common is the acknowledgement of tension with the *Hukumat* (local government) or with other villages (where the dispute is again over resources). When asked to identify threats again there was significant agreement between community leaders and members – with both identifying the lack of work opportunities and the consequent affects of unemployment and labour migration as the most significant threat to peace (Tajiki: *tinji*; Russian: *spokoystvo*). Table 1 illustrates the answers of sixty respondents to the question:

Table 1. Perceived threats

What is the greatest threat to peace in the village?					
Community	Unemployment & labour migration	Lack of water and other resources	Illiteracy/ alcoholism/drug addiction	None	Grand total
Koshonar	7	2		3	12
Margedar	11	1			12
Novabad	6		6		12
Navbuned	2	6		4	12
Tojikokjar	1		1	10	12
Grand Total	27	9	7	17	60

45 The research was initially conducted for a baseline analysis of Mercy Corps' Peaceful Communities Initiative (PCI) in Tajikistan. The five communities selected for study were Navbuned and Tojikokjar (both in Asht *raiyon*), along with Koshonar, Margedar and Novabad (all in Panjakent).

‘What is the greatest threat to peace in the village?’. Economic (lack of resources) and social (illiteracy, addictions) were also cited as potential threats. Strictly political or security threats were not cited at all.

To probe further it is interesting to look at the perceptions of community and personal livelihood. Community leaders give the impression that while the situation is still difficult, the material conditions of the community have improved over recent years. The results from villagers are some what more mixed.⁴⁶ Attempts to measure personal views of conflict and livelihood were often thwarted by an interpretation of ‘you’ as necessarily meaning ‘the community’ — part of a broader public discourse of community togetherness. Elsewhere, this has been called a ‘harmony ideology’.⁴⁷ Under a harmony ideology, community members refuse to acknowledge any disagreements or even any personal opinions for fear of breaking from the group. The harmony ideology of Peaceful Communities Initiative (PCI) communities was particularly strongly represented by the CIGs.

Unity and cohesion

While a harmony ideology indicates a denial of conflict, in Tajikistan it is accompanied by affirmations of community unity. Perhaps, the most revealing demonstration of this world view in my research was provided during the bilingual Russian/Tajik SWOT analysis conducted with the CIG in Novabad. When asked to identify the strengths and weaknesses of the village, and the opportunities and threats that they face, the CIG identified the aspects detailed in Table 2. In this depiction of a practical ideology of peace (*tinji*) the central concepts are unity/cohesion and harmony. Strengths and

46 When asked to assess whether the livelihood of the village has improved over the last year, an overall majority felt that it had. However, the minority who answered ‘no’ was composed of just one man but half of all women (15 out of 30), giving the impression that the threats identified above had a greater impact on women than men. Or that women are more ready to acknowledge their poverty than men.

47 Christine Bichsel, ‘In search of harmony: repairing infrastructure and social relations in the Ferghana Valley’, *Central Asian Survey*, Vol. 24, No. 1, March 2005.

Table 2. SWOT analysis <i>Novabad</i>	
<p>Strengths Respectful culture (<i>Izati Ehtiom. Uva-zhaymaya kultura</i>) Unity (<i>Yagonay. Edinstvo</i>) Mutual understanding (<i>Yakdigarfahmi. Vzaimoponimaniye</i>) Friendship (<i>Dusti. Druzhba</i>)</p>	<p>Weaknesses <i>Provokatsiya/Ighvo</i> (includes people who do not follow the leadership; people who know head of the police and report lies about our community, because they are jealous of projects, people who dig up our pipes)</p>
<p>Opportunities To teach the youth and direct them on the right path (<i>Obucheniyе molodozha i napravit ikh na pravilni put</i>) Solving problems with mutual understanding and without quarrels (<i>Halli muik ilocho beh zanzal va bo yakdigar orahmi</i>)</p>	<p>Threats Not being able to agree (<i>Muroso nakardan</i>) Belittling one another? (<i>Dushi? po kardani yakdigor</i>) Some people do not obey the head of the community (<i>Ba'zeho gersh namehdeyhand ba raisi mahalla</i>)</p>

opportunities relate to the achievement of unity, weaknesses and threats relate to insufficient unity. While a harmony ideology might be seen as an avoidance or even denial of the actual existence of conflict, it is important to recognize that such ideologies can be, to a certain extent, productive. This is not to say that they serve to end perceptions of inequality, or stifle all tensions and arguments, but they can to some extent act as a functional method of self-control and hence a self-fulfilling prophecy.

The overall theme of unity carries over into how PCI communities are managed. The two most common words attributed to community problem-solving are cohesion (*splochonost*) and activeness (*aktivnost*). Often they are used together to imply that an active community is one that coheres, and a coherent community is one that is active. When asked, ‘Do people listen to your voice?’, the head of Koshenar community (*mahalla*) committee noted: ‘Yes, of course. The village represents one family, from one root (*koren*).’ The community leader (*raisi mahalla*) in

Margedar, who served forty-five years as *brigadir* from the first day the community was opened until 1997, described the situation: ‘Because I worked with them from the first day. All men and women grew up under my eyes. The people trust me and would not be able to deceive me.’ In Tajik villages the community is denoted as the *mahalla*, a term that can be used to refer to the community as a whole and, sometimes in

the same breath, the head (*rais*) of the community.⁴⁸ In addition the title *aksakal* (literally 'grey beard') is used for older men in the community who have special status as decision-makers and conflict-enders. In any of these variants a group of, most commonly, older men meet in the teahouse (*choikhona* – which also functions as the mosque and general community centre) on a daily basis and discuss the life of the village. The young and, especially, women are rarely present at these times. While in other parts of Central Asia attempts have been made to formalize the *mahalla* committee or equivalent body by making it an organ of local government (Uzbekistan) or advisory council (Kyrgyzstan), in Tajikistan the *mahalla* has remained entirely informal notwithstanding the attempts of international organizations to formalize it through the establishment of community-based organizations.

Given the nature of this 'unity', PCI communities, particularly in Sughd *oblast* where the effect of the war was weakest, cite numerous examples of the mobilization of people for collective voluntary labour (*khashar*) prior to the involvement of PCI. 'Mobilization' here is understood as calling on people to provide free labour for a community goal that has been decided by the *rais* and other 'respected' community members or even local government. Informal ties are important and there are real processes of participation in place for those of a certain standing. However, while decision-making may not be exclusively top-down, it is clear that certain sections of the community may be listened to more than others. A majority of men, in particular older men, cite that they feel listened to, while just two out of fifteen younger women felt that their voice was heard in the

community. However, for many people there is little sense that this is a problem. The Koshonor CIG leader was quite open that 'the voice of women has no kind of meaning'⁴⁹ and the women in his group vociferously agreed.

48 Sometimes the term *mahallinski commitet* (community committee) is used to denote the leadership of the community, at other times simply *raisi mahalla* or *raisi kishlok* (head of community or head of village).

49 Ironically this was the one CIG focus group we conducted where women actually spoke up.

Anti-politics

A reluctance to acknowledge conflict or dispute (*raznogalsiye*) and the emphasis on the value of unity, despite evidence of inequality, is accompanied by a further aspect of Tajiki *tinji*: a strong aversion to the political sphere, and anti-politics. The CIG in Margedar provided a particularly strong example of this. 'In our village', one man noted, 'peace (*spokoystvo*) is one of our strengths'. Another man added, 'there are no tensions, no kind of political parties'. At this point he was somewhat chided by fellow group members for mentioning politics. The Margedar community leader (*raisi mahalla*) in a later interview agreed that there was no political tension. However, contrary to the CIG he acknowledged, 'there are political parties'⁵⁰ but there are 'no contentious [*sporni*] questions between them'. More generally, citizens strongly express deference to and respect for the state – both the idea of it and its representatives. Such examples offer glimpses of the retreat from the political which has taken place in Tajik society since the numerous popular political movements of *perestroika*, prior to the civil war. The association of plural and competitive politics with war is extremely strong. Accordingly, the political becomes a sphere left for one united group, the *avtoritetni* elite. This discursive practice of *tinji* is accordingly emboldened in interaction with the elites of *mirostroitelstvo*.

The question poised by peacebuilders is to what extent such attitudes, that I have characterized as the discourse of *tinji*, are fragile pretensions that barely cover up a considerable anger towards the ruling powers. Is the expression of harmony, unity and anti-politics disingenuous? Is the discourse merely a 'thin simplification' reality?⁵¹ It is the author's judgement that hatred of conflict, along with compromising and moderate attitudes of individuals, is sincere and reflects other aspects of the social structure and cultural values of Tajik society. Such depoliticized representations of the world can be productive in Tajikistan. They are

50 We later discovered that the three political parties represented in the village are the president's own National Democratic Party of Tajikistan, as well as the Communist Party of Tajikistan and the Socialist Party of Tajikistan – neither of which are effectively oppositional.

51 James C. Scott, *Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed*, New Haven, Conn., Yale University Press, 1998, p. 319.

undoubtedly politically beneficial to ruling elites who act to reconfirm such beliefs in their everyday practices of governance. However, they also reflect a genuinely held disbelief in, and retreat from, the value of politics on the part of a strong majority of citizens. This is often characterized as 'war weariness'. The precursors of the discourse of *tinji* may include, in addition to the legacy of the war, the legacy of anti-pluralism from the Soviet Union and the enormous and difficult to measure effect of the labour migration of hundreds of thousands of Tajiks to Russia and elsewhere.⁵² In such circumstances, the approaches of conflict avoidance and accommodation can be broadly effective as strategies of peacebuilding. Hence the prospects for the escalation of conflicts to a 'political' level where local authorities, organized crime or neighbouring regions become involved are extremely low.

As evinced by the above analyses, there are profoundly different approaches to conflict resolution found in present-day Tajikistan and those of the discourse of peacebuilding, which has an enormous influence on international aid allocation in Tajikistan. The discursive institutions of accommodation and avoidance found in Tajikistan's villages are confronted with strategies of conflict transformation or resolution through the establishment of formally democratic systems of self-governance.⁵³ Peacebuilding, as a theory of transition to democracy, implicitly and at times explicitly makes claims to a 'natural' and universal applicability which is beyond ideology. The above analysis suggests that peacebuilding represents just one of many approaches to conflict resolution and emerges from a particular cultural context. Different cultures have different discourses of peace and these approaches are largely resilient in the face

52 There are estimates of 500,000–1,000,000 Tajiks away on labour migration at any one time. This is most common in the Rasht valley which suffered longest during the war. In 2005, I found 20%–25% of the population of villages where I was conducting fieldwork away on labour migration. In the village of Kadara, for example, an estimated 70% of families had at least one member in Russia, providing an estimated 50% of their family income.

53 This is openly acknowledged by another Mercy Corps Programme working in Tajikistan, the Tajikistan Conflict Prevention Program in Tavildera. The programme uses the Thomas–Kilman conflict model to interpret Tajiki conflict avoidance and accommodation strategies and introduce modes of collaborative conflict transformation. Interview with Barbara Stuart, TCCP Chief of Party, Tavildera, 26 July 2005.

of exogenous practices. Peacebuilding may have an ideological quality among the international community but as a representation of the realities of Central Asia, becomes what James C. Scott terms ‘thin simplifications’, wherein the complexity of any lived situation is reduced to a finite set of terms, with limited possibilities. Complex and indeterminate series of relationships are hypostasized into a causal narrative, wherein factors that do not fit, do not make sense, or are not rhetorically desirable are dismissed in terms of a more easily identifiable concept, ‘danger.’⁵⁴

Indeed in the case of Tajikistan there are numerous examples of actors within peacebuilding programmes stepping away from the rhetoric of their proposals in a pragmatic compromise with local institutions and ideas.⁵⁵ More prosaically, they do not practise what they preach. This may be for the better. Scott has warned us that when the ‘simplifications’ of ‘high modernism’ ride roughshod over ‘practical knowledge’ of localized actors, both technical ‘progress’ and immense human suffering can result.⁵⁶

However, moving on from the case of Tajikistan we must acknowledge that there are limits to the ‘culturalist’ arguments if they are used to claim on the one hand the absolute relativism of competing discourses, or on the other hand the immutability of traditions, cultures and mentalities. This paper has attempted to sketch how such discourses are produced by a political and historically contingent process. In conclusion I now reflect on the implications for ‘human security’ of the cautionary tale of ‘peacebuilding’ in Tajikistan.

Conclusion: a cautionary tale for ‘human security’

This paper has not attempted to establish a causal link between a certain discourse and peace but rather illustrate the correlation

54 Chad Thompson and John Heathershaw, ‘Introduction: discourses of danger in Central Asia’, *Central Asian Survey*, Vol. 24, No. 1, March, 2005

55 See John Heathershaw, ‘The paradox of peacebuilding: peril, promise and small arms in Tajikistan’, *Central Asian Survey*, Vol. 24, No. 1, March 2005.

56 Scott, op. cit., 1998.

between the Tajiki peace and the existence of multiple interacting discourses of peace (as summarized in Table 3). *Mirostroitelstvo* and *tinji* as discourses cannot simply be dismissed as superficial or

Table 3. Summary of discourses of peace in Tajikistan

Discourse	Primary location	Strategies	Overall approach
Peacebuilding	International community	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Democratization - Decentralization - Transparency/ accountability 	Conflict transformation
Mirostroitelstvo (Russian: peacebuilding)	Post-Soviet states	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Avtoritet (authority) - Stablnost (stability) - Power politics 	Peace enforcement (competition, containment and eradication)
Tinji (Tajik: peacefulness/wellness)	Post-conflict Tajik society	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Denial of conflict - Unity/cohesion - Anti-politics 	Conflict avoidance and accommodation

illegitimate as they are representative of identities and ideologies that have a far greater purchase in Central Asian societies than do those of ‘peacebuilding’. The important point here is that while refusing an absolute relativism we nevertheless cannot avoid the conclusion that the most effective form of peacebuilding is one that is based on the ambiguities present when multiple discourses, emanating from differing contexts, are in dynamic debate. This is the key implication of this study for the concept of ‘human security’.

Tajikistan’s widely acknowledged success in achieving an end to violence is a product of this ambiguity: in terms of ‘peacebuilding’ it is ‘democratic’ enough to remain the recipient of relatively significant donor assistance and international support; in terms of *mirostroitelstvo* it is ‘stable’ enough for the government’s authority to be accepted as unquestionable and unchallengeable by its potential political rivals, and accepted on the international stage by its neighbours; in terms of *tinji* it is ‘harmonious’ enough for conflict to be avoided and accommodated, and political participation shunned, by millions of ordinary Tajiks. Tajikistan’s political party system provides a good example. The existence of six legally registered and nominally functioning political parties is sufficient progress in terms of ‘democracy’ to please the international community. However, the

fact that one of these parties operates as an umbrella for the solidarity group of the man who has been in charge of Tajikistan for thirteen years is evidence of the government's 'authority' and 'stability' to domestic and regional neighbours. Finally, the near irrelevance of party politics to the everyday lives of ordinary Tajiks allows them to accept the system as one that maintains 'harmony' and does not unnecessarily disturb economic and social life. It is the ambiguous coincidence of discourses which characterizes the Tajik peace.

It may, to speak counterfactually, never have been possible to create a vibrant party system, fair elections, decentralized government, or a reformed security sector over the course of several years or even decades of peacebuilding in Tajikistan. Such change, when it occurs, probably reflects broader political and economic change over the long term. It is neither inevitable nor irreversible. However, strategic interventions by informed and modest international actors – of which, sadly, there are precious few – may achieve small movements. But interpreting such changes as steps on the road to democratization, or alternative as evidence of 'negative' as opposed to 'positive' peace, is perhaps more a reflection on the ideological predilections of the author-practitioner than a credible work of analysis. Strategic interventions in the aftermath of war should be valued in and of themselves for reducing the probability of violence. Most importantly, they must be enacted with the understanding that they are contingent on both the wider context and future events without trying to interpret their significance through a grand narrative (such as 'human security') which both transcends cultural differences and individual agency. Such interventions are necessarily cautious and ambiguous – in that they are open to contrasting interpretations and enactments.

Understanding the multiplicity of discourses in play and their cultural context leads to a richer understanding of 'human security'. It is not that the existence of multiple discourses represents a problem of contradictions, but rather that this plurality is an essential quality of the concept in practice. The case of Tajikistan illustrates that 'human security' interventions must be grounded in contextual particularities and comfortable with ambiguities. Grand narratives

remain important only to the extent that they interact, are interpreted and reimagined in their area of application. As such, the practice of 'human security' in Central Asia will remain diverse and contested.

Acknowledgements

The author would like to thank Stacy Closson and Mark Hoffman for comments on the rough draft of this paper. Thanks must also go to the staff of Mercy Corps' CAIP and PCI programmes with whom the author worked in the field.

ECONOMIC INTEGRATION AS A FACTOR IN PEACE AND SECURITY IN CENTRAL ASIA

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Allow me, on behalf of the Secretariat of the Integration Committee of the Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEc), to express my gratitude to UNESCO and the OSCE Academy in Bishkek for their invitation to this international conference on 'Public Security and Peace in Central Asia', which will, we hope, help strengthen peace, stability and security in Central Asia.

The issue raised at the conference cannot help but concern the peoples of this region's countries and the world community. Today we are living in a world grown small, and disturbances anywhere can reverberate in other regions and continents.

Nearly fifteen years ago, after the collapse of the world socialist system and its superpower, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the countries of Central Asia won their national sovereignty. The Newly Independent States found themselves confronted with a broad set of problems to do with ensuring their own security. The problem was compounded by the fact that they lacked institutions and personnel able to tackle these problems independently.

In the intervening years, inter-ethnic, inter-clan, and inter-confessional problems that had built up and been suppressed under the USSR surfaced in some of the region's countries. Lately those problems have been worsened by the consequences of the socio-economic crisis that struck all the Central Asian countries during the last decade's economic reform. In *The Grand Chessboard*,⁵⁷ the well-known US political analyst Zbigniew Brzezinski even described the Central Asian region of the twenty-first century as the 'Central Asian Balkans', by which he meant that conflicts of varying intensity could keep breaking out here for a long time to come.

57 Zbigniew Brzezinski, *The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives*, Basic Books, 1997.

During a meeting with OSCE representatives in February 2000, Kazakh President N. A. Nazarbaev noted that terrorism, drugs and scarce water resources were the main threats to stability in Central Asia. Speaking at the opening of the second session of the Republic of Kazakhstan's Parliament on 1 September 2005, the head of state said: 'Today, however, I would like to emphasize another significant problem: ensuring the stability, security, and steady development of our region. It is one thing when Central Asia is a region of stability with a rapidly growing economy accompanied by social and democratic progress. And it is another when Central Asia is a region of poverty riven by internal conflicts and ethnic and religious strife, when an outburst of violence in one country sets an example to be copied in another.'

The president went on to note: 'We must admit that these explosive conflicts have been the domestic socio-economic problems that built up over all those years. Kazakhstan has 'avoided' such upheavals thanks specifically to its systematic policy for developing the economy and well-being of its people and for ensuring inter-confessional, inter-ethnic, and inter-cultural accord.'

Summing up his thoughts, the Kazakhstan leader stated: 'In addition – and I think you will agree with me – maintaining stability and prosperity throughout the Central Asian region is in the interests both of our country and of the international community.'

Today we can say that in the years of independence the region's countries successfully resolved many external security problems through cooperation not only with their immediate neighbours but also with the world's leading countries and authoritative international organizations. As a result of joint efforts, isolated armed conflicts have been halted and the threat of their recurrence has been somewhat reduced.

After the Central Asian states won their sovereignty, they shifted their economies to market relations, following various models and at varying speeds, which determined the characteristics of their economic development. What they shared, though, was a profound economic crisis and a drastic decline in living standards.

As a result, the Eurasian region began to experience particularly acute poverty-related problems and a self-awareness among the population that allowed the problems of economic inequality, demographics, migration, terrorism and the drug trade to 'bud' and take on a life of their own.

Of late, a nexus of tension whose representatives consist in many cases of the backbones of different antagonistic political and religious groups has made itself felt in the Fergana Valley (Uzbekistan). The objective basis for this phenomenon stems from the acute socio-economic situation in this region, which is feeling demographic pressure. The local production and social infrastructure are inadequate for the now extremely high population density.

The intricacy of the borders and the multi-ethnic make-up of the population, together with its high density, create a unique mosaic of conflicts and contradictions that demand a comprehensive solution to a whole set of related problems, among which the threats of separatism and ethnic violence pose the greatest danger. Moreover, because the Fergana Valley and the entire Central Asian region function as a transit corridor, the international drug mafia views them as a promising area for the drug trade.

All this means that eliminating these problems will require seriously confronting their underlying causes. Responding to a question in a live broadcast on 24 August 2005, President Nazarbaev recalled a pithy saying by Victor Hugo: 'Poverty begets revolution and revolution poverty.' If this vicious circle is to be broken, the countries' economic potential must be developed and a self-awareness shaped that fits the basic trends of development in the modern world.

To confirm the existence of the problem of poverty: in 2003, the average monthly wage (in US dollars) per worker was 179.2 in the Russian Federation, 154.5 in Kazakhstan, 120.8 in Belarus, 43.8 in Kyrgyzstan, and 14.6 in Tajikistan. International standards classify states where the wage is below US\$100 a month as the poorest countries in the world.

During the very first years of independence it was clear that resolving the economic crisis and ensuring state, economic, ecological and other security would require the development of cooperation in all spheres both among the states of the region and with their immediate neighbours and other states in the world community. In other words, it was essential to develop economic cooperation.

Aware of their community of interests in economic development, the presidents of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan signed a treaty in April 1994 establishing an economic union. Later, on 17 July 1998, after the Republic of Tajikistan decided to join the treaty, the regional association became the Central Asian Economic Community (CAEC). In February 2002, CAEC became CACO, the Central Asian Cooperation Organization.

Thus far, however, the development activities of CACO have not been effective enough. In a live broadcast late last month, President Nazarbaev commented: 'If in the end these associations ever achieve normality, then we could talk about one or two associations of the new format. For now, though, owing to the differences in our economies, the delays in reforms, and the differences in our policies, we cannot reach an agreement. Which, however, does not mean that we should not desire or work towards this in the long term.'

In January 1995, Belarus, Kazakhstan and the Russian Federation signed a Customs Union Agreement, which Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan later joined. Proclaimed as the main goal of the agreement's participants was the creation of conditions for the free movement of goods, capital and services, and the shaping of a common economic space.

On 10 October 2000, in order to advance the formation of the Customs Union more effectively, the Presidents of the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, the Russian Federation and the Republic of Tajikistan signed a treaty instituting the Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEc), which can be viewed as a working model for a future Eurasian Union (see structure chart).

It is evidently worth repeating that, on 8 May 2003, the United Nations approved the EurAsEc's status as an international organization,

and on 9 December 2003 it was granted observer status at the United Nations General Assembly.

By decision of 27 April 2003, the Inter-State Council of the Eurasian Economic Community (at the level of heads of state) approved 'Priority Areas for the Development of the Eurasian Economic Community during the Period 2003 to 2006 and Beyond' and measures for their implementation.

Based on the logic of the integration processes and socio-economic interests of the states of the Central Asian region, the following areas of activity may be considered key spheres for interaction:

- 1 Development of trade
- 2 Water resources and energy
- 3 Development of transport and infrastructure
- 4 Environmental protection
- 5 Migration

These areas of activity are not of course the only issues in the development of economic and social-humanitarian cooperation.

1 Development of trade

Main objectives

At present, the Community practises free trade. The necessary work is now under way for the transition in 2006 to the next stage, a customs union.

At this stage of integration, two areas are priorities: harmonization of trade regulations among the Community's Member States with respect to third countries; and the creation of equal terms for economic subjects of EurAsEc Member States engaged in foreign trade.

Implementation of the first of these objectives basically depends on establishing a common customs tariff and a common list of goods subject to non-tariff regulation and export control, and on harmonizing technical regulations.

The second objective is to set common rules for regulating foreign trade: a common licensing procedure for import and export operations; uniform rules for the application of technical regulations, standards and other technical requirements in the import and export of output; the harmonization of customs rules and taxes levied upon crossing the customs frontier, and so forth.

World experience in regulating foreign trade and the generally recognized standards for multilateral international treaties concluded within the framework of the United Nations, the World Trade Organization (WTO) and other organizations are being taken into account in the elaboration of harmonized standards.

Sequence of actions

Between 2002 and 2004, several documents were drawn up within the EurAsEc framework that are key to standardizing the rules regulating foreign trade. Some of these documents have already been approved; others are expected to be signed in 2005.

In October 2003, the heads of state of the EurAsEc Member States signed an agreement on common export controls. This document complies fully with treaty requirements in this area. In September 2004, during the development of this agreement, general requirements were approved for control procedures concerning foreign economic operations involving goods and technologies subject to export control.

The rules set fully meet WTO standards, in particular the Agreement on Import Licensing Procedures, and also use the 'single window' concept. Meanwhile the document establishes only general principles, and several documents regulating the licensing procedure in detail for individual categories of goods are scheduled to be approved for its development in 2005–06.

In March 2005 the agreement on principles for harmonizing the technical regulations of EurAsEc Member States was signed, providing for the elaboration and uniform application of common technical regulations for all five states.

Work is continuing in the Committee for Technical Control, Sanitary, Veterinary, and Phytosanitary Measures in Trade under the EurAsEc Integration Committee on harmonizing the legislation of EurAsEc Member States on technical regulations. The laws on competition and subsidies are also being unified, a necessary step towards eliminating the application of special protective, anti-dumping and compensation measures in reciprocal trade between Member States.

Thus be said that, by creating a common system regulating foreign trade, EurAsEc is also addressing the task of simplifying trade procedures, which is essential for developing foreign trade ties with third countries and for securing a long-term partnership between economic subjects, in turn extremely important for the stable development of the economies of the Community's Member States.

2 Water resources and energy

EurAsEc goals and initiatives in regional water and energy cooperation

One of the key problems for the countries of Central Asia is water resource use, which is closely tied to every aspect of the region's economic development and ecological security. Along with the scarce water resources and the arid climate, the fact that virtually all the rivers cross borders imposes significant limitations on this region's socio-economic development.

Moreover, the fact that the countries of the transboundary rivers' basins have different priorities and strategies for water use generates and increases tension in inter-state relations, reduces the economic potential for cooperation, and makes the region liable to escalating ecological crises.

To help solve this problem, national water policies must be synchronized with regional cooperation programmes for managing the waters of transboundary rivers, using international conventions and guiding principles for managing and preserving their water resources as the legal basis.

In 2004 the Secretariat of the EurAsEc⁵⁸ Integration Committee prepared a technical and economic report, *Prospects for Integration in the Energy and Water Sectors of Central Asia*. Study has shown that the rational use and development of the water and energy resources of the Syrdarya and Amudarya river basins (in conjunction with wide-scale, long-term investments in unfinished hydroelectric installations in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan) remains Central Asia's most acute regional problem.


The main difficulties in the relationships between the states of the Central Asian region in regulating water relations, and the basis for their conflicts, are:

- the recommendatory nature of the decisions taken at the level of the existing Inter-State Commission for Water Management Coordination (ICWC);
- the lack of correlation between the activities of water and energy management structures regionally nationally;
- the contradictions between the interests of the states of the upper and lower river valleys and the lack of an economic mechanism for regulating water use;
- the lack in existing inter-state structures of an effective mechanism for managing water resources.

One practical step towards solving existing problems would be to implement the EurAsEc programme to transfer surplus hydroelectricity, summer output, from Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan to the Russian Federation (through the networks of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan). This way not only can hydroelectric operations in the Syrdarya and Amudarya basins be balanced, but the hydroelectric sector in the countries of Central Asia will also become more attractive to investment.

This is a successful example of progress towards a common energy market for the EurAsEc countries. At the same time it indicates that, given the political will, there is a real chance for mutually beneficial regional cooperation in the water and energy sectors.

58 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eurasian_Economic_Community



Simultaneously, through joint actions, EurAsEc Member States are defining investment mechanisms for developing hydroelectricity, which must take into account the economic interests of the region's countries. In particular:

- Bilateral Russian–Tajik agreements have been signed on completion of construction of the Sangtudinskaya GES–1 (Hydroelectric Station–1) and the Rogunskaya GES in Tajikistan, and an agreement has been reached between the Islamic Republic of Iran and Tajikistan on construction of a Sangtudinskaya GES–2.
- Similar resolutions have been drawn up for the Kambaratinskaya GES–1 and GES–2 in Kyrgyzstan.

Further strengthening of integration processes by EurAsEc Member States should consider regulating water and energy relations and solving the region's ecological problems as an important factor.

In accordance with the 'Priority Areas' and their implementation within the scope of the Community, the following measures have been worked out and will be approved in the near future:

- a protocol on transferring electricity among EurAsEc Member States;

- an agreement on developing a combined fuel and energy balance-sheet for EurAsEc Member States;
- an agreement on a procedure for organizing, administering, operating and developing a common electricity market for EurAsEc Member States;
- an agreement on forming a common system to provide information for the energy market for EurAsEc Member States;
- an agreement on a procedure for organizing, administering, operating and developing a common oil and gas market for EurAsEc Member States.

3 Development of transport and infrastructure

Formation of a Transport Union and the fulfilment of transit potential

This objective appears in one of the main sections of the 'Priority Areas'. It provides for the development and implementation of a programme for the formation of a Common Transport Space for EurAsEc Member States, the development of a network of international 'East-West' and 'North-South' transport corridors, the creation of favourable tariff conditions, and so on.

In order to create favourable legal conditions for mutually beneficial cooperation among the transport complexes of the EurAsEc Member States, a comparative analysis has been made of national legislations regulating this sphere and proposals have been drawn up to harmonize them. An agreement has been signed on conducting a coordinated policy for creating and developing transport corridors for the Eurasian Economic Community.

To implement the provisions of this agreement, a list of transport corridors and routes of EurAsEc Member States has been drawn up which, pending approval by the agencies administering the integration, should become the Community's principal transport arteries.

The next step will be to investigate and evaluate the technical condition of the roads, waterways and water crossings, as well as the

corridors' entire infrastructure, including the border transit points recommended for inclusion in the list. The plan is to develop a special programme to bring Eurasian transport corridors into line with international standards, to ensure uninterrupted transit and export–import freight shipments through these corridors, to create rational schemes for locating international logistical centres, and to introduce multi–modal (mixed) freight shipments.

4 Environmental protection

The EurAsEc countries are implementing national strategies and action plans to protect the environment, and their participation in international programmes and conventions is expanding. However, the cumulative effect of these measures is still inadequate, as they do not take into consideration the transboundary nature of the ecological problems and there is no effective mechanism for coordination and interaction.

Regional security issues are still being considered outside the context of the effect of ecological factors and the need to improve the quality of the environment. Every EurAsEc Member State has ecological disaster regions resulting from the technogenic consequences of environmental impacts.

Environmental protection issues cannot be resolved by just one country as the ecological disaster zones are situated primarily in border regions. Measures to coordinate the policy and actions of all contiguous states are therefore essential.

The countries of the Community have noted a steady upward trend in production and an economic improvement. However, the critical state and continued depletion of capital assets, the shortage of financing to renew and modernize equipment, and the lack of effective economic incentives to promote the rational use of nature all compound existing ecological problems.

Improving the nature–protection activities of EurAsEc Member States at a time when the economy is growing is an important aspect

of the Community's integration processes. The primary objectives in this area are:

- to make the transition from an ecological policy based on fighting the consequences of dangerous transboundary environmental pollution to a concept based on averting ecological disasters;
- to create in the countries of the Community favourable legal and economic conditions to help advance innovative ecological and resource-saving technologies for the sake of ecologically safe output and reduced environmental pollution;
- to expand international cooperation with the goal of counteracting natural and technogenic ecological threats.

5 Migration

Migration problems in the EurAsEc countries are directly related to the specific nature of socio-economic development in this region and the post-Soviet region in general. Given expanding globalization, migration as a social phenomenon is an objective reality. However, uncontrolled, illegal migration is a threat to any country's national security. The issue is therefore how to minimize the costs and adverse effects of transboundary migration and turn its positive aspects to countries' advantage.

In the EurAsEc, the 'receiving' states are Kazakhstan and the Russian Federation, while the 'sending' states are Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, as well as Belarus (to Russia). In other words, while for Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan the topical issue is the labour drain, for Kazakhstan and Russia it is the influx of labour.

In Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan the outward migration of labour is a very important means of cushioning social discontent; it has allowed a significant segment of the population to escape starvation during a precipitous decline in production and massive unemployment. For these states, exporting labour provides an opportunity to build revenue through taxes on the profit of intermediate firms, investments from the income of returning migrants, and the hard currency that comes in from importer countries as compensation for labour used, and also raises the population's standard of living and solvent demand.

Exporting labour thus helps to reduce tension in the domestic labour markets of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, which is especially urgent given the high level of concealed unemployment, improves workers' qualifications and teaches them advanced principles of labour organization, attracts international organizations to solve the socio-economic problems of the labour-exporting countries, and optimizes labour reproduction.

Meanwhile, the positive effects of immigration for the receiving countries may to a significant degree be cancelled out by the uncontrolled influx of illegal migrants. Foreign migrants often compete in domestic labour markets. And if they can use low-paid imported labour, businesses lose any incentive to improve working conditions and their workers' qualifications.

More lawbreaking and the drug business go hand in hand with unlawful migration, although they are not always its consequence.

The problem of the increased unlawful migration is attended by the absence at the national and inter-state levels of objective and complete information about the migrants, to say nothing of a legal mechanism for regulating migration flows. As a consequence, the strategic area of socio-economic cooperation between EurAsEc Member States is linked to bringing order to the migration sphere and placing it under strict control.

Both the significance and the scale of labour migration, which affects the socio-economic, legal and other interests of EurAsEc citizens, coupled with the vulnerable position in which illegal migrants and the members of their families often find themselves, demand the establishment of general principles for a coordinated migration policy in the states of the Community.

The EurAsEc Integration Committee's Secretariat is preparing two draft agreements to make labour migration more manageable: 'The collection, analysis, and exchange of information about workers migrating between EurAsEc Member States' and 'Temporary labour activity in the Community by citizens of EurAsEc Member States'.

These drafts are aimed at tightening control over migration flows, regulating foreign labour migration at the inter-state level, and balancing supply and demand for labour within the context of the Community's common labour market, which is now taking shape.

Sequence of actions

EurAsEc Member States need to study both the worldwide experience of states that have long participated in labour export and import and the requirements of the Community's labour market.

Because the Community's common legal field is still incomplete, more coordinated cooperation is essential among the parties at inter-branch and interdepartmental levels. The parameters of the migration quota have to be examined on the basis of the principle of priority use of national labour resources with consideration for the labour market situation, the demographic situation, and the receiving parties' ability to find employment for foreign citizens and give them professional training in special programmes, including language instruction.

Migration can be put in order only if it is placed under strict control. Control is already being tightened over migration flows in Russia and Kazakhstan. As for those whose status is illegal, measures are being taken to deport them to their own states. In addition to harsh measures against unlawful migrants involved in crime, we need a set of measures to legalize migrant labour and ensure the rights of migrant workers.

It will take more than just strict control and regulation to realize the labour potential of migration. Also essential is an effective mechanism of economic and social incentives for migrants to work and live in regions where society most needs their labour. Long-term, multi-purpose socio-economic programmes to increase migration and prosperity in individual regions must be devised to develop and open up these regions strategically.

In conclusion, I would like to state that we are open to expanding and deepening interaction and constructive cooperation with all international organizations and institutions, in addition to regional and subregional economic organizations of states, on issues of our common and mutual interest in improving the population's quality of life, which in turn is an assurance of peace and security in the region.

There is a popular Kazakh saying: 'Where there is unity, there is prosperity!' We shall be moving in precisely that direction.

THE SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF TRANSFORMATION FOR THE NATIONAL ECONOMIES OF CENTRAL ASIA

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The recent history of the states of Central Asia goes back a little more than 14 years. In this time, certain results have been achieved in these countries that, despite the apparent statistical prosperity (Table 1), cannot be termed unambiguous, as the speed and content of the transformation processes have varied.


Table 1. Dynamics of GDP in Central Asia (1995–2004)										
	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004
Kazakhstan	91.8	100.5	101.7	98.1	102.7	109.8	113.5	109.8	109.3	109.4
Kyrgyzstan	94.6	107.1	109.9	102.1	103.7	105.4	105.3	100.0	107.0	107.1
Tajikistan	87.6	83.3	101.7	105.3	103.7	108.3	110.2	110.8	111.0	110.6
Uzbekistan	99.1	101.7	105.2	104.4	104.4	103.8	104.2	104.0	104.2	107.7

Source: Inter–State Statistical Committee of the Commonwealth of Independent States.

Kazakhstan is generally recognized as a leader in macroeconomic growth parameters not only among the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) but also among countries whose economic systems are undergoing systemic transformation. A comparative analysis of the dynamics of growth in transitional economies shows that the rates of change in real gross domestic product (GDP) in Kazakhstan have been higher than the average for the CIS and the states of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) (Figure 1).

In recent years, Kazakhstan has seen a revival in production, and the economy has moved to regular, steady growth. Since the financial crises in Asia and the Russian Federation in 1997 and 1998, which had a definite effect on Kazakhstan's economic growth, macroeconomic stability has been restored in the Republic. And this, as we know, is a prerequisite for economic growth.

Figure 1. Dynamics of real GDP in Kazakhstan, CEE and CIS (1995–2004)



Source: Based on *World Economic Outlook 2004*, p. 173; *World Economic Outlook 2005*, p. 201, Washington DC, International Monetary Fund.


Indeed, GDP rose from 2003 to 2004 by 9.4% and cumulative economic growth after the 1998 financial crisis was 54.5%.

According to data from the Inter-State Statistical Committee of the Commonwealth of Independent States, Kazakhstan and Belarus are the only CIS countries to have surpassed their 1990, pre-crisis level of development. Thus, in 2004 Kazakhstan's GDP had risen 103.4% over 1990, or 112.2% per capita (Figure 2).

In 1993, per capita GDP in Kazakhstan was US\$696. In 2004 it reached US\$2,713: i.e. 3.9 times higher. Note that in 2005 this indicator is expected to be about US\$3,000.

Two factors continue to influence the growth of Kazakhstan's economy. First, in recent years GDP growth has been helped by the favourable world market, especially high world prices for the republic's principal export goods – oil and ferrous and non-ferrous metals. Second are its fairly high rates of growth in industrial production (10.1%) and construction (11.2%). High production growth rates have also been characteristic of the service branches – transport (9.2%) and especially communications (32%).

Figure 2. Dynamics of real GDP in Kazakhstan (1990–2004)



Note: Estimated data cited for 2004.

Source: Based on data from the Agency of Statistics of the Republic of Kazakhstan.

According to preliminary data, the oil sector now accounts for approximately 16.5% of GDP (Table 2). This is virtually identical to the total contribution to GDP from the republic’s transport and construction sectors. Moreover, in the last seven years, the oil and gas sector’s share in GDP has grown by a factor of 2.4. The oil and gas sector accounts for 12.8% of the industrial structure, having increased threefold over this period. In the same period, the oil and gas sector’s share in construction rose by a factor of more than 1.3, reflecting the intensive development of new sites in this sector.

The reasons for these changes are obvious: the substantial increase in oil production (Figure 3), due to two factors. First, there has been a significant increase in the influx of foreign capital, especially direct foreign investments in the oil production branch. Second, the favourable world market for hydrocarbons has substantially influenced the oil sector of Kazakhstan’s economy. For the period 1985–2004, oil production increased overall by a factor of 2.6. At the same time, while in the first half of the 1990s there was a decrease in oil production, since 1998 there has been a steady increase.

Kazakhstan’s economic growth figures certainly look promising. However, other integration indicators for the quality of economic


Table 2. Oil and gas sector in GDP of Kazakhstan (1998–2004)							
	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004
Gross domestic product	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Oil and gas sector	6.8	9.7	14.0	13.1	14.2	14.3	16.4
Other sectors	93.2	90.3	86.0	86.9	85.8	85.7	83.6
Industry	24.3	28.2	32.6	30.6	29.5	29.1	31.1
Oil and gas sector	4.2	7.0	10.3	9.3	10.2	10.5	12.8
Oil and natural gas production and related services	3.4	6.2	9.3	8.0	9.1	9.3	11.5
Oil refining	0.8	0.8	1.0	1.3	1.1	1.2	1.3
Other sectors	20.1	21.2	22.3	21.3	19.3	18.6	18.4
Construction	4.9	4.7	5.2	5.5	6.4	6.0	5.9
Oil and gas sector	1.6	1.8	2.4	2.6	2.5	2.3	2.1
Other sectors	3.3	2.9	2.8	2.9	3.9	3.7	3.8
Transport	12.3	10.6	10.0	9.6	10.2	10.7	10.4
Oil and gas sector	0.6	0.7	1.0	0.8	1.2	1.1	1.1
Railways	0.2	0.3	0.4	0.3	0.4	0.3	1.3
Pipelines	0.4	0.4	0.6	0.5	0.8	0.8	0.8
Other sectors	11.7	9.9	9.0	8.8	9.0	9.6	9.2
Real estate operations	13.1	12.0	10.8	12.1	12.6	14.5	13.7
Oil and gas sector	0.3	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.4	0.4	0.4
Other sectors	12.8	11.8	10.5	11.8	12.2	14.1	13.3

Source: Agency of Statistics of the Republic of Kazakhstan, 2005.

growth and living standards offer a bleaker picture. At issue here, in particular, is gross domestic revenue (GDR), which equals the cost added by all resident producers plus any taxes on the output (minus any subsidy) not included in the cost of the output, plus net revenues from primary income (wages and property income) from non-resident sources.

All the Central Asian states except Kazakhstan are considered to be low-income states. Kazakhstan occupies second place, after the Russian Federation, among CIS states, for total per capita GDR, calculated in relation to purchasing power parity (GDR/PPP) – US\$8,920 and US\$6,170, respectively (Figure 4). By way of comparison, the average world level is US\$8,180, and in the countries of Europe and Central

Figure 3. Volumes and dynamics of oil production in Kazakhstan (1985–2004)




Source: Based on data from BP Statistical Review of World Energy, London, BP, June 2005, p. 40.

Asia it is US\$7,570. Moreover, among the 208 countries in the world, Kazakhstan occupies 101st place for this indicator and the Russian Federation 82nd. Note that the list is headed by Luxembourg, which has the highest GDR/PPP level per capita – US\$54,430.

Analysis of this parameter for all countries of the world produces some very interesting conclusions. Virtually all states whose economy

Figure 4. GDR/PPP in the world and Central Asia (2003)



Source: Based on data from World Development Report, Washington DC, World Bank, 2005.

has a raw materials orientation fall below 35th place in the world ratings (with the exception of Norway, which comes fourth in the world for this indicator). Kazakhstan, while outstripping the CIS states (except for the Russian Federation) for this development parameter, nonetheless lags significantly behind the CEE and Baltic countries.

Characteristically, in Kazakhstan the GDR/PPP index dropped by 3.1% in 2003. By contrast, levels in most of the countries under consideration except Belarus, together with world average and European average levels, have shown a decided upward trend. This is because in Kazakhstan a significant proportion of the property belongs to non-residents whose property revenue, together with the wages for foreign specialists and workers, is credited to other countries. In other words, the republic has experienced a drain of so-called factor incomes.

Without belittling the significance and successes in the transformation of Kazakhstan's economic systems, it seems we simply must turn our attention to some of their social consequences.

The top priority for the state's social policy has been raising the standard of living (Table 3) and improving the labour market and labour relations. To be fair, we should point out that the downward trend in the standard of living (especially in the first half of the 1990s) was caused by objective difficulties of the transformation period. The change for the better in individual quality-of-life parameters observed in recent years reflects the positive influence of economic growth.

Among the indicators presented in Table 3, the cause for greatest concern is the minimum wage, which verges on a threshold value of US\$1 a day. The minimum wage serves as an estimate for the scale of poverty and is an indicator of consumption of the most important basic foodstuffs, goods and services that provide a low standard of living meeting physiological consumption standards. This subsistence minimum was calculated in 1992 and consists of a minimum food basket and the cost of non-food goods, services, taxes and mandatory fees included as a specific proportion (30%) of the food assortment (twenty items in all). A new minimum wage standard is now being calculated that includes forty-three items.

Table 3. Main socio-economic indicators of the standard of living in Kazakhstan (2000–2004)					
Indicators	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004
Average nominal monthly wage:					
in national currency (tenge)	14,374	17,303	20,323	23,128	28,270
in US dollars	101	118	133	155	208
Average nominal monthly wage, as percentage of previous year	121.2	120.4	117.5	113.8	121.7
Real wage, as percentage of previous year	107.1	111.1	110.9	107.0	113.9
Average annual subsistence wage (tenge/ dollar)	4007 28.2	4596 31.3	4761 31.1	5128 34.3	5427 39.9
Average pension, as of end of year*	4462	4947	5818	8198	8628
Estimated average per capita nominal monthly income (tenge/ dollar)	6352 44.7	7670 52.3	8958 58.4	10,533 70.4	12,744 93.4
Estimated real income (percentage)	101.3	111.3	110.3	110.5	113.2
Proportion of labour earnings in all earnings (percentage)	79	77	77	76	77**
Minimum wage (tenge)	2680	3484	4181	5000	6600
Minimum old-age pension (tenge)	3500	4000	4336	5500	5800

Note: *Data include security structures; **Based on research data on households for fourth quarter of 2004.

A major social problem is the poverty inherent in any society. Poverty existed in Soviet society as well but was not admitted officially. The euphemism used was ‘of scant means’.

The early 1990s were marked by an unprecedented rise in poverty in virtually every CIS country. The restructuring of Kazakhstan’s economy, which involved a radical breakdown of production relations and the collapse of the social system, led to massive impoverishment. High unemployment, mounting income inequality and hyperinflation contributed to a drop in living standards and the appearance of a social

stratum of poor people that no ideological considerations could cover up.

Poverty peaked in 1998, when nearly two-fifths of the population had incomes below the subsistence minimum (Table 4). The highest percentage of poverty was observed in remote rural districts and small towns. In rural areas the percentage of poor was 38.5% in 2001, for example, with the highest percentage – 45.9%⁵⁹ – observed in Mangistausk *oblast*. Table 4 shows the poverty indicators.

Table 4. Poverty indicators in Kazakhstan (1996–2004)

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004
Proportion of population with below minimum wage incomes (%)	34.6	38.3	39.0	34.5	31.8	28.4	24.2	19.8	16.1
Depth of poverty		12.1	12.8	13.7	10.3	7.8	6.1	4.6	
Acuteness of poverty		3.1	3.8	5.5	4.0	3.1	2.2	1.6	
Funds coefficient			11.3	9.4	8.3	8.8	8.1	7.4	

Source: Y. K. Shokamanov (ed.), *Standard of Living: Statistical Collection*, Almaty, Agency of Statistics of the Republic of Kazakhstan, 2004.

World practice uses three main approaches to measure the scale of poverty: absolute, relative and subjective.

The absolute concept of poverty is based on establishing a minimum list of basic needs (the subsistence minimum) and the quantity of resources required to satisfy those needs. The official approach in Kazakhstan to defining poverty is based on the absolute concept whereby the poverty line is set at the subsistence minimum, which is oriented towards minimum physiological standards.

Under the relative approach to defining poverty, the welfare indicator is correlated not with minimum needs but with the level of material provision prevailing in a given country. In the context of this definition, there are two types of poverty. In the first, the emphasis is on the means for survival and the ability to purchase the

59 Y. K. Shokamanov (ed.), *Uroven' zhizni naseleniia. Statisticheskii sbornik* [Standard of Living of the Population. Statistical Collection], Almaty, Agency of Statistics of the Republic of Kazakhstan, 2004, p. 87.

goods necessary to satisfy basic needs. The second type is based on measuring poverty in terms of deprivations.

The subjective approach is based on the assumption that people themselves determine whether or not they are poor. Using this method (the research was done in 2004), 32.4% of households (average family size 4.6) considered themselves poor.⁶⁰ Assessing their income level as one at which they either lacked choice or had limited opportunities to satisfy their needs, 44.7% of households considered themselves poor.⁶¹

Poverty can be characterized by indicators of its depth and acuteness. A decrease in the proportion of the population with incomes below the subsistence minimum indicates an absolute drop in the number of poor people, but a decrease in the indicator of the depth of poverty reflects an increase in income for a population whose income had been below the subsistence minimum. A reduction in the poverty acuteness indicator is evidence of a decrease in distinctions in the degree of poverty among the poor themselves.

One of Kazakhstan's gravest problems has been significant income polarization, which, moreover, is quite acute whether viewed in territorial cross-section or with respect to citizens' social status (elite, entrepreneurs, budgetary workers, especially in science and education, pensioners, disabled people, etc.). There are also notable distinctions in per capita income depending on the number of members in a family. Therefore, in the sphere of social protection, one of the state's most important tasks is to elaborate standards for social provision and social services that set quantitative and qualitative parameters for citizens' lives.

Studies on the results of reforms in the CEE countries in the 1990s point to the flaw in the notion that social inequality is useful

60 Y. K. Shokamanov (ed.), *Uroven' zhizni naseleniia Respubliki Kazakhstan. Monitoring. Prichiny i usloviia bednosti. Rost blagosostoianiia* [Standard of Living of the Population of the Republic of Kazakhstan: Monitoring: Reasons and Conditions Of Poverty: Growth of Prosperity], Almaty, Agency of Statistics of the Republic of Kazakhstan, 2004, p. 5.

61 Ibid., p. 10.

for increasing economic activity during the transition to a market economy. Comparative assessments of the dynamics and level of income differentiation confirm the hypothesis that sharp income polarization hinders rather than stimulates economic growth. Unequal distribution of material goods exacerbates the problem of poverty for the population. Thus, even in the 1990s in the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland, Hungary and Slovenia, the average per capita income of the richest families was 4.5 to 5.5 times higher than the respective incomes of the poorest, in Bulgaria and Romania 10 times higher, and in the Russian Federation 15 times higher. According to World Bank estimates, in Kazakhstan the Gini Coefficient, which measures income inequality, rose between 1987 and 1995 by a factor of nearly 30. The poverty of a significant portion of the population was so blatant that in early 2000 the government officially recognized this problem. According to various estimates, 50%–60% of Kazakhstan's 15 million people were living below the subsistence minimum in the late 1990s. The subsistence minimum in 2000, according to official data, was about US\$28, or less than US\$1 a day. In 2004 this indicator was around US\$40.⁶² The *World Bank World Development Report 2000/2001* – 'Attacking Poverty' – calls the life of people living on less than US\$1 a day (1.2 billion out of a total of 6 billion people on the planet) 'extreme poverty'. According to that report, 'in the countries of Europe and Central Asia in transition to market economies, the number of people living on less than a dollar a day rose more than twentyfold'. The fact that there are now substantial numbers of poor inhabitants is a disgrace for a republic where virtually the entire population is literate and has received an education and vocational training.⁶³

A comparative analysis of average monthly wage indicators in the CIS countries (Table 5) demonstrates that Kazakhstan is among the leaders in terms of the average monthly wage, as expressed in dollars. In 2004, the average nominal wage in the republic was US\$208, in the Russian Federation US\$237, and in Belarus US\$161.80. According to

62 Based on data from the Agency of Statistics of the Republic of Kazakhstan.

63 Bulat D. Khusainov, 'Kazakhstan: economic development under globalization', *Central Asia and the Caucasus* (Sweden), No. 4(10), 2001.

Table 5. Average monthly nominal wage for workers in several CIS countries (1998–2004)*

	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2004 as % of 2003
Kazakhstan	119.0	99.0	101.1	118.0	132.6	154.6	208	174.8
Azerbaijan	43.5	44.8	49.5	55.8	64.9	78.8	98.4	226.2
Armenia	35.7	37.7	42.1	44.1	47.5	58.8	78.7	220.4
Belarus	106.3	70.8	73.6	86.6	104.9	120.8	161.8	152.2
Georgia	39.8	33.4	36.5	45.6	51.7	58.5	...	147.0**
Kyrgyzstan	40.1	26.9	25.7	30.0	35.9	43.8	51.7	128.9
Moldova	46.6	29.0	32.8	42.3	51.1	63.9	89.5	192.0
Russian Federation	108.3	61.8	79.0	111.1	139.1	179.2	237.0	218.8
Tajikistan	11.8	9.4	8.5	9.9	11.8	14.6	21.5	182.2
Ukraine	62.7	43.0	42.3	57.9	70.6	86.7	110.8	176,7

Note: *In US dollars at the national bank exchange rate; **2003 as percentage of 1998.

Source: Inter-State Statistical Committee of the Commonwealth of Independent States, 2005.

estimates from the Agency of Statistics of the Republic of Kazakhstan, in 2004 real wages were about 64% of the pre-reform level.

Thus, during the reforms, the problem of poverty acquired not only new proportions but also a new ‘face’. The drastic drop in living standards without any prospects for legally improving a family’s material position has encouraged broad segments of the population to enter the informal sector.

Households engage in informal economic activity as unincorporated businesses that are characterized by a low level of organizational structure, the presence of family relations, and the absence of any distinction between capital and labour. In addition to households, this category includes family associations and individual entrepreneurs producing goods or services for their own consumption or for sale (agricultural production on personal plots, individual housing construction, the private carrier trade, repair of household items, private hairdresser services, etc.). Often informal activity is based on secondary employment and in many instances is engaged in unprofessionally. The informal sector includes the hidden activities of these kinds of businesses.

While ‘Soviet’ poverty was defined by family and demographic factors and disability, in the reform years the ranks of the poor were swelled by the unemployed, the bulk of whom, on the basis of social characteristics, were middle-class and, according to the demographics, female (57%–59%). In 2001, 94.9% of the unemployed were aged 16–54 years,⁶⁴ and a significant number were able-bodied citizens. Employment indicators are cited in Table 6.

Table 6. Main employment indicators in Kazakhstan (1991–2004)

	1991	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004
Hired workers (thousands)	7389.5	4918.4	4271.3	3783.0	3354.2	3504.4	3863.3	4030.2	4229.6	4469.9
Hired workers as % of EAP	95.8	65.7	57.4	53.6	47.5	49.3	51.7	54.5	55.2	57.0
Unemployed (thousands)		970.6	967.8	925.0	950.0	906.4	780.3	690.7	672.1	658.8
Unemployed as % of EAP		13.0	13.0	13.1	13.5	12.8	10.4	9.3	8.8	8.4
Women among the unemployed							442.3	407.0	390.7	377.7
Self-employed (thousands)	326.7	1600.5	2201.0	2344.6	2751.2	2696.6	2835.5	2678.7	2755.6	2711.9
Self-employed as % of EAP	4.2	21.4	29.6	33.2	39.0	37.9	37.9	36.2	36.0	34.6
EAP (thousands)	7716.2	7489.5	7440.1	7052.6	7055.4	7107.4	7479.1	7399.7	7657.3	7840.6

Note: EAP = economically active population.

Source: Agency of Statistics of the Republic of Kazakhstan.

A comparative analysis of unemployment data shows that Kazakhstan ‘leads’ among the states of Central Asia for this indicator (Table 7). However, the real situation in these states is probably quite different, owing to two factors. First, International Labour Organization methods calculate unemployment on the sole basis of people officially registered at the labour exchange. In Kazakhstan there are probably many more people who, for one reason or another, have lost their jobs and believe in the possibility of finding

64 A. A. Smailov (ed.), *Trud i zaniatost’ naseleniia v Kazakhstane. Statisticheskii sbornik* [Labour and Employment of the Population in Kazakhstan: Statistical Collection], Almaty, 2003, p. 246.

Table 7. Percentage unemployment in Central Asia (1995–2003)*

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003
Kazakhstan	11.0	13.0	13.0	13.1	13.5	12.8	10.4	9.3	8.8
Kyrgyzstan	2.9	4.3	3.0	3.1	2.9	3.0	3.1	3.1	2.9
Tajikistan	2.0	2.6	2.8	2.9	2.8	2.4	2.3	2.6	2.3
Uzbekistan	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	–	–

* *Proportion of total unemployed in economically active population.*

employment through these exchanges; in the other countries of the region these services are less efficient. Second, economic development in Kazakhstan is significantly higher than elsewhere in Central Asia, as shown above.

Major work was done in Kazakhstan during the transformation period to reform the social sphere and the social protection system. The Kazakh Government approved and is implementing seventy-five state and branch programmes directly or indirectly concerned with improving the standard of living. In particular, the 2000–2002 Programme to Combat Poverty and Unemployment has been carried out. Measures provided for in the 2003–2005 Programme to Reduce Poverty in the Republic of Kazakhstan are being completed at the time of writing.

The fact that the country's economic development has exceeded target rates justifies a basic review of the Strategy for Kazakhstan's Development to 2030. As Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbaev stated at a meeting with business people in Almaty on a working trip to the region, 'we were planning to double the size of the economy by 2010. I think we may accomplish this by the end of 2007, and definitely in 2008'. Also, in President Nazarbaev's opinion, plans to multiply the size of the economy by 3.5 by 2015 will be fulfilled before the scheduled deadline. The aforesaid document would, he announced, be duly amended by the end of 2005, and the new target for Kazakhstan is to be one of the world's fifty most competitive states and among the twenty most developed countries.

It seems to us that there is every reason to set the target in this way. In 2005, for the first time, the World Economic Forum (WEF) included the CIS countries in its assessment of economic competitiveness. Of

117 countries in the world, Kazakhstan came 61st, and among CIS countries first. By way of comparison, the Russian Federation came 75th in the world, Tajikistan 104th, and Kyrgyzstan 116th. Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan were not included in the WEF assessment.


Making the economy more competitive also presupposes not only meeting targets for economic growth itself and the competitiveness of domestic output on the world market, but also meeting social targets, inasmuch as a country's economic competitiveness is measured by an array of indicators, including social ones.

In this regard, the question arises as to what real reserves Kazakhstan possesses, for example, for improving the state's social policy.

First there are its financial reserves, as supported by the following facts.

Despite significant growth in oil exports, Kazakhstan's economy has had a serious problem meeting the state budget. In the last ten years, the country's budget (in dollar equivalent) has grown by a factor of nearly 2.7 (Figure 5). Meanwhile, exports of oil and gas condensate in that period rose in value terms by a factor of nearly 14.4. By way of

Figure 5. Volumes and dynamics of changes in state budget revenues and cost of oil exports from Kazakhstan (1995–2004: 1995 = 100)



Source: Agency of Statistics of the Republic of Kazakhstan.

comparison, between 1998 and 2004 the Russian Federation's budget increased from US\$20 billion to US\$120 billion, which to some extent was helped by the single-rate income tax (13%).

A characteristic feature of the country's export of raw hydrocarbons is its geographical orientation. Most of the crude oil and gas condensate is being exported to countries outside the CIS, whose share has been rising steadily. While in 2003 CIS countries took 16.4% of total hydrocarbon exports, the corresponding proportion for 2004 was 10.1%. The rest of the oil is 'draining out' to more distant foreign countries, primarily to offshore zones (mainly in the Bermuda Islands). The reorientation of exports to offshore zones is the result mainly of the following specific characteristic in the development of the republic's oil sector.

At issue here is the practice of transfer pricing used by oil companies (foreign and domestic) for deliveries of raw hydrocarbons outside Kazakhstan. In essence, this is one of the methods used in the 'shadow' export of capital. In Kazakhstan, as in other CIS countries, the transfer pricing mechanism, which major transnational corporations use intentionally to move capital out of the country, is becoming increasingly sophisticated. As a result of these manipulations, it is very hard to prove the affiliation of the parties to a transaction and, as a result, nearly impossible to prove deliberate underpricing.

Meanwhile, a significant share of the republic's strategic resources is exported at below-market prices. As an example, we cite several calculations (Table 8) that are quite valid for macroeconomic analysis.

According to our assessments, between 1998 and 2004 potential losses from transfer prices for oil exports totalled US\$12,098.3 million. If the maximum marginal rate for corporate taxes is 30%, it can be said that during those years Kazakhstan's state budget received about US\$3,629.6 million less than it should have done from oil exports. And these are only the nominal losses; the real losses are much greater.

In reality, the tax burden on oil companies in Kazakhstan is significantly lower. According to the Kazakh Ministry of Finance,

Table 8. Oil exports and losses from transfer prices in Kazakhstan (1997–2004)

	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004
Crude oil exports (millions of tonnes)	20.4	25.2	27.7	32.4	39.1	43.5	47.7
Average annual value of exports (US\$/tonne)	80.9	91.6	153.4	131.3	128.6	161.2	226.4
Average annual world Brent crude oil price (US\$/tonne)	95.4	133.6	213.8	183.3	187.7	216.2	280.5
Losses from transfer prices (US\$ millions)	295.8	1058.4	1773.1	1684.8	2310.8	2392.5	2582.9

Note: 1 tonne = 7.5 barrels.

Sources: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development; Agency of Statistics of the Republic of Kazakhstan.

the net coefficient of the tax burden on crude oil and natural gas production, as well as on services in these branches, averaged 17.2% in 2003. In recent years, contrary to elementary logic, this coefficient has been extremely low for the largest foreign oil companies.

Of forty-four states exporting raw hydrocarbons, Kazakhstan is in 21st place. Meanwhile, the oil and gas sector accounts for only 6.2% of the country's fiscal revenue, which is several times lower than in many Arab States (Table 9).

The second factor in economic growth is that there must be a substantial curtailment in the share of the unobserved economy, including the informal economy (Figure 6).

The unobserved economy has three components:

- The hidden (underground) component, which includes all types of lawful activity unknown to the state administration for various reasons, including: evasion of VAT payments; evasion of social insurance payments; violation of laws on pay, protection of labour, and so on; and failure to complete statistical forms. The underground economy consists of 'economically underground activity', which includes 'tax dodging' and unregistered activity on account of poor statistics. As a rule, hidden activity is found in those branches of the economy

Table 9. Hydrocarbon exports and fiscal revenue of several oil- and gas-producing countries (2003)


Country	Hydrocarbons as proportion of exports:		Oil and gas sector share in the country's fiscal revenues
	in world oil and gas exports	in country's GDP	
Saudi Arabia	13.5	38.3	28.1
Russian Federation	11.8	17.0	6.0
Norway	6.5	18.4	12.2
United Arab Emirates	4.7	36.8	35.8
Iran, Islamic Rep. of	4.3	19.8	16.3
Nigeria	4.3	46.1	28.0
Venezuela	3.3	24.6	23.0
Kuwait	3.0	44.8	48.1
Qatar	1.5	47.0	24.9
Kazakhstan (21st place)	1.1	23.6	6.2
Bahrain	0.8	53.9	24.4
Azerbaijan	0.4	31.5	15.2
Brunei Darussalam	0.6	80.0	29.1
Turkmenistan	0.5	26.6	9.3
Uzbekistan	0.1	3.8	5.2

Source: *Oil Market Developments and Issues*, Washington DC, International Monetary Fund, 1 March 2005, p. 26.

where goods and services are mainly provided on a cash basis, and is fostered by the fact of the unreliable information officially provided by the branches.

- The informal component includes unregistered production in the household sector. In this sector we can also distinguish between 'economically underground activity' and 'statistically underground activity'. This sector encompasses a great variety of unregistered types of activity. The main problems are (a) the submission of understated reports by registered unincorporated businesses; (b) the existence of a large number of un-

Figure 6. Percentage share of the unobserved economy in Kazakhstan's GDP



Source: Agency of Statistics of the Republic of Kazakhstan.

registered unincorporated businesses; and (c) the existence of unregistered employees in the unincorporated sector.

- The illegal component includes the production of goods and services whose sale and distribution (as well as possession) are prohibited by law, such as drugs and prostitution, together with all types of production permitted by law but engaged in by individuals not entitled to do so (e.g. medical services).

Third, one of the most important prerequisites for a country's economic growth is the expansion of domestic demand, which is a powerful incentive for stepping up domestic production. Therefore the state's efforts must be directed towards higher pay. Special attention is needed for pay issues in the budgetary sphere, primarily covering non-material production. Higher pay for workers here would be bound to raise pay in the real sector of the economy and so expand domestic consumption. At the same time, it should be noted that any increase in pay should be commensurate with the objective cost of labour in both material and non-material production.

Fourth, one of the most effective means of social support for poor segments of the population the world over has been the development of small entrepreneurship, an important component of which is the development of a microcredit system. This part of the financial market, which is the most appropriate mechanism for solving society's

social problems, has so far been virtually ignored. Microcredits are intended to offer financial services to anyone lacking access to traditional financing resources. This includes not only the poor but also better-off owners of micro and small businesses. Therefore an independent and efficient system of microcredit organizations is needed. Their main purpose must be to provide reliable long-term financing for entrepreneurs.

One other promising direction is dynamic development of the service sector. Applied to Kazakhstan, such expansion could help to increase employment, especially for women. Even though this sector's share of GDP increased from 33.6% in 1990 to 50.7% in 2004, there is still considerable room for growth. By way of comparison, in 2003 the share of services in world GDP was about 68%. In high-income countries, the share of services averaged 71%, including 69% in Germany, 73% in the United Kingdom, 75% in the United States, 72% in France and 68% in Japan. Occupying first place in the world for this indicator is Hong Kong (88%), now part of China. It is noteworthy that in some developing countries the share of services in GDP is also quite significant: 73% in Brazil, 70% in Mexico, and 81% in Panama. For the CIS this indicator averages 46%. Among the CIS leaders we can point to the Russian Federation with 61% and Kazakhstan with 51%; the rear is brought up by Turkmenistan with 30% and Azerbaijan with 29%.⁶⁵

65 Based on data from *World Development Report 2005: A Better Investment Climate for Everyone*, Washington DC, World Bank, 2005, pp. 260–61.

ISLAM IN CENTRAL ASIA: TODAY AND TOMORROW

(The view from Tajikistan)

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As a rule, when people speak of Islam in modern Central Asia, they note its revival, implicitly referring to a broad range of phenomena: the extensive construction of mosques; the spread of religious education and instruction; the restoration of Islamic law regulating certain spheres of private life; the legal activities of political religious organizations, including parties; the spread of underground oppositional Islamic trends; and the activities of armed extremist groups.

However, despite this sweep of recent phenomena in Central Asian Islam, there is no acceptable nomenclature or satisfactory explanation for them. The terms being used – ‘revival’, ‘Islamic renaissance’, ‘re-Islamization’, ‘secondary Islamization’, ‘spread of fundamentalism’ – have given rise to heated debates among scholars. There have also been animated discussions as to whether Islam’s revival in Central Asia is a result of the region’s independent spiritual, social and political development or a phenomenon foisted upon it from without. Scholars are also divided over the issue of whether Central Asia during the Soviet period could be considered part of the Islamic world or whether it developed autonomously along the atheistic lines of the communist experiment. These debates have been harshest between two US analysts, Allen Hetmanek and Muriel Atkin.⁶⁶ Elsewhere, Stéphane Dudoignon of France most consistently defends the view that the Islamic revival in Central

⁶⁶ Allen Hetmanek, ‘Islamic revolution and *jihad* come to the former Soviet Central Asia: the case of Tajikistan’, *Central Asian Survey*, Vol. 12, No. 18, 1994; Muriel Atkin, ‘Religious and other identities in Central Asia’, in Jo Ann Gross (ed.), *Muslims in Central Asia: Expressions of Identity and Change* Durham, N.C., Duke University Press, 1992; Muriel Atkin, ‘Tajikistan: reform, reaction and civil war’, in Ian Bremmer and Roy Taras (eds), *New States, New Politics*, Cambridge University Press, 1997.

Asia has its own roots.⁶⁷ However, the limited study of the problem and the acute shortage of empirical research hinder the formation of well-argued positions on this issue.

The link between Islam and security raises the most questions. Why have opposition movements in Central Asia during the era of independence almost always been linked to Islam? What is the nature of the Islamic movement in Central Asia? If this is primarily a social protest movement, then why does the Islamic component play such an important part?

To answer these questions, we must study the Islamic movement in Central Asia in the social context of the changes that have occurred in the region over the last twenty years, analyse their social basis, and examine the political component of the Islamic movement and the problems it is encountering at the present stage.

It has to date been widely believed that owing to the Soviet policy of state atheism, involving as it did extensive destruction and emigration of Muslim clergy in the early years of Soviet power, Islamic thought in the region virtually died out during the period. As a result, Islam began to function in Central Asian societies primarily as a tradition, a way of life, and the basis for cultural identity but not as a world view and ideology. If we take this as our premise, then we have to agree with the opinion of the overwhelming majority of scholars, who feel that Islam's revival in the 1980s and 1990s in Central Asia, which included the rapid spread of a political Islamic movement, was the result of outside influence, proselytizing. The activities of international Islamic organizations have been exceptionally successful, they suggest, owing to the spiritual vacuum that formed as a result of the collapse of communist ideology.

This explanation cannot satisfy us, however, since it does not provide the key to understanding the scale and diversity of forms inside the Islamic movement in Central Asia. Nor does it explain

67 See Stéphane Dudoignon, 'Political parties and forces in Tajikistan, 1989–1993', in Mohammad Reza Djahlili, Frédéric Grare and Shirin Akiner (eds), *Tajikistan: The Trials of Independence*, Surrey, Curzon Press, 1998.

the massive spread in the region of little-known radical Islamic movements such as Hizb at-Takhrir.⁶⁸

Research in the last few years⁶⁹ demonstrates that Islam survived and developed in Central Asia during the Soviet era not only within the context of ‘popular’ Islam but also as dogmatic Islam and theological and legal Islamic thought. Informal Muslim spiritual leaders who preserved and supported Islamic tradition and handed down Islamic scholarship to the younger generations ensured the functioning and development of dogmatic Islam.

After the Soviet Union broke up and sovereignty was attained, each Central Asian country faced its own unique and highly complex task of building a state that was true to its own traditions and political culture. The search for Islam’s place in the nation-states being formed began immediately. Now, after nearly fifteen years of independent existence, we can see that some problems have been resolved and some trends defined in the evolution of religious policy in the new states of Central Asia. However, many problems remain unresolved and have in fact been exacerbated. In addition, new challenges have arisen in connection with the events of 11 September 2001: failed social policy, the slippage of political reforms in the region’s countries, and the mounting barriers between countries, which hinder the economic and social development of the Central Asian countries.

Even now, Islam continues to be a very important component of the cultural, civilizational and ethnic self-identity of Tajiks and Uzbeks and, to a significantly lesser extent, Kazakhs and Kyrgyzs. Moreover, in the post-Soviet period, Islam’s influence on Central Asian societies has increased dramatically and continues to grow.

68 Hizb at-Takhrir is an Islamic movement that rejects contact with the existing nation-states on principle, believing that they have discredited themselves and are not open to reform in their present form.

69 *Musul'manskie lidery: sotsial'naia rol' i avtoritet* [Muslim Leaders: Social Role and Authority], Dushanbe, Sharq Research Center/Friedrich Ebert Stiftung Foundation, 2003.

Nonetheless, not a single Central Asian country has yet demonstrated an appropriate response to these processes. This is unsurprising, as the countries liberated from state atheism have still not worked out a clear notion of secularism, formulated the content for the secularization process, or found authentic philosophical and world-view foundations for it, without which they cannot elaborate intelligent concepts of the relationship between the state and religion.

The muddled understanding of secularism's essence has resulted in contradictory national laws on religion. There is no clear, precise notion of how to ensure freedom of religion and convictions or what the boundaries of this freedom are.⁷⁰ It is no surprise that the relationship between religion, particularly Islam, and the state is rife with conflict in all the Central Asian countries. The problems cited have taken on special urgency because the processes under way in Central Asia are unfolding in the context of globalization and the spread of conflicts of which religion forms an integral part. Unfortunately, the dialogue among religions and the achievement of tolerance are in profound crisis. There are also special problems connected with Islam, especially since the events of 11 September and the anti-terrorist campaign.

All this has placed on the agenda a number of dire problems in the relationships between religion and society, religion and the state, and religions among themselves. The direction, dynamics, and stability of the development of the state and political systems taking shape in the countries of Central Asia will depend largely on the forms their interaction with religion takes.

To understand the nature of the Islamic movement's rise in Central Asia, we must apparently turn first to a study of the social

70 Arne Seifert and Anna Kreikemeyer, 'Preventivnaia stabilizatsiia posredstvom svetsko-islamskikh kompromissov' [Preventive stabilization through secular-Islamic compromises], in Arne C. Seifert and Anna Kreikemeyer (eds), *O sovместимости politicheskogo islama i bezopasnosti v prostranstve OBSE. Dokumenty svetsko-islamskogo dialoga v Tadzhikistane* [On the Compatability of Political Islam and Security in the OSCE: Documents from the Secular-Islamic Dialogue in Tajikistan], Dushanbe, 2003, pp. 8-26.

aspects of Islam's development in the region. Islamism's social roots in Central Asia have already attracted scholars' attention.⁷¹ However, the religious positions of individual social and age groups have not been examined, although such research could substantially expand our knowledge of the 'Islamic renaissance' in Central Asia.

Perhaps the most interesting group in the light of the theme under study is young people. The transformational processes that Central Asian societies are undergoing today are most acute and dynamic among young people, who are adapting much more rapidly than adults to economic and social changes. Young people as a specific social–demographic group combine the past and future, the possible and the actual. For example, it would be hard to overstate young people's role in shaping the future of a country such as Tajikistan, as they constitute the largest population group. According to the National Census conducted in the Republic of Tajikistan in 2000, the average age of the population is 22.8 years, and people under the age of 29 account for 70% of the country's population.⁷²

Moreover, we know that it is among young people that the activities of extremist organizations of various orientations, including religious, are unfolding. The spread of the influence of the illegal Islamic party Hizb at–Tahrir in all the countries of Central Asia, the appearance of the new underground groups Jamaat and Bayat, and a phenomenon never seen before in Central Asia – terrorist acts involving suicide bombers – compel us to study young people's attitudes towards religion in the social context of the recent changes that have taken place in the region.

71 Sergei Abashin, 'Sotsial'nye korni sredneaziatskogo islamizma (na primere uzbekskogo kishlaka)' [Social roots of Central Asian Islamism (on the example of the Uzbek *kishlak*)], in A. V. Malashenko and M. B. Olcott (eds), *Identichnost' i konflikt v postsovetskikh obshchestvakh* [Identity and Conflict in Post–Soviet Societies], Moscow: Carnegie Endowment, 1997; Bakhtiyar Babjanov, 'The Fergana Valley: source or victim of Islamic fundamentalism?' in Lena Jonson (ed.), *Political Islam and Conflicts in Russia and Central Asia*, Stockholm, Swedish Institute of International Affairs, 1998, pp. 112–23.

72 *The Population of the Republic of Tajikistan 2000*, Dushanbe, State Committee on Statistics of the Republic of Tajikistan, 2002, p. 65.

On the basis of material from public opinion surveys conducted in Tajikistan and interviews with young believers and representatives of the Muslim clergy, this paper examines the following questions:

- Changes in the perception of religion among young people;
- Islam's value significance for young people;
- 'Moderates' and radicals among young people;
- The attitude of young people and society as a whole to political Islam;
- The attitude of young people to extremist religious trends.

The data come from a June 2005 public opinion survey on religious problems and a series of interviews conducted in Dushanbe, Khudzhent and Isfara (Tajikistan), Tashkent (Uzbekistan), and Osha and Batken (Kyrgyzstan) in 2004 and 2005 in connection with the research project on Muslim Leaders in Modern Muslim Central Asian Society, which was supported by the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation.⁷³ Also used are data from public opinion surveys conducted in Tajikistan by the Sharq Research Center over the last ten years.⁷⁴

Political Islam in Tajikistan

For centuries, the territories that now make up the Republic of Tajikistan were not merely a part of the Muslim world but one of the centres of Islamic thought, science and culture. The tremendous spiritual culture created by Tajiks and Uzbeks within the context of Muslim civilization became an inalienable part of and foundation for public consciousness in Tajikistan.

During Tajikistan's years within the USSR, representatives of various ethnic groups and confessions migrated there: Russian

73 *Public Opinion. Tajikistan. 2005*, manuscript, Dushanbe, Sharq Research Center. The survey was conducted in June 2000 on a nationally representative, random sample representing all strata of Tajikistan's population and included 1,000 respondents from every region of the Republic of Tajikistan.

74 The surveys were conducted on a nationally representative sample and included 1,000–1,500 people from ninety localities in all *oblasts* of Tajikistan. The sample was arrived at by random selection and was clustered and multi-step in nature.

Orthodox, Lutherans, Catholics, followers of other Christian dogmas, Buddhists. A significant portion of Tajikistan's non-native inhabitants were atheists; however, for Tajikistan's native population, their unique regional version of Islam continued to be the basis of their world view and way of life during the Soviet era. In spite of harsh pressure from atheism, Islam continued to develop in Central Asia during the Soviet period; the tradition and continuity were never broken. Beginning with the Kokand *mullahs*, who found refuge in eastern Bukhara in the 1920s and 1930s, through the *ishans* and *hodjas* who supported disgraced Islamic intellectuals in the 1950s and 1960s, Islamic theological and legal thinking continued to develop in various forms, including reformism. Throughout this development, the most acute and burning issues of Islam's existence in the Soviet Union were decided: the relationship between Islam and the state, Islam's place in society, and the place and role of Islamic spiritual leaders in social and political life.

The Islamic revival began on the threshold of the break-up of the USSR. Most of the population, which during the Soviet era had been forced to conceal their views, could now openly demonstrate their devotion to Islam.

Political Islamic organizations arose that took part in the armed struggle of the intra-Tajik conflict immediately after the USSR's break-up. The Islamic Revival Party of Tajikistan (PIVT), along with the Democratic Party and other political organizations, formed the United Tajik Opposition (OTO), which in 1992 took up armed resistance against the government. Five years of armed conflict and a lengthy negotiation process ended in the signing of the General Agreement on the Establishment of Peace and National Accord between the Government of the Republic of Tajikistan and the United Tajik Opposition on 27 June 1997, in Moscow. The signing of the 1997 Peace Agreements marked the beginning of active postwar reconstruction and reintegration, in which the Islamic political movement took an active part. Under the Peace Agreements, 30% of the country's top posts were to be held by OTO followers, most of whom were PIVT members or supporters.

The National Reconciliation Commission, made up of government and opposition representatives, played a key role in the peace process. The armed Islamic movement and the irregular armed pro-government formations (Popular Front) disarmed and disbanded their detachments. In 1999, after the ban was lifted on opposition political parties that belonged to the OTO, the PIVT began the difficult transition from military-political formation to legal parliamentary-type political party. Islamists participated in the first post-conflict elections and won two deputy's seats. The PIVT reinforced its place in the legal political process in the February 2005 parliamentary elections, when Islamists also won two parliamentary seats. Tajikistan is at present the only country in the region where the religious Islamist PIVT plays an important role in the political process and is one of the three largest political parties.

Attitude to Islam: religious activism among young people

Although during the Soviet period Islam dominated in Tajikistan, the lack of reliable data makes it impossible to estimate even approximately the number of believers. Nonetheless, atheists were undoubtedly fairly numerous. The situation changed abruptly after the break-up of the USSR and independence. In 1996, according to a National Public Opinion Survey in Tajikistan, 97% of respondents reported that they were believers. Moreover, 90% of all those surveyed said that they were Muslims, 4% Russian Orthodox, 1% followers of other religions, 2% atheists, and 2% did not respond.⁷⁵ In June 2005, 95.4% of respondents said they were Muslims, 3.5% Christians of various denominations, 0.2% followers of another religion, 0.5% atheists, 0.2% did not confess any specific faith, and 0.2% did not respond.⁷⁶

During the Soviet era, representatives of the older generation were noted for the greatest religiosity. Young people were much less

75 Steven Wagner, *Public Opinion: Tajikistan: 1996*, Washington DC, International Foundation for Election Systems, 1997, p. 107. This survey was conducted in December 1996 on a nationally representative random sample representing all strata of Tajikistan's population. A method of personal interviews in respondents' homes was used to survey 1,500 respondents from all regions.

76 *Public Opinion. Tajikistan. 2005*, op. cit.

devout. This situation has changed radically. Judging from public opinion surveys, there are now virtually no young atheists. The level of religiosity also depended on people's education. The higher the level of education, the fewer active believers there were. This situation has changed substantially. Now this pattern holds only for age groups over 25 years. Among younger groups, the level of religiosity does not depend on education. Moreover, according to survey data, students are more devout than pensioners.

The pattern in the post-Soviet era has been a higher level of religious activism in young people than among adults, which is a change in traditional standards of behaviour. In Tajik society, tradition has reinforced young people's free attitude to the observance of Islam's basic requirements, in particular attending mosque, daily prayer, fasting and participation in religious rites. People generally believe that all these standards become mandatory after young people move into the age group of adults, householders and parents of families.

In recent years, however, Tajikistan's young Muslims have treated observance of religious standards much more strictly than their parents did when they were young. Their level of religious activism approaches that of 40-year-olds. Closer examination of this issue shows that one of the main mandatory religious requirements is prayer. Every day, 12% of young people aged 18–29 and 30% of people aged 40–49 perform the *namaz* five times daily; whereas 40% of people aged 18–29 and 41% of those aged 40–49 do not pray regularly.⁷⁷

An equally important requirement of Islam is fasting during Ramadan. A strict fast is observed by 64% of people aged 18–29, while 24% fast irregularly. By way of comparison, data for the 40–49 age group show that 73% observe a strict fast and 18% fast irregularly.⁷⁸

In the post-Soviet era, there has been a cardinal change in young people's attitude to attending mosque. Whereas before the collapse of the USSR there were seventeen functioning *jamis* (Friday mosques), there are now 300 of them in Tajikistan. Six new *jamis* opened in the

77 Ibid.

78 Ibid.

first half of 2005 alone.⁷⁹ A no less important role than that of the *jamis* is played by the neighbourhood mosques, which have become centres of community spiritual, religious and social life. There are now more than 3,000 functioning registered neighbourhood mosques and many unregistered mosques in Tajikistan. These are particularly important for young people, for whom the mosques provide contact and the chance to discuss topics of concern and obtain information.

Mosques are also philanthropic organizers. Surveys and interviews conducted in Dushanbe in 2004 and 2005 show that most high- or middle-income men donate a percentage of their income to charity regularly through the mosques.

Material cited in studies demonstrates that the observance of religious injunctions by young people has been dictated mainly by a sense of duty to older family members, by pressure from society, which demands fulfilment of various Islamic injunctions as proof of adherence to a given social, age or gender group, and by personal conviction. The latter aspect is becoming increasingly significant, especially among younger age groups. Evidence of this comes from survey material: 70% of those surveyed said they considered themselves Muslims above all because their parents were Muslims; and 15.4% believed Islam to be an inalienable part of the national culture. They believe that ethnic Tajiks should be Muslims, since Islam is the Tajiks' tradition, mother culture and way of life. Among the newly converted, 7.5% are Russians and Germans who have studied Islam and consciously accepted it as the one true religion; 6.4% have never given any thought whatsoever to why they consider themselves Muslims.⁸⁰

Religious education: Islam's role in young people's socialization

Most of Tajikistan's Muslims, except for the newly converted, were introduced to Islam in their families, where they received the

79 Salimakhon Vakhobzade, 'O religii' [On religion], in *Narodnaia gazeta* (Dushanbe), No. 31, 3 August 2005, p. 4.

80 *Public Opinion. Tajikistan. 2003*, Dushanbe, Sharq Research Center. A nationally representative sample of 800 people.

rudiments of religious knowledge concerning reading the Koran, dogmatics, rituals, *fiqh* and the Arabic language. Nearly half the Muslims surveyed received their religious education at home: 23.3% had studied with their parents, grandfathers and grandmothers; and 13% had acquired their religious knowledge at home from relatives, acquaintances, neighbours, or private tutors with family ties to the pupils and belonging to the same community. Only 3.4% of the Muslims surveyed had acquired their religious knowledge outside their family and community. Of these, 2% had studied in a mosque, 0.3% had graduated from a *madrasa*, 1.1% of the women surveyed had acquired their religious knowledge from a *bibi-khalif* (a female tutor and expert in Muslim learning), and 25.3% had received no religious instruction at all.⁸¹ The prevalence of familial religious education, when knowledge is transmitted within a family from older to younger relatives, indicates that, despite atheistic pressure during the Soviet era, Islam remained a key element in the culture, outlook and way of life of Tajik society. Only a quarter of the respondents (25.3%) grew up in families that were unable or did not consider it necessary to give their children any religious education.

The family's role in preparing young religious leaders is exceptional. Materials from interviews with young *mullahs* (clergymen), young PIVT members, and activists in religious communities have shown that deeply devout parents or relatives played a major role in each respondent's socialization. Especially influential were those relatives who were knowledgeable about Islamic scholarship. The choice of outlook is also dictated by family traditions and traditionally reinforced adherence to a specific sphere of activity. If the ancestors in a family were *mullahs*, *fakikhs* and *qori* (readers of the Koran), then this tradition has been passed down to the children in our era.

The familial nature that religious education acquired in Tajikistan during the Soviet period and Islam's 'retreat' into the sphere of private life, into the 'invisible' but exceptionally important part of society's life, contributed to the practice of transmitting deeper Muslim knowledge mainly in illegal private religious schools, *khujras* (rooms), where the

81 Ibid.

teaching is done by a single tutor, as a rule a clergyman noted for his knowledge. This is a deeply traditional system of religious education that has barely changed in many centuries of existence.

Private religious education reached its peak in the 1980s and 1990s. From 1980 to 1992 in central Tajikistan alone, there were fairly large (fifty or more students on average) home-based religious schools in operation, such as the schools of Malavi Muhammadzhon Khindustoni,⁸² Domullo (scholar or professor) Eshondzhon, Mullo Abdugaffor, Makhsumi Sadridin, Mullo Tokhir and Eshoni Imomuddin and his sons (all in Dushanbe). The school of Eshoni Kiemiddin Gosiev in the Gazimalik Rayon (modern-day Khatlonsk *oblast*), was one of those winning acclaim.

Historically, the system of religious education was much more developed in northern Tajikistan than in the rest of the country. Islam in northern Tajikistan resisted the repression of the Soviet period and, because it went underground, retained its traditional spirit and form. During the Soviet era, traditional private religious schools remained virtually the sole available means of acquiring deep religious knowledge. Indicative of their significance and role in the religious revival in Tajikistan is the fact that leading theologians and spiritual figures of Tajikistan, such as Eshoni Abdulkhalidzhon, Eshoni Turadzhon, Domullo Khikmatullo Todzhikobodi, Said Abdullokh Nuri, Mukhammadsharif Khimmatzoda, Eshoni Abdulkuddus, Makhsumi Ismail Pirmukhammadzoda, Eshoni Nuriddin, Eshoni Makhmudzhon, Domullo Abdulkhi, Domullo Mukhammadi, Domullo Makhmadali Pandzhi, Amonullo Nematzoda (chairman of the Ulema Council), and many others, received their religious education from private instructors. This fact alone points to the special role of this educational network in training religious figures.

Today, the system of official religious education in Tajikistan includes the Islamic University, twenty Islamic *madrasas*, one school

82 For more detail, see M. Olimov, S. Shokhumorov and Mukhammadzhon Khindustoni, 'Zhizn' i deiatel'nost' [Life and activities], in *Musul'manskie lidery: sotsial'naia rol' i avtoritet* [Muslim Leaders: Social Role and Authority], Dushanbe, 2003, pp. 83–102.

for Koran readers, and two preparatory divisions. Nonetheless, the network of private religious education has not lost its significance and comprises dozens of private home-based schools, study groups and courses. There can be as many as 150 to 200 students at a time in such schools, depending on the resources and authority of the teacher and instructor.

Islam's 'transition' to the sphere of private life and the family has helped preserve its role in the socialization of young people. According to the author's research findings, most of Tajikistan's Muslims socialize as Muslims as they mature under the influence of the family, the 'microsociety', and as they are educated by entering into marriage and founding a family. Young people's adaptation to and inclusion in social life in modern Tajikistan also means their integration into the basic components of the society's social structure. It also means the attainment of a certain social status, which is related not only to the choice of profession but also to that of religious outlook and religious conduct, as Islam in Tajikistan is above all a way of life and a socio-cultural regulator. From this standpoint, young people growing up as 'good' Muslims is an important part of their social adaptation. According to young believers, fulfilling religious injunctions and participating in rituals are what make young people adult Muslims. Young people believe that performing the rituals and fulfilling norms marks their transition to an older age group. They expressed the opinion that as they matured they should observe religious norms more and more strictly and expand their participation in rites and religious holidays.⁸³ So doing attaches young people to the life of the community, socializes them as members of the umma (global Islamic community), and supports the stability of the social structure and cultural system.

An important symbol of growing up from the standpoint of interviewees is knowledge of the injunctions that regulate the daily life of an adult. Carrying out these duties and obligations makes a person a full member of the community worthy of the respect accorded a member of society.

83 Series of interviews with young religious activists and *mullahs* conducted by the author in 2004 and 2005.

When they speak of fulfilling religious injunctions, young people clearly acknowledge the difference in sex–role models of religious conduct and place special responsibility on men to carry out religious injunctions.

Women’s participation in religious activity expanded quickly in the post–Soviet period, owing largely to the general decline in women’s status in Tajik society. The spheres of activity in which women’s participation is encouraged have been increasingly curtailed. Women have ever fewer opportunities to exercise their abilities in the public sphere, public life and production, to have an education or a career. Therefore, for many young women, activities within the scope of Islam have become the only possible socially sanctioned sphere in which they can attain high status and exercise their abilities. Material from interviews with young female PIVT activists shows that they possess leadership inclinations and are fighters by temperament. They are striving to improve their social status and occupy a place of prestige of a woman respected in the Islamic umma – as an expert on Islamic learning.⁸⁴

Thus, although opportunities for women have been drastically curtailed in modern Tajikistan, they are beginning to seek outlets for self–realization in Islam, ignoring the limitations imposed on them by the rules of religion (requiring the wearing of the *hijab* and so forth).

Value significance of Islam for young people

Islam has a very high value significance for young people. In Tajik society, it functions as a system of primarily moral values, convictions and insights that make sense of the life of the individual.

Research material shows a widely held view among Tajikistan’s population that one must live in accordance with the moral values,

84 Interviews with a female *madrassa* student aged 18, Khudjand, October 2004; with the printing press director of the Islamic Revival Party of Tajikistan (PIVT), aged 27, April 2005; with a female journalist working for the Islamic magazine *Naison*, aged 26, April 2005.

precepts and norms set by the Koran, sharia law and *hadith* (Prophetic tradition). Islam's moral and ethical values comprise a rigid moral law, and moral laws are linked primarily with Islam.

From the standpoint of interviewees, being a 'good Muslim man or woman' means maintaining purity of thought and deed, which assumes, first, the observance of moral standards and laws and, second, the injunctions that regulate both social and private life. From young people's standpoint, joining adult life means gradually mastering the full set of knowledge about a 'pure', correct life filled with religious meaning and acquiring the habits of living 'correctly' by conforming to religious moral standards. A person is socialized as a moral being in Tajikistan primarily in the context of religion.

Among young people in Tajikistan, Islam primarily fills a goal-setting and meaning function, providing an opportunity to make sense of one's own life and the life of the human community. This is very important when secular ideologies have either lost their influence over young people (e.g. communism) or have no grounds for development in a given society (liberalism). The search for a sound general outlook is one major reason why young people turn to Islam.

The fourteen years of independence, the period in which Tajikistan's young people grew to adulthood, have been a time of trial, war, famine and devastation, none of which has been rationally explained in the public consciousness. 'Adults', including the social sciences, the media and official propaganda, have been unable to offer a convincing explanation for the collapse of the USSR, the civil war in Tajikistan, the destruction of the country's economy, or the high social cost of economic and political reform. As a result, Tajikistan's young people feel an acute need to see meaning in their lives and to correlate human conduct with a general understanding of the meaning of life in the context of the universe and the general order. Faith has helped them to create an intelligent context for their own existence and to gain an explanation for their own, often negative, experience. Religion has given them both an understanding of a world order in which injustice, suffering and death appear to have meaning in the

‘ultimate future’ and a belief in justice, in the fact that the pursuance of moral laws will ultimately be rewarded and evil will be punished, if only beyond the grave. Thus Islam offers support that is extremely important in conditions where the young have limited opportunities to influence the course of events and take charge of their own lives. Religion offers its own understanding of the meaning of life, which consists of Divine Providence. Hope and faith in ultimate justice in this world or the next and in the help of Allah that religion offers are a counterweight to despair and hopelessness. At the same time, the failure to make sense of current events and the frequent impossibility of having any influence on the events that determine the course of young people’s lives reinforce fatalism among them.

Islam also fulfils an identification function. Young people need a sense of belonging and rootedness. Islam functions for them as the foundation of their cultural paradigm and is one of the most important components of their identity, even more important than civil and ethnic identity. Moreover, Islam is an integral part of the national identity.

Level of religious knowledge

Research has shown that the level of religious knowledge among most believers in Tajikistan is extremely low. Religious knowledge is usually confined to the five dogmas of faith and one or two *suras* from the Koran. All the rest of their religious knowledge is frequently mythological in nature and based primarily on oral tales from parents, older relatives and neighbours. Islam thus concerns the national tradition, local culture and way of life to a much greater degree than religious knowledge.

Indicative of the level of religious knowledge is the fact that 30.5% of Tajikistan’s Muslims do not know what *mazkhab* (branch of Islam) they belong to. In an August 2003 survey, when asked which *mazkhab* they belonged to, only 69.5% of the Muslims surveyed answered: 55.2% said that they were Hanafis, 1.7% that they were followers of Imom Azam, 9.6% that they were Ismailites, and 2.9% that they were Sunnis.

The low level of religious knowledge is connected with the active search for a philosophy. Marxism's loss of attraction and the absence of objective factors for the spread of liberal views have helped to advance Islam as the dominant teaching in post-Soviet Tajikistan. The desire to acquire religious knowledge and the search for a world view are very widespread, especially among young people. Given the relatively low level of knowledge among a significant portion of the *mullahs* from the neighbourhood mosques and the conservatism of theologians, who are doing their utmost to preserve rather than develop tradition, there has been widespread anomie, which finds a foundation in the supposedly Islamic postulates acquired and utilized by informal leaders of various persuasions for their own purposes. All this has led to the spread of prejudice, ignorance and amorality, and an undermining of the social order. This situation is especially dangerous in a period of transformation of the political-economic model, when old structures and value systems are breaking apart and new ones are only just coming into being.

Changes in the perception of Islam among young people

Survey and interview material has demonstrated a definite disparity in views of Islam between adults and young people. Adults mainly support 'popular' or 'traditional' Islam, i.e. views, customs and standards based on the Koran, sharia and folk traditions that regulate the life of people and society as a whole. Popular Islam unifies the life of individuals, brings it into their community's accepted framework, and subordinates them to society's interests. Popular Islam has always been a moderate Islam that has stabilized and harmonized relations between society and the state by separating way of life, politics and ideology into parallel and non-conflicting streams.

More widespread among young people is a somewhat different vision of Islam which, on the one hand, is a continuation of their parents' views and, on the other, results from the profound socio-cultural changes that have overtaken Tajikistan society. Young people are much more oriented towards individualism and individual spiritual inquiry. They believe that there can and should be a variety of religious views in a society. Given the prevailing adherence to Islam,

people are entitled to adopt religious practice to whatever extent they define for themselves.

Young people believe that a distinction is needed between people who, while observing all the religious norms, are not devout believers, and those who ignore the ritualistic, external aspect of religion for the sake of an intense spiritual life. Interviewees commented that there were people who had not accepted God, who had sinned and committed amoral actions, but who nonetheless carried out all the religious injunctions and considered themselves moral people and genuine Muslims.

Age-based radicalism and a youthful rejection of compromise cannot wholly explain young people's criticism of adult hypocrisy. In most interviews, the young expressed the opinion that the main thing in religion was one's inner spiritual life, which might or might not be expressed in the practice of rituals. People had to embark on their individual spiritual inquiry after freely choosing their own path.

Young people spoke of their disagreements with their parents and older relatives. They believe that adults are foisting on them their own system of values, models of behaviour and methods of social action, which from their standpoint are outmoded and irrelevant to the modern day.

Young people and adults have serious conflicts over clothing, both fashionable clothing that contradicts traditions and clothing that strictly follows Islamic canons but is perceived by adults as an extremist challenge to public opinion.

Adults criticize young people for following 'Western models' and consider young people's fashion incompatible with the image of a decent Tajik Muslim, yet they are displeased when their children reject traditional garb and wear black coverings that have never before been seen in Tajikistan.

The secular government, while trying to block the spread of extremist religious movements, is tacitly banning, in state and

education institutions, the wearing of hijabs (headscarves), other scarves, and men's and women's clothing brought in from Saudi Arabia and other Arab countries. Young Islamists who adhere to Koranic clothing standards are experiencing discrimination because of their clothing in education institutions, at work, and in interactions with law enforcement agencies and representatives of authority.

I work for the Islamic women's magazine *Naison*. Our magazine has published a torrent of letters with stories about women not being hired for jobs because of their scarves, wide-legged trousers, or clothing people identify as Islamic, about women students being driven out of university auditoriums and schoolgirls being expelled from school for the same reason.

Young rural women are in the hardest position of all. In the younger classes the girls go without scarves because they're still little. By fifth or sixth grade many parents believe that girls are grown up and should always wear a scarf. If a girl goes to school with a bared head, that is a disgrace for the entire family and no one will marry her later on. But the teachers in the schools ridicule these schoolgirls. The girls are ashamed and refuse to go to school. And their parents are actually pleased, since they exploit the girls' labour in the home and have them look after the younger children.

The government says we have a democratic rule-of-law state. If we have a democracy, then we should observe human rights, including the right to choose your clothing. They teach us that democracy means taking the people's opinion into account. Our people are used to wearing scarves and wide-legged trousers, and they want to continue doing so. But they tell us that democracy is short skirts, sleeveless blouses, and shorn hair. Is this really democracy?

A female journalist, 26 years old, Dushanbe

In October 2005, Tajikistan's Minister of Education published an order barring admission to general education schools and other state education institutions (higher education, special high schools) to girls and young women wearing scarves tied in the Arab manner (hijabs). This provoked a public outcry and heated discussion in

the media but, most importantly, schoolgirls and women students began streaming out of education institutions. As a result, the state's religious policy has accelerated the decline, which began in the post-Soviet period, in women's educational standards. In the short term, this may radicalize some young people, and for the long term it is creating grounds for the retraditionalization of archaic forms of religion and public awareness as a whole.

Speaking of their conflicts with their parents and elders over clothing, young people commented that a person's appearance can be misleading: you can cut your hair short and wear a short skirt and fashionable clothing and still be a true Muslim. In the opinion of many respondents, the main thing is not to overstep the bounds of established proprieties, which are the essence of the social standard.

Research material from recent years attests that religion is undergoing change among the young people of Tajikistan. It is increasingly an individual philosophy rather than a way of life and means of social control. A deep divergence can now be observed between the views of young people and adults.

Young people believe that religion is a private matter. It is an issue of individual choice, the maturing of individual convictions and outlooks, the right of individuals to their own philosophy.

Everyone has the right to choose their own religion.

Male high school student, 16 years old, Dushanbe

The theme of dissatisfaction with adults, which came up constantly in interviews with young people, indicates serious conflict between the older and younger generations. Young people are presumably experiencing pressure from society and would like to loosen strict social control and diminish the obligation to engage in organized ritual foisted on them by older members of society.

The 'privatization' of religion, the individualization of Islam as a trend noted among young people, reflects profound socio-cultural shifts inside Tajikistan society and the inability of 'popular' Islam to satisfy new intellectual, spiritual, social and political needs and interests. The contradiction between the individualistic leanings widespread among young people and the social control supported by

adults means that group consciousness and solidarity are coming into conflict with the individualism brought on by market reforms. This has contributed to diversifying Islamic trends and diminished the role of 'popular' Islam as a means of social control, thus helping to activate radical Islamic movements. At the same time, this conflict has given rise to a new kind of religious leader – headstrong, ignoring social control and generally accepted standards and freely manipulating followers' consciousness and behaviour.

The 'moderates' and the radicals: social perception

In Tajik society, the dominance of moderate Islam is relatively clear. Proof of this is the broad public support for the position of the Tajikistan Government regarding the anti-terrorism campaign.⁸⁵ The Republic of Tajikistan is taking an active part in combating radical political and terrorist activity. Since November 2001, a contingent of NATO forces has been based in Dushanbe to provide support for the anti-terrorist operation in Afghanistan.

In 2000 Tajikistan also signed a Collective Security Treaty to fight terrorism, political and religious extremism, transnational organized crime, and other threats to stability and security. The Republic of Tajikistan supports the activities of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) anti-terror agency and cooperates with countries in the region in combating extremism and terrorism. Nonetheless, Tajikistan's position with regard to political Islam differs from that of its neighbours in the region. The experience of a civil war in which the Islamic political movement took one side forced the government and Islamists in Tajikistan to hold a dialogue to find a satisfactory compromise.

The legal existence of a political Islamic movement and its participation in Tajikistan's political process has drastically reduced the level of radicalization in society, despite the extremely adverse socio-economic conditions, yet at the same time it has placed on the agenda very sensitive issues regarding the existence of a political

85 In June 2005, 71.7% of those surveyed supported participation by the Republic of Tajikistan leadership in the campaign to fight international terrorism. *Public Opinion. Tajikistan. 2005*, op. cit.

Islamic movement in a secular state. An attempt to solve them has been made through the joint efforts of Islamic leaders, government officials, scholars and representatives of international organizations in the Group to Find a Compromise between Islamists and Secularists, which began work in 2001 and continues to the present day.⁸⁶

Survey data show that there is no broad social base for radicalism of any kind in the Republic of Tajikistan. Only 5% of respondents in a June 2005 survey reported that they might join a political group acting to change Tajikistan's political order, and 0.9% expressed their readiness to resort to violence for the purpose.⁸⁷

Support for political Islam among young people is just as low as among other population groups. In June 2005, the PIVT, the sole legally functioning Islamic party in the republic, would have received the votes of 3.2% of young people aged 18–20 years (as against 3.4% of those aged 30–39; 2.3% of those aged 40–49; 9.3% of those in the 50–59 group; and 7.0% of people over 60). However, in spite of PIVT's low popularity, more than a quarter of those surveyed believe that the Islamic project could become the basis for a solution to the most acute problems Tajikistan faces. According to survey data, 26% of people aged 18–29 reported that they would support parties offering to solve acute social, political and economic problems on the basis of Islamic laws. Among the 30–39 year-olds, 35.5% felt that way; and in the 40–49 group, 25.7%.⁸⁸

Research shows that, despite general improvement in social well-

being as a result of economic growth and increased state support, there are numerous youth groups in Tajik society viewing and assessing Islamic radicalism positively. They identify the establishment of an 'Islamic' order with social justice, equality for all before the law, and the restoration of law and order on the basis of sharia.⁸⁹

86 For more detail, see Seifert and Kreikemeyer (eds), op. cit.

87 *Public Opinion. Tajikistan. 2005*, op. cit.

88 Ibid.

89 Muzaffar A. Olimov and Saodat K. Olimova, 'Religious roots of terrorism and religious extremism in Central Asia', in Mahavir Singh (ed.), *International Terrorism and Religious Extremism: Challenges to*

These are the groups of young people seeing no future in preserving the existing social and political order. They are mainly unemployed, have lost their prospects and are alienated from society. Unemployment forces young people to remain dependent on their parents or relatives for a protracted length of time, and this brings with it infantilism, a lack of necessary social skills and independence, fear of the future, despair and hopelessness. Peer pressure, characteristic of young people, leads to the formation of cliques of unemployed men. It is in this environment that the activities of extremist societies unfold.

Another small but notable group consists of market traders, small entrepreneurs, and workers in small and medium-sized businesses. Entrepreneurship in Tajikistan exists under difficult conditions. Corruption, a heavy tax burden, and a dearth of law and order keep small and medium-sized businesses from developing and force people to work in quasi-criminal conditions. All this evokes acute dissatisfaction among entrepreneurs with the existing order in the state. Inasmuch as a secular administration cannot or will not improve the situation in the legal sphere or ensure law and order, young entrepreneurs and traders turn to Islam in their search for a regulator of social and business life.

This crisis in society, in which young people cannot exercise their abilities, means that some of them are prevented from becoming 'adults' and taking charge of their own lives, encourages individual groups to see their sole hope in implementing the radical Islamic project.

Young people's attitude to extremist religious trends

According to research data, Tajikistan's population, including the young, does not consider the activities of religious extremist groups inside the country to be a serious threat for Tajikistan. Not one of the 1,000 people surveyed in June 2005 cited religious extremism as a major problem.

Central and South Asia, Kolkata, Maulana Abdul Kalam Azad Institute of Asian Studies, 2004, pp. 43–60.

Tajikistan's young citizens are considerably more concerned about unemployment (22.3% of those surveyed), the difficult economic situation (16%), and low wages and other payments (14%). They are also worried about power cuts, the collapse of the education system, corruption and the drug trade.

All the interviewees disapproved of the activities of extremist religious trends. Even though young people are a risk group, their war-weariness and their disillusionment with the use of force to solve the political problems that gripped Tajikistan society after the civil war, coupled with the improvement in the socio-economic situation observed over the last four years, have helped them deny their support to extremist ideas.

People have rejected armed struggle as a means of achieving their goals and refuse to concede that Islam provides justification for violence. Young interviewees prefer to believe that the armed struggle waged by Islamists during the civil war was provoked by their ignorance, lack of religious education, or criminal intent aimed at Islam and Muslim society in general.

On the whole, young people condemn action by extremist groups and believe that religion is a personal matter and that no one should foist their opinion or way of thinking and living on others. Most of those surveyed expressed the view that a devout person is not entitled to bear arms, and 91.4% of young respondents believe that Islam is a religion of peace and understanding. Only 1.4% believe Islam to be a religion that condones violence. The remaining 7.2% offered no response.

Young people's attitude to the underground Islamic organization Hizb at-Takhrir is somewhat contradictory, having taken shape under the influence of government propaganda, information on international terrorism and the fight against it, and their own experience and observations. Among young people aged 18–29 years, 51% believe that Hizb at-Takhrir represents a major threat to Tajikistan; 18% that it is a moderate threat; 14% that it is a minor threat; 13% that this extremist movement poses no threat whatsoever; and the rest did not reply.⁹⁰

90 *Public Opinion. Tajikistan. 2005*, op. cit., December 2003 survey.

The majority believe that extremist ideas have spread as a result of outside influence and clever propaganda. The most widespread view of radical Islam and Islamic-oriented extremist groups is that extremists are backed by specific political forces that exploit these kinds of organizations for their own purposes. Interviewees believe that extremist groups pay for the services of young people and draw them into their activities by exploiting their destitution.

As a result, Islamic extremists seem mere tools for the policy of individual Western or Eastern countries pursuing specific goals. Moreover, public opinion ultimately views the Islamic extremists themselves as deluded people who, out of naivety or need, fall under the influence of powerful outside forces.⁹¹

Conclusions

Islam is going through a very difficult period of resurgence and rapid development in Central Asia. Freed from the pressure of state atheism, Central Asian Islam is in search of its own place in the spiritual, social and political life of the newly forming independent Central Asian states. Underpinning the process are spiritual, philosophical, political and social factors. Political Islam has deep social roots in Central Asia. Deterioration of the socio-economic situation, unmet expectations and disregard for the vital interests of large segments of the population have boosted political Islamic movements that offer alternatives in the political marketplace and display a marked social slant. However, spiritual quests for a world view in the societies of Central Asia have played no less important a role than social and political factors in Islam's revival. These processes are most actively under way among young people. Overall, Islam's influence on young people is very great and particularly significant in regions that had previously been important spiritual and cultural centres for the entire Muslim world, that is, modern Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and southern Kyrgyzstan. As it is for adults, Islam for the young people in these regions is a system of moral values, the basis of their cultural identity,

91 Saodat Olimova et al., *Governance, Youth Values and Life Styles in Central Asian Countries*, Vol. 2, Tashkent, UNESCO/MOST, 2001, pp. 115–17.

a way of life, and a socio-cultural regulator of social and private life. In contrast with the older generation, though, Islam is increasingly a conscious choice for young people, a chosen individual philosophy. The 'privatization of religion', i.e. the process whereby religious beliefs and religious practice become more a matter of personal choice, a personal matter for the individual, which began much earlier in the Western world and was noted by Bella,⁹² is spreading. The development of individualism in the course of political and economic reforms has helped to alter religion's role and place in society and has given the individual an opportunity to choose a world view and individual actions not sanctioned by tradition, social control or a sense of justice.

Of course, most young people are oriented towards moderate Islam, which recognizes the distinction between the secular and the spiritual and allocates governance exclusively to secular power. At the same time, the difficulties of the transitional period and the exceptionally high social cost of the reforms (social stratification, the impoverishment of a large segment of the population, and the economy's post-Soviet involution) have encouraged the formation of population groups whose interests cannot be satisfied in the context of existing political regimes and economic models. As a result, they are beginning to link satisfaction of their interests with radical Islamic projects. All this makes the need to move on from attempts at control to genuine dialogue with Islam and religion as a whole an acutely urgent objective.

92 R. Bella, 'Sotsiologiiia religii' [Sociology of religion], in T. Parsons (ed.), *Amerikanskaia sotsiologiiia: Perspektivy, problemy, metody* [American Sociology: Prospects, Problems, Methods], Moscow, 1972, p. 89.

EDUCATION, TERRORISM AND MULTILATERALISM IN CENTRAL ASIA: HUMAN SECURITY PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS

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Human security, education and terrorism debates: from Kosovo to Xinjiang

After the 11 September 2001 attacks on the United States many media, scholarly and government policy debates focused on Islamist extremism, backing a military-led war as a primary response while Central Asia became a key battleground. Yet how education⁹³ should be analysed as a related human security or terrorism concern is a complex challenge deserving more careful study.⁹⁴ This paper⁹⁵ examines Central Asian issues.

By way of background, the 1994 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) report popularized the human security notion, highlighting 'soft' or 'non-traditional' threats to individuals over 'hard' security or military defence for nation-states. Theoretical frameworks and field applications since have ranged from a broad sustainable human development-oriented concept ('freedom from want') to a

93 Understood as all formal and non-formal teaching, knowledge transmission and 'life-long learning' processes or systems, training, sciences or research in public or private settings.

94 I discuss theoretical issues, debates and research trends with case studies among other colleagues in Wayne Nelles (ed.), *Comparative Education, Terrorism and Human Security: From Critical Pedagogy to Peace-building?*, New York, Palgrave-MacMillan, 2003.

95 Some field research (September 2004 to March 2005 in Bangkok, Islamabad, Almaty, Paris and Jakarta) helped in writing this paper. Funding was provided thanks to Foreign Affairs Canada (FAC), Asia Pacific Branch while UNESCO, Asia and Pacific Regional Bureau for Education, Bangkok, was my host. My analysis here, however, is independent scholarship.

narrower, personal safety or human rights idea ('freedom from fear'), and a human 'rights-based' or international 'rule of law' approach.⁹⁶ 'Conflict prevention' (touched on further in my conclusions below) is sometimes viewed as a specialized human security sub-field. But I suggest that the 1998–99 Kosovo crisis and 9/11 were problematic turning points, strengthening violent military or national defence-oriented security models, while co-opting and undermining human security values.

Some proponents of a NATO-led Kosovo war justified bombing Serbs to provide 'human security guarantees' for Albanians while the West supported Albanian KLA 'terrorism,' violating human security's 'rule of law' approach. Tragically and ironically education was both a source and potential non-military solution to Kosovo's conflict. Had the international community better understood education as a critical security and development issue, dealing fairly and consistently with it as a diplomatic problem (in a non-implemented 1996 'Education Accord') a costly war could have been avoided.⁹⁷ Now education is a so-called 'post-conflict reconstruction' challenge. The 'responsibility to protect' idea, forged in the Kosovo crisis, became a human security norm.⁹⁸ But some Asians became more suspect of military-led humanitarian intervention approaches after Kosovo. They saw this type of human security agenda partly as a Western government idea to justify interference in their domestic affairs. At the same time some Asian countries including Japan (a

96 For an overview of these three dimensions see Fen Osler Hampson with Jean Daudelin, John B. Hay, Todd Martin and Holly Reid, *Madness in the Multitude: Human Security and World Disorder*, Don Mills, Oxford University Press, 2002, p. 16, *passim*.

97 Argued in: Wayne Nelles, 'Education, underdevelopment, unnecessary war and human security in Kosovo/Kosova,' *International Journal of Educational Development* (IJED), Vol. 25, No. 1, January 2005, pp. 69–84.

98 Discussed in: Wayne Nelles, 'Canada's human security agenda in Kosovo and beyond: military intervention versus conflict prevention,' *International Journal of the Canadian Institute for International Affairs*, Vol. 57, No. 3, Summer 2002, pp. 459–79. Also see *The Responsibility to Protect: Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty*, December 2001 (<http://www.iciss-ciise.gc.ca/Report-English.asp>).

major donor), Thailand and Mongolia defined human security for their purposes.⁹⁹

Some scholars now argue that Asian governments appear 'firmly wedded to a national security paradigm'¹⁰⁰ reflected in military spending increases, particularly after 9/11. Nonetheless, education is gradually becoming more understood as a human security concern. The Commission on Human Security (CHS) has highlighted education-related violence suggesting the need to eliminate illiteracy, limited opportunities as well as schools that promote intolerance and 'inflammatory education.' Yet it warned that 'education barely appears on security agendas ...' further concerned that some issues were compromised by the fight against terrorism with the education sector 'chronically underfunded.'¹⁰¹ Research on education, terrorism and security issues with impacts on and broader policy implications for Central Asia¹⁰² has so far been sparse,

99 See Wayne Nelles, *Council for Security Cooperation in Asia Pacific (CSCAP) Comprehensive and Cooperative Security Working Group* (Kuala Lumpur Meeting–November 2000) for one report (<http://www.iir.ubc.ca/cancaps/cscap.html>); and for a case study Wayne Nelles, 'Meeting basic needs, embracing the world and protecting the state: integrating human and traditional security in the New Mongolia,' *Asian Perspective: A Journal of Regional and International Affairs*, Vol. 23, No. 3, 2001, pp. 207–45.

100 Quoted from p. 80 of Amitav Acharya, 'The nexus between human security and traditional security in Asia,' in *Human Security in East Asia: Proceedings International Conference on Human Security in East Asia 16–17 June 2003*, Seoul, Korean National Commission for UNESCO, 2004, pp. 77–101.

101 *Human Security Now*, New York, Commission on Human Security, 2003. Education is a cross-cutting theme in much of the report.

102 Central Asia often narrowly refers to the five post-Soviet, now independent, states of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. But a report prepared for the Commission on Human Security, for example, suggested that 'Central Asia is a geopolitical space extending from Turkey in the west, to the Xinjiang region of China in the east, and from Russia in the north to Iran, Afghanistan, and Pakistan in the south.' See Kathleen Collins, *Human Security in Central Asia: Challenges Posed by a Decade of Transition (1991–2002) Report for the Commission on Human Security*, March 2002, p. 1. Anara Tabyshalieva's 'Ethical, Normative and Educational Frameworks for the Promotion of Human Security in Central Asia' (July 2005 Draft, background discussion document for the September 2005 UNESCO–OSCE Bishkek conference) suggests the seven 'stans' plus Iran might best define the

but some studies help to introduce broader contexts that future research might build on.

Even in the late 1990s some political scientists argued that education (or its lack) might contribute to conflict or violence. One scholar suggested this could come from increasing gaps between elites who could attend private schools or go abroad while disgruntled masses have less access to public education with governments closing schools. More tensions came from unwanted (according to governments or elites) religious education transmitting ideas across porous regional borders.¹⁰³ Other scholars pointed to ‘social cohesion’ problems with the loss of Soviet educational support. Heyneman suggested that this brought increased ‘opportunities for local ethnic and other groups sometimes hostile to traditional authorities, to use the school system as their communal instrument to take revenge on perceived injustices’.¹⁰⁴ The Soviets also worried about unwanted ‘foreign influences’ on education while Russian concerns remain current. After Glasnost in the 1980s many scholars suggest that Islam underwent a revival as education reflected and sustained new initiatives and institutions. Cross-border education and information flows (migration of peoples, ideas, books and institutions) from other Islamic countries increased, while Western education institutions were established and offered study abroad programmes.¹⁰⁵

region based on cultural-economic and geopolitical alignments. Other scholars may include different countries (Mongolia, for example) beyond narrow political characterizations (i.e. five former Soviet states).

103 Discussed pp. 134–35 of Martha Brill Olcott, ‘Regional cooperation in Central Asia and the South Caucasus’, in Robert Ebel and Rajan Menon (eds), *Energy and Conflict in Central Asia and the Caucasus*, Lanham, Md., Rowman & Littlefield/National Bureau of Asian Research, 2000, pp. 123–44.

104 From p. 4 of Stephen P. Heyneman, ‘One step back, two steps forward: the first stage of the transition for education in Central Asia’, in Stephen P. Heyneman and Alan J. Deyoung (eds), *The Challenges of Education in Central Asia*, Greenwich, Conn., Information Age Publishing, 2004, pp. 1–8.

105 Shirheen T. Hunter, with Jeffrey L. Thomas and Alexander Melikishvili, *Islam in Russia: The Politics of Identity and Security*, Armonk, N.Y., M. E. Sharpe, 2004, pp. 70–76.

Against this backdrop some new attention to human security came with CHS studies and conferences,¹⁰⁶ noting declines in literacy and education system quality after 1991 as fewer youth received basic education or could take post-secondary or technical training. Lack of state funding and resources for public education and equality in access, with introduction of fees students cannot afford and poor teachers' wages, are major reasons for decline. Women and girls may be more adversely affected, with some involved in 'soft prostitution' (ostensibly to enhance their personal economic security but endangering their health or putting them in physical danger) to pay school fees, while corruption (with low teachers' wages) remains a problem in access and grades. Brain drain compounds these challenges by reducing the educational capacity of local populations. At the same time Collins, for example, in raising points for discussion asked if too much education was always good, with lack of job opportunities. And (post-9/11) she wondered if 'an overly educated urban and rural elite' lent 'support to radical Islamic movements ...'¹⁰⁷

In Central Asia interrelated education and terrorism concerns have also been debated around regional security issues or 'hot spots'. Education and history writing or teaching has been a particular issue in Xinjiang, where ethnic minority interests and some separatist movements conflict with, and are suppressed by, nationalist values and authorities of the Chinese state.¹⁰⁸ The human rights and personal security of the Uyghur population is threatened by this situation which can result in violence (from both the Chinese Government and alleged 'terrorists'). Elsewhere some argue that the Fergana Valley was 'the educational centre for Central Asia's fundamentalists'¹⁰⁹ or still is.

106 Shahrbanou Tadkbakhsh (Rapporteur), Roundtable on Transition and Human Security in Central Asia Ashgabad, Turkmenistan 22–24 April 2002. *Rapporteur's Summary for the Commission on Human Security*.

107 Kathleen Collins, *Human Security in Central Asia: Challenges Posed by a Decade of Transition (1991–2002) Report for the Commission on Human Security*, March 2002.

108 Linda Benson, 'Education and social mobility among minority populations in Xinjiang', and Gardner Bovington with Nabijan Tursun, 'Contested histories', in S. Frederick Starr (ed.), *Xinjiang: China's Muslim Borderland*, Armonk, N.Y., M. E. Sharpe, 2004, pp. 190–215; 353–74.

109 From p. 33 of Martha Brill Olcott, 'Islam and fundamentalism in Central Asia', in Yaacov Ro'i (ed.), *Muslim Eurasia: Conflicting Legacies*, London: Frank Cass, 1995, pp. 21–39.

Some field-based security analysis has also focused on education. The International Crisis Group (ICG) highlights that the Soviet Union's collapse brought more education and youth problems with regional, cultural and demographic factors increasing the risk of political instability, conflict and religious extremism.¹¹⁰ The ICG notes that under the Soviets, despite ideological control and limited intellectual freedom, youth had near 100% literacy and school access as education was viewed as a priority contributing to national socialization. Moreover, everyone had relative job security with full employment later. Yet youth today are more poorly educated with greater school drop-outs, and difficulties in finding work. High school fees or privatized institutions, corruption, quality concerns, gender barriers, linguistic discrimination, poor curricular content, and more limited access with increasing illiteracy and lower enrolments are prevalent. Critical thinking and debate is treated with suspicion by some governments, conservative communities and higher education institutions, with political ideologies promulgated in required textbooks and examinations. Government suppression or direct control of Islamic teachings also appears stronger in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan,¹¹¹ in response to alleged terrorism.

Unemployment, poverty and other barriers may also make youth vulnerable to joining radical (Islamic) groups, crime, migration or prostitution. Hizb at-Tahrir, for example, has actively recruited disillusioned youth while young people seek alternatives not available in the public system. Religion (Islam in particular) can provide community and economic support, including free education. The ICG recommends more open and better Islamic education while improving knowledge of Islam among government officials. It calls for more constructive dialogue with youth acknowledging the real sources of their frustration potentially channelled into social and political activism, job creation and sports. It suggests raising public

110 ICG Asia Report No. 66, *Youth in Central Asia: Losing the New Generation*, Osh/Brussels, International Crisis Group, 31 October 2003.

111 With reference to the closure of the only university department for Muslim theology due to concerns about the rise of radical Islam, see: 'Clampdown on Islamic teaching in Turkmenistan,' *Institute for War & Peace Reporting, Central Asia*, No. 401, 4 August 2005.

education spending to Soviet levels of at least 5%–6% GDP while facilitating infrastructure, teaching and curricular improvements.¹¹²

In the light of such complex and often contentious education, terrorism and security relationships, what concerns face multilateral organizations? How do they view (or avoid) the challenge? What kinds of policies or programmes do they propose or implement? Do they complement each other or conflict? What implications arise for human security cooperation, teaching and research? Below I examine some of these questions comparatively.

Competing multilateral approaches to terrorism, education and security

Amid a post–Cold War security vacuum new research focused on Central Asian history, geopolitics, democratization and culture (particularly its Islamic foundations) while some studies discussed the five independent republics as a unique ‘regional security complex’ by virtue of close geography, culture and common security needs or threats.¹¹³ Central Asia’s security views or practices are also affected by external institutional actors, individual countries, ad hoc alliances, or more formal groups of states. The ‘Eurasian’ regional ‘security governance’ idea¹¹⁴ is a related concept partly reflecting Western or European values and norms behind the existing post–Second World War international system, and a belief that it should guide interstate relationships and domestic behaviour. But our understanding of uniquely Asian or even Islamic security approaches is limited while new multilateral models for the region (especially challenging Western–dominant multilateral institutions post–9/11) are still evolving.

112 ICG Asia Report No. 66, op. cit.

113 Discussed on p. 5 of Lena Jonson and Roy Allison, ‘Central Asian security: internal and external dynamics’, in Roy Allison and Lena Jonson (eds), *Central Asian Security: The New International Context*, London/Washington DC, Royal Institute of International Affairs/ Brookings Institution Press, 2001, pp. 1–23.

114 James Sperling, Sean Kay and S. Victor Papacosma (eds), *Limiting Institutions? The Challenge of Eurasian Security Governance*, Manchester University Press, 2003.

In this section I compare multilateral security agencies with different terrorism views and education approaches in Central Asia, showing that they may compete with more than complement each other as human security catalysts or providers. On this point I borrow from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development's Development Assistance Committee (OECD-DAC) identifying the problem of 'policy coherence' (or its lack) among agency or government approaches. OECD member government donors have even consented that some policies may 'undermine development objectives.'¹¹⁵ I suggest that basic education goals or specific forms of education or training to mitigate violence and further peace may be jeopardized by military or defence policies, even though some advocates even claim their policies or initiatives support human security. To illustrate I discuss four groups of approaches in thirteen selected security organizations.

Group One – traditional military or collective security organizations

The first group is primarily military or strategic in orientation using deployments, intelligence-gathering operations or alliances to pressure or deter other countries. They are 'traditional', principally concerned with state security. Here I focus mainly on one Eurasian, one Western and one Asian body – the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), NATO and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). All have 'counter-terrorism' programmes, rationale or support analytical research to assess threats and responses. Each is coincidentally led by a Permanent UN Security Council member. The Russian Federation leads the CIS, the Americans dominate NATO, and the Chinese SCO. After 9/11 they have cooperated but none have been indisputable human security defenders. All have been accused of human rights violations or torture aided by military education and training assistance, or in operations fighting alleged terrorists.¹¹⁶

115 The quote is from OECD, *Shaping the 21st Century*, Paris, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 1996, p. 18 (<http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/23/35/2508761.pdf>).

116 For one among many post-9/11 reports see Human Rights Watch, 'New survey documents global repression: U.S. human rights leadership faulted', *Human Rights News*, 14 January 2003 (<http://www.hrw.org/press/2003/01/wr2003.htm>).

The CIS and SCO do not yet have sophisticated, extensive or influential military education or training systems¹¹⁷ compared with NATO. But the CIS has had a longer direct regional interest in terrorism issues, with the parallel Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) becoming more of a focus with the ailing, some say largely dead, CIS.¹¹⁸ With Kabul's fall to the Taliban in September 1996, Russia, Central Asian nations and China grew more worried about religious extremist influences inciting separatism and terrorism. By 1998–1999 this was a main SCO focus as it also continues to be for the CSTO. Russian interest in SCO was partly to check Muslim militants in the CIS while it also saw China as a potential new regional ally after the Kosovo war when NATO's Western alliance favouring Albanians trounced Russia's Slavic interests and Serb Allies.¹¹⁹ Some CIS, CSTO and SCO activities were specific intelligence-sharing or 'counter-terrorism' efforts while others were more indirect or non-military initiatives, without education being a major strategic consideration. The related Central Asian Cooperation Organization (CACO) has more strategic (albeit mostly economic) significance after Russia joined in 2004 (to check growing American influence), opening a military base in Tajikistan.¹²⁰ Chinese regional

117 Things may be gradually changing, however. China, in response to its own alleged 'terrorism' worries, is especially concerned about the Uighurs in Xinjiang, and the East Turkestan Liberation Organization. Through the SCO China is leading the establishment of a new counter-terrorism and training facility for its Central Asian allies. See 'Jonathan Watts, 'China turns war on terror to its strategic advantage', *Guardian Weekly*, 16–22 September 2005, p. 10.

118 The CIS (established in 1991) members are Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Rep. of Moldova, Russian Federation, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan. The CSTO (established as the CST in 1992, becoming a functioning political-military 'organization' in 2002/3). Members include Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russian Federation and Tajikistan while Azerbaijan, Georgia and Uzbekistan withdrew in 1999 mainly over differences with Russia. For background see J. H. Saat, *The Collective Security Treaty Organization*, Conflict Studies Research Centre, Central Asian Series, February 2005, Swindon, Defence Academy of the United Kingdom.

119 Discussed in Hunter, 2004, op. cit., pp. 334–39, 396–97.

120 See Sergei Blagov, 'Russia: yet another Central Asian state', *Asia Times Online*, 3 June 2004 (http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Central_Asia/

power, and SCO influence, however appears to be growing even stronger, complementing and competing with Russia, soon to include education and training programmes through an Asian NATO-type organization,¹²¹ possibly bringing more of a military challenge at an operational level to the Western NATO and especially to the United States.

The Chinese-Russian and SCO response is understandable. NATO's deployment, influence, and especially its American footprint, has threatened non-Western states over a longer period. Over the past decade NATO has moved physically, and through membership expanded and deployed 'out of area' into Eastern Europe and Western or Central Asia. Since 2002 it has even included a Russia-NATO Council, ostensibly for enhanced cooperation on terrorism and other concerns. But this is also partly a way for the West to keep Russia on side when possible, or close enough to monitor when not, while full membership is never likely. NATO's increased institutional focus on terrorism followed 9/11, including the unprecedented invocation of NATO Charter Article 5, then bombing and invading Afghanistan. Education in Afghanistan is now a 'post-conflict reconstruction' tool (and for some viewed variously as a 'human security' initiative or investment in donor governments' 'national security') with scores of agencies or NATO members involved. At the same time the United States, leading NATO, highlights more apparently benign activities such as unilateral aid for girls' schooling, textbooks, teachers, buildings, etc. as investments in fighting terrorism. Lesser understood but perhaps equally significant bilateral funding goes to International Military Education and Training (IMET) while parallel multilateral support aids military education or training through NATO.

After 9/11 the United States established new military bases in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan while increasing IMET assistance in

FF03Ag01.html); Farkhad Tolipov, "The expansion of CACO: a Russian offensive or a Central Asian surrender?", *Central Asia-Caucasus Institute Analyst*, 1 December 2004 (http://www.cacianalyst.org/view_article.php?articleid=2873).

121 Fred Wier, 'Russia, China looking to form "NATO of the East"?' *The Christian Science Monitor*, 26 October 2005.

Central Asia and ignoring dubious human rights records, alleged torture and potential for new abuses,¹²² and often working through the NATO infrastructure. For countries not full NATO members it operates the American-led Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme. NATO asserts: 'the PfP's main task is to increase the participants' ability to act in concert. Through various mechanisms it helps partner countries prepare to operate jointly with NATO forces.'¹²³ The PfP has worked closely with the American-supported peacekeeping Central Asian Battalion (Centrasbat) including units from Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, with much activity focused on alleged terrorist networks. With respect to 'security governance', one PfP founder views the programme's role as exemplary, unique, indispensable and positive as the best multilateral tool for testing and modifying plans or efforts to combat non-traditional security challenges in the region, and for facilitating multilateral troop deployments. Spero also suggests that the PfP reduces tensions over American unilateralism in its war on terror while helping to preserve (and ultimately strengthen) NATO.¹²⁴

Related (with Cold War roots) are NATO's Science for Peace or Security through Science Programme, activities focused on counter-terrorism research, psychological operations and information operations and 'public diplomacy',¹²⁵ which critics have sometimes referred to as 'pseudo-educational' propaganda countering or undermining human security values.¹²⁶ On the other hand, with respect to the PfP's security orientation some NATO Member States

122 For background see Lora Lumpe, *U.S. Foreign Military Training: Global Reach, Global Power, and Oversight Issues*, Special Report for Foreign Policy In Focus, May 2002 (<http://www.fpif.org/papers/miltrain/index.html>).

123 <http://www.nato.int/issues/pfp>

124 I disagree with his assessment. But see the argument on pp. 179–89 of Joshua B. Spero, 'Paths to Peace for NATO's partnerships in Eurasia', in James Sperling, Sean Kay and S. Victor Papacosma (eds), *Limiting Institutions? The Challenge of Eurasian Security Governance*, Manchester University Press, 2003, pp. 166–84.

125 <http://www.nato.int/science/about/guide.pdf>

126 Wayne Nelles, 'American public diplomacy as pseudo-education: a problematic national security and counter-terrorism instrument',

suggested that it was a human security instrument. Canada's former foreign minister even argued that NATO's Partnership for Peace programme 'promotes democracy, and by extension human security' while 'this new concept of security is central to the new NATO' as it was to help 'rebuild' Kosovo and prevent more conflict elsewhere.¹²⁷ Whether NATO or the PfP actually do this, or how it can be measured in Central Asia, however, is a matter of contention.

Group Two – traditional and alternative development agencies

The second group of multilaterals are regional or international development agencies mandated primarily to provide financial aid or technical assistance (including education, research or training projects), some of which aim to directly or indirectly prevent conflict, support regional stability or promote various human rights or civic awareness programmes. Traditional agencies operate mostly to support aid to states while alternative agencies focus more directly on individuals or NGOs and 'civil society', sometimes working more obviously or directly with communities and organizational 'partners' or local leaders outside government departments.

Not all in this group approach terrorism in the same way, but on potential development policy implications a recent OECD–DAC study called for more support to social analysis research on terrorism's causes; education that promotes tolerance and peace; new forms of dialogue; increased youth employment opportunities; improving 'quality education' to include better understanding of religious roles (particularly of Islam); more reflection on education content and purpose; and bridging traditional values and modernization through education.¹²⁸ In this group are two major Asian-focused agencies

International Politics: A Journal of Transnational Issues and Global Problems, Vol. 41, No. 1, March 2004, pp. 65–93.

127 Lloyd Axworthy, 'NATO's new security vocation', *NATO Review*, Vol. 47, No. 4, Winter 1999, pp. 8–11 (<http://www.nato.int/docu/review/1999/9904-02.htm>).

128 Development Co-operation Ministers and Aid Agencies Heads met in Paris 22–23 April 2003 endorsing a related statement on guidelines. See OECD–DAC, *A Development Cooperation Lens on Terrorism*

and another two international. Two with a more exclusive Eurasian or Central Asian focus are the European Community TACIS Programme, and the Asian Development Bank (ADB). The World Bank (WB) and UNDP are internationals with regional activities. A third, lesser known, but symbolically important international agency, with modest activity in Central Asia, is the Islamic Development Bank (IsDB).

The TACIS Programme approaches terrorism indirectly through ‘civic education’ to address issues such as citizenship, human rights and responsibilities while funding some NGOs in schools.¹²⁹ Beginning in 1997, ADB supported studies and conferences and laid some foundations for the Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation (CAREC) programme to facilitate economic growth, as well as subregional civic educational policy dialogue, networking and multilateral cooperation. One result was an ADB-financed Open Society Institute (OSI) project – the Central Asia Education Cooperation Network (CA-ECN) – to expand related linkages and exchanges.¹³⁰ These two agencies focus on education without clear references to terrorism, but CA-ECN members (if academic or policy institutions) may do related research or teaching.¹³¹

The WB takes an even broader international approach to managing a Europe and Central Asia Region supporting mostly large education projects. But statements by the then President Wolfensohn, that ‘exclusion can breed violent conflict’, suggest that

Prevention: Key Entry Points for Action – A DAC Reference Document, Paris, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2003, pp. 8, 12–15, 21, 23.

129 Field Interview, 7 October 2004, Almaty. Mr John Penny, First Counsellor, Head of Political and Economic Section, European Union, Delegation of the European Commission in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan.

130 For background note two ADB financed Technical Assistance (TA) projects. The first was the TA call: ADB, *Subregional Cooperation in Managing Education Reform*, Manila, 2000. On the second see Asian Development Bank TAR-OTH 37288, *Technical Assistance for the ADB-OSI Education Cooperation Network*, October 2003 (http://www.adb.org/Documents/TARS/REG/tar_reg_37288.pdf).

131 http://www.soros.org/initiatives/esp/focus_areas/caecn

development assistance for poverty reduction may (indirectly) contribute to terrorism mitigation,¹³² hinting at broader contexts. The WB has not focused on terrorism issues, targeted human security interventions or related analysis. However, the Bank's Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction Unit does analytical work on education's role in reproducing conflict or its role in prevention.¹³³ With the recent appointment as President of the World Bank of former Deputy Defence Secretary Paul Wolfowitz, among the chief architects of the Iraq War as part of America's (controversial) counter-terrorism strategy, it is still unclear what new policies or strategic directions the bank might take.

The UNDP has also not focused on terrorism, however, Mark Malloch Brown, former UNDP administrator, suggested that terrorism 'is very avoidable ... if the right steps are taken to address human security in all its dimensions'.¹³⁴ The UNDP, most closely associated with the human security idea, has done specialized work on conflict through its Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery. Pioneering work included 'early warning' analysis in the post-Cold War Balkans, some touching on education.¹³⁵ UNDP's Regional Bureau for Europe and CIS (RBEC) since the early 1990s has been responsible for an expanded geographical mandate in former Soviet republics or territories and now has a Central Asian 'cluster unit'. In its analysis of the post-Soviet situation the UNDP also highlighted common education challenges (among others)

132 James D. Wolfensohn, 'Fight terrorism and poverty', *Development Outreach: Putting Knowledge to Work for Development*, Fall 2001 (<http://www1.worldbank.org/devoutreach/fall01/special.asp>).

133 World Bank, *Reshaping the Future: Education and Postconflict Reconstruction*, Washington DC, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 2005. Central Asia is not discussed, although Afghanistan is referred to briefly.

134 Mark Malloch Brown, Security or Poverty? America's Year of Choice, statement by UNDP Administrator to the World Affairs Council of Northern California, 13 December 2004 (<http://www.undp.org/dpa/statements/administ/2004/december/13dec04.html>).

135 For example, see *Kosovo Early Warning Report #3* (April–May 2003), pp. 4–6, http://www.kosovo.undp.org/Projects/EWS/ewrn3_eng.pdf; and for Bosnia note, UNDP, *Early Warning System Quarterly Report*, July–September 2003, p. 7 (<http://www.ews.undp.ba>).

when participating in a 2002 Turkmenistan conference for the CHS global report.¹³⁶ Kalman Mizsei, RBEC's Director, stressed that the UNDP's Central Asian role was to promote regional cooperation and strengthen regional institutions and frameworks including joint efforts against terrorism while reducing ethnic and international tensions.¹³⁷ UNDP's forthcoming Central Asian regional report will also be on human security.¹³⁸

The IsDB Group, established in 1975, has had a Central Asian Regional Office in Almaty since 1997 serving the five former Soviet republics, including field representatives stationed nearby in the Islamic Republic of Iran and Pakistan. Although the IsDB has steered clear of terrorism or classical security debates it offers a culturally relevant, human development model for supporting education and research about Islamic economics and sharia law. Most work is done internationally and in Central Asia, through the IsDB's Islamic Research and Training Institute (IRTI) founded in 1981.¹³⁹ More study is needed beyond this paper, however, to better understand the IsDB's or IRTI's role in reproducing variations of Islamic culture and any affects on public and private education systems or regional and human security.

Group Three – non-traditional (non-military) security organizations

A third group of multilaterals are those established primarily as 'human dimension' security organizations operating in Central Asia, where confidence-building, cooperative values, 'soft diplomacy', conflict prevention and peacebuilding aspects of security are

136 Tadbakhsh, op. cit.

137 Statement of Kalman Mizsei to the Human Security and Transition Round Table in Ashgabat, 22–23 April 2002 (http://www.humansecurity-chs.org/activities/outreach/ashgabat_mizsei.html).

138 See project description and links on *Central Asian Gateway* website and 'Central Asian HDR corner' (<http://www.cagateway.org/index.php?lng=1&hdr=CA&nu=201>).

139 For background see <http://www.isdb.org> and <http://www.irti.org>. The IsDB also shares some overlapping mandates and leadership with the OIC, discussed below along with ISESCO.

paramount, and which may (or not) include specific education institutions or programmes with non-military activities. There are two, the Western-led Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), and the Asian-led Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia (CICA). They share some similar values but are very different in available resources and activities. OSCE is older and institutionalized, and although born in the Cold War like the CSCE, it now has an extensive network of offices, field operations and programmes, some focused on education. CICA is more of an aspiring post-Cold War alliance (similar to CSCE in its early years) than institutionalized at field level.

OSCE's presence in the Balkans, Eastern Europe, the Caucasus and Central Asia has grown dramatically over the past decade, with fifty-five Member States from the West, Eastern Europe (including Russia) and now some Asian states now partly reflecting a 'Eurasian' identity. Its broader work in human rights education, capacity-building and training generally, and conflict analysis and resolution skills in particular, are intended as contributions to conflict prevention.¹⁴⁰ Working with local governments, stakeholders and international NGOs, OSCE has specifically focused on education as a security issue and conflict prevention or peacebuilding tool extensively applied in the Balkans,¹⁴¹ and it has dedicated some resources to analysing trends and lessons from such work.¹⁴²

140 Monika Wohlfeld, 'The OSCE as a primary instrument of conflict prevention in Europe: frameworks, achievements, and limitations of the OSCE's preventive action', in Albrecht Schnabel and David Carment (eds), *Conflict Prevention: From Rhetoric to Reality: Vol. 1. Organizations and Institutions*, Lanham, Md., Lexington Books, 2004, pp. 167–205.

141 Blair Blackwell, 'Investing in the future of BiH: Security and education are a "natural fit"', *OSCE Magazine*, Vol. 1, No. 2, May 2004, pp. 4–5. For one academic case study especially highlighting the OSCE see Wayne Nelles, 'Bosnian education for security and peacebuilding?', *International Peacekeeping*, Vol. 13, No. 2, June 2006, pp. 229–41.

142 Note especially, CPC Project Coordination Cell, OSCE Conflict Prevention Centre, *Review of OSCE Education Activities*, CIO/GAL 112/04 RESTRICTED, (OSCE Conflict Prevention Centre, 24 November 2004) discussing a range of education types (capacity-building, awareness-raising, and education courses) with budget breakdowns

OSCE now extends into Central Asia, with some new initiatives designed to build regional capacity for more constructively dealing with many forms of conflict (including terrorism) through educational means. The OSCE Academy in Bishkek, established in 2003, and a local partner in hosting this UNESCO-sponsored regional conference, is a case in point. OSCE's 'politico-military dimension' activities so far have included seminars on freedom of religion contributing, it says, to 'prevention of extremism and terrorism'.¹⁴³ OSCE also supports various conflict prevention projects involving youth across Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, collaborating with UNESCO, UNHCR and UNICEF among others. One was to 'strengthen intercultural dialogue among young people by developing ideas of a culture of peace and tolerance, cultural diversity and human rights and democracy', with another 'to encourage critical thinking' on human security debates through a Model United Nations.¹⁴⁴ OSCE's new Bishkek Academy also supports various educational and training activities, noting a core activity pillar as 'practice-oriented and demand-driven research'. Among its first projects was one focused on Education and Ethnicity in Central Asia,¹⁴⁵ which has some relevance to the interrelated education and 'social cohesion' issues noted above.

There are no similar Central Asian institutions, but Kazakhstan at the UN General Assembly (UNGA) in 1992 asserted regional leadership by launching CICA, modelled partly on OSCE. CICA now includes sixteen Member States within or surrounding Central Asia.¹⁴⁶ It gained momentum as a viable project, particularly during

according to four subregions (Central Asia, Caucasus, Eastern Europe and Southeast Europe) and the Secretariat; and different 'dimensions' (economic and environmental, human and multi-dimensional) or theme activities.

143 *Annual Report on OSCE Activities 2003*, Vienna, Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, 2003, p. 113.

144 'Central Asian Youth Camp in Co-operation with UNESCO', OSCE Project Document, 8 April 2003 (http://www.osce.org/osceprojects/show_project.php?id=426).

145 'The Second Regional Model United Nations Conference on Human Security in Central Asia, Project Document', *OSCE in Partnership with Centre for Democratic Education*, 28 March 2002 (http://www.osce.org/osceprojects/show_project.php?id=179).

146 Member States are Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, China, Egypt, India, Islamic Rep. of Iran, Israel, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Mongolia,

an international colloquium, 'Asian Security in the Context of Convening the CICA', held in Almaty on 21–22 October 1998. Higher education (in terms of local or international representatives from various scientific and research centres and institutions) played some role in CICA's more concrete conception, with an initial dialogue among scholars and others exploring new regional security system ideas. CICA foreign affairs ministers later met in Almaty in 1999, resulting in a declaration on principles.¹⁴⁷ Concerning education, CICA signatories pledged to 'develop cooperation based on mutual interests in the economic, social, humanitarian, environmental, information, scientific and cultural spheres', but stressed 'territorial integrity' of their states, no threats or use of force among them, and 'non-intervention in internal affairs' of members. Still CICA committed itself to respect, protect and promote human rights and fundamental freedoms as a contribution to political and social stability and peace. CICA's non-Western approach gained new support after NATO's bombing and occupation over Kosovo a few months earlier. Russia (sidelined by Western NATO decision-makers) and China (NATO bombed its Belgrade Embassy) as leading CICA members are non-interventionist champions.¹⁴⁸ And although OSCE itself was undermined in Kosovo during the 1999 war,¹⁴⁹ CICA now appears as an emergent Asian alternative.

Pakistan, Palestine National Administration, Russian Federation, Tajikistan, Turkey and Uzbekistan. Mongolia did not join until June 2001. Observer states are Indonesia, Japan, Lebanon, Malaysia, Rep. of Korea, Thailand, Ukraine, United States and Viet Nam. International organizations, such as the League of Arab States, OSCE, UN and others, also participate. See *Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia: History of Success* (<http://www.kazakhembus.com/CICA.html>).

- 147 See the Kazhak Government hosted site for background with this *Declaration on the Principles Guiding Relations among the CICA Member States*, September 1999, and other documents (<http://www.kazakhembus.com/Declaration.html>).
- 148 More research might actually be useful to examine the decision-making process at the time, and in what ways ideas have evolved among its members since.
- 149 For my own critique of the West's botched diplomacy (including a failed Education Accord) see: Nelles, op. cit. (2002 and 2005).

CICA's response to 'terrorism' has been consistent, each state allowing self-definition concerning which peoples or groups might be labelled as terrorists,¹⁵⁰ even amid considerable international and domestic civil society debate (quelled) on such questions. In 2002 CICA further elaborated its views. It suggested that terrorism itself was 'a direct violation of human rights and, in particular, the right to life, freedom, security and development', stressing that CICA was 'against using the fight against terrorism as a pretext for interference in the internal affairs of sovereign states.' Yet in response to perceived terrorist threats CICA underscored that 'terrorism cannot be attributed to religion, nationality, or civilization'. Also in 2002 the first CICA summit recalled Eurasia as a 'cradle' and a 'bridge' between the world's largest civilizations, pledging 'to comprehensively and actively promote' UNGA Resolution A/RES/56/6 on Dialogue among Civilizations.¹⁵¹ One context for this initiative was well-publicized Western scholars' 'clash of civilization' theories and their accusations of Islamic civilization (with Central Asia a cultural centre) as backward and a threat to the West, especially after 9/11. The 'dialogue of civilizations' idea also has cultural and education-based human security dimensions (discussed further below).

What such trends and contradictions mean for a long-term, non-traditional, non-military, Central Asian human security agenda remains to be seen. Kazakhstan appears most interested among the region's five core countries in advancing multilateral approaches to conflict prevention and strategic studies. The president's 2004 speech on terrorism (in the light of the 2004 Beslan school massacre) and other security challenges called for UN reform including a Council of Regional Organizations and the establishment of a Central Asian

150 CICA expressed solidarity with the Kyrgyz Republic in dealing with what it called 'terrorists', e.g. in *Statement of the Member States of the Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia (CICA) on the situation in the Kyrgyz Republic*, 14 September 1999. (<http://www.kazakhembus.com/CICAStatement.html>).

151 *CICA Declaration on Eliminating Terrorism and Promoting Dialogue among Civilizations*, 4 June 2002, Kazakhstan News Bulletin, Embassy of The Republic of Kazakhstan (http://www.kazakhembus.com/CICA_Declaration.html).

Preventive Diplomacy Center.¹⁵² But problematically, CICA so far has stressed terrorism largely as a threat to its Member States (sometimes connected to separatism concerns also expressed in SCO statements) rather than to persons. Some CICA states have been accused of human rights violations against alleged terrorists, as well as (concerning education) suppressing academic freedoms or student activism even more strongly amid the American-led ‘war on terror’.¹⁵³ Moreover, CICA has not openly advocated examining terrorism’s causes (arguably needing human security research) to advance solutions. Kazakhstan’s promotion of CICA regionalism actually preceded China’s SCO leadership, and while they are complementary they also compete.

Group Four – education-based development or non-traditional (non-military) security organizations

This fourth group represents educational organizations, based on collective, community or human security orientations, with children or youth-oriented concerns, and educational or broader scientific research-based, culturally relevant and dialogic approaches to terrorism and other forms of violent conflict paramount. For Central Asia I highlight three: the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), the United Nations Educational, Cultural and Scientific Organization (UNESCO) and a Muslim sister agency, the Islamic Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (ISESCO).

UNICEF’s work generally, and in its Central and Eastern Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CEE/CIS) region, has focused on children’s rights and their basic education, especially for girls, as well as physically protecting them from violence and abuse. However, UNICEF raised greater concern about recent trends. Director Carol Bellamy, at the UNICEF Executive Board’s 2004 session, said

152 Speech by H.E. Mr Kassymzhomart K. Tokaev, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Kazakhstan, at the fifty-ninth session of the United Nations General Assembly, New York, 24 September 2004.

153 See, for example Human Rights Watch, ‘Academic freedom’ excerpted from *World Report 2002* (<http://hrw.org/wr2k2/academicfreedom.html>).

that counter-terrorism activities had 'diverted resources and political will' from vital development work. And that 'human security did not just imply the absence of war and terrorism'. She stressed that children's human security allowed them to grow to adulthood 'in peace, health, and dignity' through free primary education, access to clean water, proper sanitation and preventing unnecessary deaths from measles or malaria. With terrorist threats to United Nations staff, however, she also stressed the need for 'partnerships' to provide collective action for children.¹⁵⁴

What resources have been diverted to fighting terrorism in Central Asia at the expense of children's security is unclear without more research. But UNICEF programmes are now guided by concerns over dramatic reductions in education spending since the Soviet Union's collapse, poverty creating fewer schooling opportunities, crumbling infrastructure, lack of equipment and textbooks, discrimination against girls' education and undervalued teachers.¹⁵⁵ UNICEF's aims to implement the 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child and 2000 Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), specifically contributing to human security in meeting children's individual needs, providing schooling opportunities, or mitigating threats to child health, survival or well-being. This includes providing alternatives for child victims or progenitors of violence (including terrorism) where there is community conflict or post-war reconstruction.¹⁵⁶ UNICEF was also involved in the 2002 CHS Central Asia Ashgabat meeting but has not widely engaged in human security or terrorism debates.¹⁵⁷

154 UNICEF Executive Board, session updates, June 2004 (http://www.unicef.org/about/execboard/index_23581.html).

155 <http://www.unicef.org/ceecis/education.html>

156 Canada played a role in strengthening UNICEF's mission and advancing related discussions in the UN Security Council on war-affected children and those in other forms of armed conflict as part of its own foreign policy agenda, noting that this was 'a human security priority'. Canada hosted an international conference on 'war-affected children' with a UNICEF partnership (<http://www.waraffectedchildren.gc.ca/menu-en.asp>). Also see *Canada and UNICEF Announce New Partnership to Protect War-Affected Children*, News Release, Gatineau, Quebec, Canadian International Development Agency, 29 May 2000.

157 One UNICEF representative attended from the Almaty office. See list of participants (http://www.humansecurity-chs.org/activities/outreach/ashgabat_participants.html).

Beyond UNICEF's child focus, among UN agencies UNESCO has the most obvious mandate linking education, terrorism and security concerns. UNESCO's founding Charter asserted since wars begin 'in minds' as well as 'ignorance of each other's ways and lives' it was through education that 'defences of peace' must be built. UNESCO was established as part of a global collective security system, and for six decades it has represented an explicitly non-military, educationally oriented vision. In response to recent events, UNESCO has also been more active in human security or terrorism debates with related programming. Internationally (directed from Paris), UNESCO has facilitated work on human security and 'dialogue of civilizations' with some discussion on educational causes and responses to terrorism. After 9/11 the October 2001 General Conference of UNESCO affirmed in its Resolution 2001-39 that 'a coherent and coordinated response by ... the United Nations system as a whole' was needed. It rejected 'the association of terrorism with any particular religion, religious belief or nationality' (i.e. not just focusing on Islam). And it stressed that UNESCO's contribution to eradicating terrorism was to promote 'values of tolerance, universality, mutual understanding, respect for cultural diversity and the promotion of a culture of peace ... and based upon its mandate 'within its areas of competence - education, science, culture and communication.'¹⁵⁸ At its 2003 General Conference in Paris, Member States agreed to develop 'regional frameworks' for promoting human security through UNESCO's Major Programme III -- Social and Human Sciences with our Bishkek conference contributing to Asia-Pacific regional conceptualization. Its 2003 General Conference Resolution 47 emphasized that 'a commitment to dialogue among civilizations and cultures represents also a commitment against terrorism', suggesting that more 'concrete activities and actions ...' would help.¹⁵⁹

158 General Resolutions, Resolution 39, 'Call for international cooperation to prevent and eradicate acts of terrorism', *Records of the General Conference, 31st Session, Paris, 2001 Proceedings, Vol. 1 Resolutions*, Paris, United Nations Educational, Cultural and Scientific Organization, 2003, p. 79.

159 General Resolutions, Resolution 47, 'New perspectives in UNESCO's activities pertaining to the dialogue of civilizations, including in particular follow-up to the New Delhi Ministerial Conference' (adopted 16 October 2003), *Records of the General Conference, 32nd Session*,

In 2004 UNESCO collaborated in a conference on education towards preventing extremism and terrorism that included a few Central Asian participants.¹⁶⁰ However, UNESCO's work in Central Asia has been limited. Among other UN agencies it established a subregional office in Almaty in 1994, now covering four countries: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.¹⁶¹ UNESCO's Central Asian office mandate covers all sectors – Education, Social and Human Sciences, Culture, and Communications and Information. It has done little work on human security or terrorism issues, and (although UNESCO was well represented at our 2005 Bishkek conference) had no delegate at the 2002 Ashgabat CHS meeting. However, UNESCO has facilitated regional dialogue and strategic planning among social scientists and policy-makers from research agencies, national academies of sciences and academic institutions. Those discussions contributed to the UNESCO/Kazakhstan Social and Human Sciences Strategy for 2004–05. Discussion topics and identified priorities included the 'common threat of international terrorism' and 'penetration of ideological separatism' through education.¹⁶²

Much of UNESCO's work has relevance for debates and potential responses to terrorism, especially with respect to its 2004–2005

Paris, 29 September to 17 October 2003, Vol. 1 Resolutions, Paris, United Nations Educational, Cultural and Scientific Organization, 2004, pp. 87–88.

160 I attended, and it was called 'Education for Shared Values for Intercultural and Interfaith Understanding: Education Towards Preventing Extremism and Terrorism – Curriculum Design: Innovative and Effective Strategies', 28 November to 3 December 2004, Adelaide, Australia.

161 For background see <http://www.unesco.kz>. Turkmenistan, unusually, however, is overseen through UNESCO's Central and South–West Asia subregional cluster office, based in Tehran, which is also responsible for Afghanistan, Islamic Rep. of Iran and Pakistan. I further discuss Iranian-led Islamic multilateralism and security perspectives with respect to ISESCO below.

162 'Central Asian social scientists for the first time gather in Almaty to elaborate UNESCO Regional Social Sciences Strategy', 7 May 2003; 'UNESCO/Kazakhstan Social and Human Sciences Strategy', 24 August 2003, UNESCO Almaty website (<http://www.unesco.kz>).

biennium strategy including Culture Sector objectives for ‘protecting culture diversity and encouraging pluralism and dialogue between cultures and civilizations,’ as well as ‘capacity–building for culture conflict resolution.’ The Social and Human Sciences sector strategy also noted ‘the post–9/11 international order poses a new challenge in terms of human security ...’ Among several new identified tasks are: ‘establishment of new institutional linkages between research and training programmes,’ as well as creating a ‘Central Asia network on social and human sciences.’¹⁶³ But this includes no specific budget allocations or activities for conflict–related education and terrorism analysis or its prevention. UNESCO’s challenge, given its broad mandate and limited budget, is resources, staffing and capacity for focused human security work.

The final education–based, non–traditional multilateral security organization I discuss is the Islamic Scientific Educational and Cultural Organization (ISESCO), a specialized agency founded in 1980 as part of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) system. ISESCO and UNESCO also signed a cooperation agreement in 1984. The OIC itself was a response to perceived ‘dangers’ or threats to the umma (global Islamic community),¹⁶⁴ particularly problems arising from the Israeli–Palestinian conflict from the late 1960s on. ISESCO’s Charter objectives include the need to ‘consolidate understanding among Muslim peoples and contribute to the achievement of world peace and security,’ while better bringing Islamic culture into educational curricula. With respect to Islamic community perceptions of security, ISESCO is also chartered to ‘protect the independence of Islamic thought against cultural invasion and distortion factors, and safeguard the features and distinct characteristics of the Islamic civilization; (and) to safeguard the Islamic identity of Muslims in non–Islamic countries.’¹⁶⁵

163 *UNESCO in Central Asia: Strategies for 2004–2005*, brochure, Almaty, UNESCO Cluster Office, n.d., pp. 19–21.

164 ‘The Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) home page, and ‘OIC in Brief’, n.d. (<http://www.oic-oci.org>).

165 Article 4: Objectives, Charter of the Islamic Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, Rabat, ISESCO (<http://www.isesco.org.ma/English/presentation/ISESCO/Charter.asp>).

Although ISESCO's international headquarters are in Morocco, Iran has asserted leadership in Islamic Asia. Iran also, partly in response to Western 'clash of civilizations' theories and post-Cold War realities, attempted an international dialogue process to de-escalate tensions and prevent open conflict. In 1998 Iran actually called upon the UNGA for a new initiative to advance a 'culture of peace' and avoid 'domination, unilateralism, confrontation and exclusion'.¹⁶⁶ This led to the International Year for the Culture of Peace in 2000, and 2001 being declared as the UN Year of Dialogue Among Civilizations. At the same time the United States has long declared Iran a 'terrorist state', more strongly after 9/11.¹⁶⁷ Yet even though the US rejoined UNESCO in 2003 partly as strategic element of its global counter-terrorism strategy,¹⁶⁸ it has shunned dialogue approaches with what it calls terrorist states. One Iranian-led multilateral initiative was to establish ISESCO's Regional Office in Tehran, responsible for twelve countries including Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.¹⁶⁹ The human security and educational implications need further research, but some might be done in cooperation with other multilateral organizations, international scholars and regional stakeholders.

Conclusions: towards a new multilateral Track II conflict prevention agenda?

In sum, closer examination of Central Asian multilateral institutions is needed to assess trends. We need to better understand if violence prevention is a principal normative human security value, how human security (from all three perspectives: development, personal protection and legal), as well as education, is conceived, what approaches to terrorism are now taken, and if new initiatives might be better conceived or initiated.

166 Full text of President Khatami's speech at the United Nations General Assembly, 21 September 1998 (http://www.salamiran.org/events/UN_GeneralAssembly/speech_khatami_un.htm).

167 George W. Bush, 'The President's State of the Union Address', 29 January 2002, Washington DC, White House.

168 'Remarks by Mrs Bush to UNESCO Plenary Session - Paris', White House press release, 29 September 2003 (<http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/09/20030929-6.html>).

169 For background see <http://www.isesco-tehran.org>.

Assessments could be better made in the light of particular events (e.g. Uzbekistan's recent Andijan incident as a human security failure) or trends (geopolitical realignments and competing military deployments or training programmes among Russia's CIS/CSTO, China's SCO and the US-led NATO). Most recently, for example, when the United States finally called for an inquiry into the Andijan incident, SCO at its most recent meeting backed Uzbekistan asking the US to close its air bases, although Kyrgyzstan's will remain for now.¹⁷⁰ The SCO move was partly to deter future Western interference on human rights or human security grounds. And while Russia and China have both asserted new power through SCO, and have sometimes been at odds, together they view their own military, counter-terrorism and strategic objectives more important than American interests. Meanwhile, CICA's non-military, human security-oriented, preventive diplomacy and dialogic orientation (especially with respect to education and terrorism issues) appears a less important priority than its worries over Western non-interference in the sovereignty of Central Asian states.

More work generally is needed to better understand Central Asian human security and education linkages with regionally relevant conflict-prevention approaches to terrorism. Questions remain about what role human security analysts and practitioners should play to conceive and implement new models and norms. But to understand current trends and challenges the common adage 'follow the money' could be revealing. Among various multilateral institutions operating regionally, military security models and investments dominate or compete while human security initiatives are distorted, marginalized and under-funded in fighting terrorism. A rough comparison of NATO's PfP, education, training and science programmes combined (in addition to US bilateral IMET allocations and others supporting NATO), OSCE education and/or training work, and UNESCO budgets for Central Asia, would be a good starting point to illustrate. NATO's education, training and science programme budgets are consistently tens of millions of dollars annually. OSCE's total education activities

170 'Special Report: Central Asia's Neighbours Close Ranks', *IWPR'S Reporting Central Asia*, No. 396, 15 July 2005; Nick Paton Walsh, 'Uzbekistan kicks US out of key military base: Pentagon given marching orders by Asia strongman', *Guardian Weekly*, 5-11 August 2005, p. 11.

by contrast are a small fraction of this. Over the past five years they totalled just €10.4 million, with only €2.9 million to Central Asia, while the Bishkek Academy was a flagship initiative. UNESCO's entire regular budget, for more than forty Asia–Pacific regional countries over two years, is just US\$46 million, with social sciences (where human security programmes are carried out) getting just US\$2.4 million. The Almaty office budget for Central Asia as whole is similarly small, with its social sciences work miniscule compared with OSCE or NATO, while allocations for specific human security work from UNESCO's regular budget are negligible, with details unclear without more extensive research. But except for a modest amount allotted for its global work, UNESCO relies largely on uncertain 'extrabudgetary funding'.¹⁷¹

Further research might also explore how OSCE and UNESCO in particular can better facilitate non–military, non–violent, conflict–prevention oriented education and human security work. Others have already argued that the UN and OSCE can help to check international or Central Asian regional power competition while better coordinating international confidence–building and conflict–prevention efforts.¹⁷² Broader studies of Central Asia have already stressed, importantly, that many of the region's conflicts were and are 'preventable'. Some lay blame on leaders' policies, particularly campaigns to eliminate some Islamic groups and organizations. They call for more international community engagement with reforms but have worried of weakened possibilities with tightening regional security through military

171 These approximations hint at a broader picture for future research. But for preliminary sources to begin a study with a critical comparison and evaluation of specific programmes (including all multilaterals operating in Central Asia) and budgets for their human security impacts or outcomes see: (1) NATO's Joint Education and Training (JET) and Science initiatives at www.act.nato.int/organization/transformation/jetindex.htm and www.nato.int/science pointing to a labyrinth of funding schemes, fellowships and direct budget allocations for education, training, and science activities (many affecting Central Asia); (2) for OSCE note the OSCE Conflict Prevention Centre, 24 November 2004, op. cit; (3) for UNESCO see *United Nations Educational, Cultural and Scientific Organization, 2004–2005 Approved Programme and Budget*, 32 C5, Paris, UNESCO, 2004, esp. p. 324, indicating most recent biennial allocations.

172 Roy Allison, 'Structures and frameworks for security policy cooperation in Central Asia', in Allison and Jonson (eds), op. cit., pp. 219–46.

means.¹⁷³ Other scholars suggested (initially in the light of the 1999–2000 Islamic militant unrest in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan) that a critical concern for Central Asian states has been ‘lack of capacity to anticipate and analyze possible and recent conflicts.’ And that more support for education and training in conflict prevention would help, with research on causes of the region’s conflicts, analysing ‘alternative, non–violent paths to sustainable peace’, and encouraging new NGO and academic cooperation.¹⁷⁴ With respect to how the region’s leaders might support a conflict prevention agenda, however, there is still tension between Soviet (or now Chinese) authoritarian governance on Islamic militancy issues, and new conflict prevention approaches.¹⁷⁵ Similar criticisms might be made of NATO’s military approach, undermining UNESCO or OSCE objectives. Meanwhile alternative approaches or Track II research and dialogue networks have little precedent or sustained tradition in Central Asia, compared with North–East or South–East Asia. Yet many NGOs and multilaterals are involved in human security work,¹⁷⁶ with some educational collaboration.

Many are concerned about terrorism and religious extremism but worry about simplistic tendencies to equate Central Asian Islam with extremism while governments undermine human rights and religious freedoms to serve a ‘war against terror.’ Some suggest better developing civil society or NGO capacity for monitoring and evaluation research, especially in the Fergana Valley, to reduce tensions. This, Tabyshalieva says, could include more research on causes of conflicts and early warning tools, fostering regional

173 John Schoeberlein, ‘Regional introduction: a host of preventable conflicts’, in Monique Mekenkamp, Paul van Tongeren and Hans van de Veen (eds), *Searching for Peace in Central and South Asia: An Overview of Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding Activities*, Boulder, Colo., Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002, pp. 66–75.

174 Quoted from pp. 76–77 of Anara Tabyshalieva, ‘The conflict prevention agenda in Central Asia’, in Schnabel and Carment (eds), *op. cit.*, pp. 61–80.

175 For an exploration of some tensions see Sharam Akharazadeh and Rafis Ahazov, ‘Status quo policy and conflict prevention agenda in Central Asia’, in Schnabel and Carment (eds), *op. cit.*, pp. 81–101.

176 Note various case studies as well as a Directory of Central Asian and other organizations in Mekenkamp, van Tongeren and van de Veen (eds), *op. cit.*, pp. 507–617.

cooperation, and more external aid with conditionality to encourage democratic reforms and respect for human rights. Pragmatically, Tabyshalieva also suggests more international community attention to make conflict prevention a priority by establishing a coalition of governmental and nongovernmental organizations, scholars, religious leaders and others.¹⁷⁷ I concur, suggesting a proactive and strategic approach, building on experiences of other Track II organizations and research strengths among the International Crisis Group, other NGOs and local or international scholars, working especially with multilateral institutions.

More strategic multilateral cooperation in particular might help overcome policy coherence problems. OSCE, UNESCO, UNICEF, ISESCO, ADB–OSI and CICA especially among Central Asian multilaterals might better collaborate to strengthen the region’s academic and non–governmental teaching and research capacity on conflict prevention. This could complement United Nations’ ‘dialogue of civilization’¹⁷⁸ initiatives with more ISESCO cooperation, but also expanding UNESCO’s social sciences work on human security.¹⁷⁹ New undertakings could build on the Council for Security Cooperation in Asia Pacific (CSCAP), the Asia–Pacific Roundtable (APR) and similar non–traditional security dialogue institutions or activities,¹⁸⁰ with a

177 Anara Tabyshalieva, ‘Policy Recommendations: some strategies for stability’, in Mekenkamp, van Tongeren and van de Veen (eds), op. cit., pp. 76–84.

178 The United Nations Year of Dialogue Among Civilizations was 2001, with UNESCO as lead agency. But the Islamic Rep. of Iran and the Muslim world actually led preparations when Tehran with the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) hosted in 1999 an ‘Islamic Symposium on Dialogue among Civilizations’.

179 Objectives were initially outlined in *United Nations Educational, Cultural and Scientific Organization, 2004–2005 Approved Programme and Budget*, 32 C5, Paris, UNESCO, 2004, pp. 168–69. The funded sector was Major Programme III – Social and Human Sciences. In September 2005 the UNESCO–OSCE–Academy–in–Bishkek International Conference on ‘Human Security and Peace in Central Asia’ will contribute.

180 For some background to conflict prevention and peacebuilding issues, institutions and approaches in the broader Asia–Pacific region see Desmond Ball, ‘Security cooperation in Asia Pacific: official and unofficial responses’, in Annelies Heijmans, Nicola Simmonds and Hans

Central Asian and human security focus. This might involve a more strategic engagement with NATO's PfP initiative and ISESCO together, for example. But new activities could focus on education, stand-alone or in working group format. More collaborative, empirically based case-study research could examine education, terrorism and security issues and relationships. In closing, I suggest continuing the OSCE-UNESCO cooperation initiated in Bishkek. A new partnership could advance regional research cooperation, education and dialogue while significantly contributing to Central Asian human security.

van de Veen (eds), *Searching for Peace in Asia Pacific: An Overview of Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding Activities*, Boulder, Colo., Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2004, pp. 37-52. Case studies and a Directory are provided in the volume.

APPENDICES

INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON HUMAN SECURITY AND PEACE IN CENTRAL ASIA BISHKEK, KYRGYZSTAN 8 AND 9 SEPTEMBER 2005


AGENDA

Wednesday, 7 September 2005 19:00–20:30	Welcoming reception Café Admiral
Thursday, 8 September 2005	
08:30–09:00	Registration
09:00–09:30	Opening Welcoming speeches and opening addresses Mr Jerzy Skuratowicz , UN Resident Coordinator Ambassador Markus Muller , Head of the OSCE Centre in Bishkek Ms Adash Iskenderovna Toktosunova , Executive Secretary, Kyrgyz Republic National Commission for UNESCO Ms Moufida Goucha , Chief of the Philosophy and Human Sciences Section, UNESCO
	Session I Reviewing the Study on the Ethical, Normative and Educational Frameworks for the Promotion of Human Security in Central Asia Moderator I – Dr Tim Epkenhans
09:30–10:30	Presentation of the study by Dr Anara Tabyshalieva Research Fellow, Institute for Regional Studies, Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan
10:30–10:45	Coffee break
10:45–12:30	Open discussion
12:30–14:00	Lunch

	Session II The Concept of Human Security and Peace in Central Asia Moderator II – Dr Syed Sikander Mehdi
14:00–15:30	Presentation of papers by invited experts ‘Human security as a conceptual, operational, and evaluation tool for Central Asia’ – Dr Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh , Director/Professor, Centre for Peace and Conflict Resolution, Sciences Po, Paris, France ‘Education, terrorism, and multilateralism in Central Asia: problems and prospects for new human security research cooperation’ – Dr Wayne Nelles , Managing Director/Senior Associate, OIKOS Research & Consulting Inc./Centre for Global Studies, University of Victoria, Canada ‘The economic factors of human security in Central Asia’ – Dr Michael Hall , Project Director, International Crisis Group (ICG Central Asia), Tajikistan ‘Culture, ideology and peacebuilding: perspectives on human security in Central Asia’ – Mr John Heathershaw , London School of Economics ‘Social implications of transformations of national economies: and human security in Central Asia’ – Dr Bulat Khusainov , Senior Scientific Fellow, Institute of Economics, Ministry of Education and Science, Kazakhstan
15:30–15:45	Coffee break
15:45–17:15	Open discussion
17:15–17:30	Closing discussion of the first conference day Moderators I and II
Friday, 9 September 2005	
	Session III Culture, Religion and Society: Human Security and Peace in Central Asia Moderator III – Dr M. Tavakol

09:00–10:30	<p>Presentation of papers by invited experts</p> <p>‘Islam and human security’ – Dr Ibrohim Usmonov, Deputy Minister of Culture, Tajikistan</p> <p>‘Islam in Central Asia: today and tomorrow’ – Dr Saodat Olimova, Director, Sharq Research Center, Tajikistan</p> <p>‘Islamism and human security in Central Asia’ – Dr Tim Epkenhans, Director, OSCE Academy, Kyrgyzstan</p> <p>‘Colonial legacies, political socialization, and human security’ – Dr Aftab Kazi, Professor, American University – Central Asia, Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan</p> <p>‘Economic integration as a factor of peace and security in Central Asia’ – Dr Serik Primbetov, Deputy General Secretary EuroAsEc, Kazakhstan</p> <p>‘A Peace University for Central Asia and beyond’ – Dr Syed Sikander Mehdi, Professor, University of Karachi, Pakistan</p>
10:30–10:45	Coffee break
10:45–12:30	Open discussion
12:30–14:00	Lunch
	<p>Session IV</p> <p>Reviewing Human Security in Central Asia: Cooperation vs Isolation</p> <p>Moderator IV – Dr Wayne Nelles</p>
14:00–15:30	<p>Presentation of papers by invited experts</p> <p>‘War against terrorism: spheres of cooperation between Pakistan and Central Asian States’ – Ms Asma Shakir Khawaja, Islamabad Policy Research Institute, Pakistan</p> <p>‘Silk Road as a historical framework for peace and cooperation in the region’ – Dr M. Tavakol, Secretary General, National Commission for UNESCO, Islamic Republic of Iran</p> <p>‘Human security situation in Central Asia: a view from Uzbekistan’ – Mr Bakhtiyar Irismetov, Director, Institute for Strategic and Interregional Research, Uzbekistan</p> <p>‘Problems and Prospects for Cooperation in Central Asia: Strengthening Human Security in the Region’ – H.E. Muratbeck Imanaliev, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary/Professor, American University – Central Asia, Kyrgyzstan</p> <p>‘The combat on drug trafficking in Central Asia: is there a unified strategy?’ – Mr Chary Atayev, National Project Coordinator, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Turkmenistan</p>

15:30–15:45	Coffee break
15:45–16:30	<i>Open discussion</i>
16:30–17:00	UNESCO’s Human Security Programme Ms Claudia Maresia, SHS/FPH/PHS, UNESCO
17:00–18:00	Closing discussion and proposals of final recommendations for the promotion of human security in Central Asia Four Moderators and Ms Anara Tabyshalieva
18:00–18:15	<i>Closure of International Conference</i>
19:30–21:30	<i>Farewell dinner</i> Restaurant Four Seasons



**INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON
HUMAN SECURITY AND PEACE IN CENTRAL ASIA
BISHKEK, KYRGYZSTAN
8 AND 9 SEPTEMBER 2005**

LIST OF PARTICIPANTS

REGIONAL EXPERTS

	Name	Position	Country
	Mr Mohammed Tavakol	Secretary-General, Iranian National Commission for UNESCO	Islamic Republic of Iran
	Dr Syed Sikander Mehdi	Professor, Department of International Relations, University of Karachi	Pakistan
	Dr Serik Primbetov	Deputy General Secretary, Eurasian Economic Community	Kazakhstan
	Dr Bulat D. Khusainov	Senior Scientific Fellow, Institute of Economics, Ministry of Education and Science	Kazakhstan
	Mr Muratbeck Imanaliev	H.E. Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary, Professor of International Politics, American University-Central Asia, Bishkek	Kyrgyzstan
	Mr Aftab Kazi	Visiting Lecturer/Fellow, American University Central Asia, Bishkek	Kyrgyzstan
	Ms Raya Kadyrova	President, NGO Foundation for Tolerance	Kyrgyzstan
	Ms Anara Tabyshaliev	Research Fellow, Institute for Regional Studies, Bishkek	Kyrgyzstan
	Dr Tim Epkenhans	Director, OSCE Academy	Kyrgyzstan, Germany
	Mr Michael Hall	Project Director, International Crisis Group (ICG Central Asia)	Tajikistan
	Ms Saodat Olimova	Director, Sharq Research Center	Tajikistan

Mr Chary Atayev	National Project Coordinator, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)	Turkmenistan
Mr Bahtiyar Irismetov	Director, Institute for Strategic and Interregional Research	Uzbekistan

OTHER REGIONAL PARTICIPANTS

H.E. Umurzak Uzbekovich Uzbekov	Ambassador of the Republic of Kazakhstan in the Kyrgyz Republic	Kazakhstan
H.E. Markus Muller	Head of OSCE Center in Bishkek	Kyrgyzstan
Dr Jerzy Skuratowicz	UN Resident Coordinator, Bishkek	Kyrgyzstan
Mr Lehmann	First Secretary, Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany	Germany
Mr Mohammad Isa Mos- bah	Third Secretary, Embassy of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan	Afghanistan
Ms Gulium Akkazieva	First Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Kyrgyz Republic	Kyrgyzstan
Mr Almaz Idirisov	Third Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Kyrgyz Republic	Kyrgyzstan
Mr Karavai Asanaliev	Head of the Department of Inter- national Affairs, Academy of the Ministry of Internal Affairs	Kyrgyzstan
Ms Yodjna Patel	Second Secretary, Embassy of India	India
Ms Rakhat Stamova	Senior Scientific Fellow, Institute of Philosophy and Law, National Academy of Science	Kyrgyzstan
Ms Hiroe Komiya	Project Formulation Advisor, JICA	Japan
Ms Aidai Bayalieva	Assistant Programme Officer, JICA	Kyrgyzstan
Ms Djamilia Abdra- khmanova	Director, Association of Teachers for Democratic Transformations, Bishkek	Kyrgyzstan
Ms Anara Aldasheva	Researcher, Institute of Continual Education, Bishkek	Kyrgyzstan
Ms Ekaterina Paniklova	UNDP Programme Officer	Kyrgyzstan

	Ms Raushan Nauryzbaeva	Director, Fund for 'Development of Civil Society', Almaty	Kazakhstan
	Mr Kumar Bekbolotov	Programs Coordinator, IWPR Kyrgyz Republic, Bishkek	Kyrgyzstan
	Ms Atyrkul Alisheva	Director, Institute for Regional Studies, Bishkek	Kyrgyzstan
	Mr Mels Bekboyev	Head of Kyrgyz Army Headquarters, First Deputy Minister of Defense, Major-General	Kyrgyzstan
	Mr Erkin Kasymbekov	Country Team Leader, Counterpart International	Kyrgyzstan

KYRGYZ NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR UNESCO

	Ms Adash Iskenderovna Toktosunova	Executive Secretary, Kyrgyz National Commission for UNESCO	Kyrgyzstan
	Ms Asel Jakypbekova	Education Specialist, Kyrgyz National Commission for UNESCO	Kyrgyzstan

INTERNATIONAL EXPERTS


	Mr Wayne Nelles	Senior Associate, Sustainable Development Research Institute (SDRI)	Canada
	Mr Bakhtier Babaev	Civilian Peace Operations – DFA Federal Department of Foreign Affairs – Political Division IV – Human Security, Berne	Switzerland
	Mr John Heathershaw	Department of International Relations, London School of Economics	United Kingdom

UNESCO HEADQUARTERS, PARIS

	Ms Moufida Goucha	Chief of the Philosophy and Human Sciences Section, UNESCO, Paris	France
	Ms Claudia Maresia	Assistant Programme Specialist, Philosophy and Human Sciences Section, UNESCO, Paris	France

UNESCO ALMATY OFFICE

	Ms Laura M. Kennedy	Programme Specialist for Social and Human Sciences, UNESCO Office in Almaty	Kazakhstan
	Ms Paz Fernandez Herrero	SHS Programme Assistant, UNESCO Office in Almaty	Kazakhstan



**INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON
HUMAN SECURITY AND PEACE IN CENTRAL ASIA
BISHKEK, KYRGYZSTAN
8 AND 9 SEPTEMBER 2005**

SYNTHESIS OF PRESENTATIONS AND PAPERS

The two-day conference on Human Security and Peace in Central Asia began with the presentation of **Ms Anara Tabyshalieva's** (Institute for Regional Studies, Kyrgyzstan) study 'Ethical, Normative and Educational Frameworks for the Promotion of Human Security in Central Asia'. Ms Tabyshalieva's study reflected in detail on the broad range of interconnected issues of human security in Central Asia and provided a supporting structure for the discussion during the conference.

After a brief introduction on the concept of human security, Ms Tabyshalieva pointed out the importance of education in all Central Asian countries, in view of the current situation of deterioration of primary education in the region, as shown by some of the empirical data. She assessed the availability and reliability of the current empirical data on the region, while calling for a review of the present data collection (an argument supported by several participants). In her paper, Ms Tabyshalieva identified the lack of political participation, the economic transition, drug trafficking, HIV/AIDS, environmental hazards and forced migration as major threats to human security in Central Asia.

Ms Tabyshalieva's presentation especially emphasized the issue of human security for women in the region, called for the active inclusion of the various societal actors, and recommended stronger cooperation on issues of human security in Central Asia at regional level. It triggered a lively discussion among the participants of the conference in which her central arguments (education and cooperation) were upheld, while some of the regional differences were highlighted.

In the afternoon session **Mr Wayne Nelles** (OIKOS Research & Consulting Inc., Canada) reflected on education, terrorism and multilateralism in Central Asia. Mr Nelles addressed the issue of religious education and emphasized the importance of multilateral structures for implementing a comprehensive approach to human security. He referred to mechanisms and structures in South–East Asia which promoted regional cooperation and which could prove relevant in Central Asia.

Mr Michael Hall (ICG Central Asia, Kyrgyzstan), in his paper on the economic factors of human security in Central Asia, focused on the desperate situation of cotton farmers in Tajikistan, and on the difficult security situation at the Afghan–Tajik border after the withdrawal of the Russian border forces. Mr Hall underlined the importance of legal literacy among rural communities and a fundamental land reform.

Mr John Heathershaw (London School of Economics, United Kingdom) presented a paper on the culture, ideology and peacebuilding perspectives on human security in Central Asia, in which he analysed the present situation after the civil war in Tajikistan. Mr Heathershaw elaborated on the concepts of peace and conflict, and how they are understood in the post–conflict context of Tajikistan.

Mr Serik Primbetov (Deputy General Secretary, Eurasian Economic Community, Kazakhstan) assessed the enormous challenges of the economic and social transition in Central Asia following the collapse of the Soviet Union. Mr Primbetov called for stronger economic and political integration in Central Asia, still taking into account regional economic differences.

The discussion that followed summed up the various issues concerning human security in Central Asia: education and economic development, as well as the political participation of various social actors. Moreover, participants promoted the idea of integrating the various cultural factors into the discussion on human security.

The second day of the conference began with a session on ‘Culture, Religion and Society: Human Security and Peace in Central Asia’.

Mr Aftab Kazi (American University in Central Asia, Kyrgyzstan) reflected on colonial legacies, political socialization and human security. Prof. Kazi pointed out that while ideologically coloured conflicts may appear as part of colonial legacies, politics and international cooperation are the main means to conflict resolution, and that education should provide societies with norms of human interaction towards the prevention of the escalation of conflicts.

Ms Saodat Olimova (Director, Sharq Research Center, Tajikistan) in her presentation on Islam in Central Asia today and tomorrow, analysed the current attitudes of Central Asian societies towards religious issues. Ms Olimova gave detailed information on religious attitudes and tendencies, especially in Tajikistan where Islamic movements and orientations had an influence on the civil war and in the post-conflict rehabilitation.

Mr Tim Epkenhans (OSCE Academy, Kyrgyzstan) presented a paper on Islamism and human security in Central Asia. Mr Epkenhans elaborated on political and Islamist groups in Central Asia, setting their manifestation into the context of social, political and economic development in the region.

Mr Bulat Khusainov (Institute of Economics, Kazakhstan) gave a comparative analysis of economic development in Central Asia. Mr Khusainov highlighted the issues of economic transition, unemployment, migration and further macroeconomic indicators.

Mr Syed Sikander Mehdi (University of Karachi, Pakistan) in his paper on a Peace University for Central Asia and beyond, called for stronger regional cooperation on issues of peace, security and education. Mr Mehdi stressed that Central Asia faces a set of similar threats to human security and needs a comprehensive and regional approach.

The concluding discussion dealt with issues of Islamism, education and the attitudes of the Central Asian population towards religious issues. The participants emphasized that Central Asia has always been a region of religious diversity and tolerance.

The afternoon session on 'Reviewing Human Security in Central Asia' opened with a presentation by **Mr Bakhtiar Babaev** (Consultant for the Swiss Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tajikistan) on the religious–secular dialogue in educational institutions. Mr Babaev reported on the programme of civil education for religious students in northern Tajikistan and stressed the importance of mutual understanding and respect.

Mr Bakhtiyar Irismetov (Institute for Strategic and Interregional Research, Uzbekistan) reflected in his presentation on the human security situation in Central Asia as seen from Uzbekistan on the necessity of open societies and pluralism in order to establish the principles of human security in the region. Mr Irismetov urged stronger regional cooperation on this issue.

Mr Muratbeck Imanaliev (American University in Central Asia) spoke on the problems and prospects of human security in Central Asia. Mr Imanaliev dealt with the political developments in the region and their impact on human security, while criticizing the lack of political will among regional leaders.

Mr Chary Atayev (UNODC, Turkmenistan), in his paper on a unified strategy in the combat on drug trafficking in Central Asia, discussed drug trafficking as a threat to human security in the region, highlighting the significance of the current cooperation of various actors and stressing the importance of ongoing joint efforts in order to eradicate the transit of drugs through Central Asia.

In the concluding discussion, the participants stressed the importance of a continuing dialogue on human security issues in the region, and promoted the idea of holding workshops and conferences, which should include the different governments and civil society actors in the region; highlighting the fact that most human security issues are shared by all Central Asian states. They also criticized the lack of regional cooperation in order to accommodate human security.

As part of the closing session, Ms Tabyshalieva reviewed both recommendations she had previously presented, as well as the recommendations provided by the participants during the conference, highlighting education as one of the most important human security issues in the region. She invited international organizations such as the UN and OSCE to engage in the discussion and promotion of an ethical and normative approach to human security in Central Asia.

All participants called for a sustainable intercultural dialogue and a continuing discussion on the concept of human security in order to promote its understanding in the region.